Yale University Press NEW HAVEN & 9 780300"089028 - Sito Mistero

210 — TALIBANand antagonism. The USA is the only world power which has the abilityto influence all the neighbouring states to stop interfering in Afghanistan.It has to do so with far more commitment than it has demonstrated sofar.Pakistan, weakened by the demise of its strategic partnership with theUSA after the end of the Cold War and in the throes of a deep economiccrisis, was nevertheless determined to extend its zone of influence bytrying to nominate the next government in Kabul. Faced with a belligerentIndian neighbour seven times its size, Pakistan's obsession with securityhas naturally shaped its domestic politics and foreign policy concernssince it was created in 1947. But the military-bureaucratic-intelligenceelite that has guided Pakistan's destiny since the 1950s has never allowedcivil society to function. Only this elite has had the right to determinethe nature of the threat to Pakistan's national security and its solutions —not elected governments, parliament, civic organizations or even commonsense.Since 1988, four elected governments have been dismissed, ten governmentshave come and gone and domestic stability is still as distant adream as ever. 7 With such deep crises of identity, political legitimacy,economic mismanagement and social polarization, the elite has neverthelessindulged in the worst example of imperial overstretch by any thirdworld country in the latter half of this century. Pakistan is now fightingproxy wars on two fronts, in Kashmir and Afghanistan and even thoughthe repercussions from these wars - Islamic fundamentalism, drugs,weapons and social breakdown - are now aggressively spilling into thecountry, there is no reappraisal or policy review. Pakistan is now ripe for aTaliban-style Islamic revolution, which would almost certainly jeopardizestability in the Middle East, South and Central Asia.What Pakistan's policy-makers have failed to realize is that any stablegovernment in Kabul will have to depend on Pakistan for reconstruction,foodstuffs, fuel and access to the outside world. Pakistan's own economywould benefit as it would provide workers, technicians and materials forAfghanistan's reconstruction. The Afghan refugees would return, easingthe financial burden of sustaining them and Pakistan could begin to reassertsome control over its dilapidated state institutions and borders.While Pakistan has had a forward policy in Afghanistan, Iran's interferencehas essentially been defensive, maintaining a limited influence andresisting a total Taliban takeover. But Iran has contributed heavily to thefragmentation of Afghanistan by playing the Shia card, the Persian languagecard and keeping the very ethnic groups it supports divided amongstthemselves. The disparateness of the Hazaras and the Uzbeks, the twoethnic groups Iran has provided the most aid to, is sufficient to show howIran's policy of divide and rule has devastated the anti-Taliban alliance.CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF AFGHANISTAN ~ 211Iran's policies have reflected the intense power struggle within the Iranianelite which has only intensified in the last two years.Moreover, the complete breakdown of trust and understanding betweenIran and Pakistan has set back the peace process and proved ruinous forthe Afghans. There is no common ground between the two states on asolution to the Afghan civil war and even more ominously both states arefunding proxy wars between Shias and Sunnis in each other's countries aswell as in Afghanistan, increasing the likelihood of a major sectarianexplosion in the region. With the advent of the Taliban, sectarianismand ethnic/sectarian cleansing has reared its ugly head for the first timein Afghanistan's history.The Central Asian states are the new players on the block, but theyhave quickly taken to protecting what they see as threats to their nationalinterests. Pashtun domination of Afghanistan does not suit them and theyabhor the kind of Islamic sentiments the Taliban espouse. Until theirethnic cousins in Afghanistan are part of some power-sharing formula inKabul, the Central Asian states will not cease to aid them to resist theTaliban. This places in jeopardy Pakistan's plans for accessing pipelineand communication routes across Afghanistan from Central Asia. If theTaliban were to conquer the entire country, the Central Asian stateswould have to accept the Taliban reality, but they would be unlikely totrust their energy exports to go through Taliban controlled Afghanistanand Pakistan.Saudi Arabia, it appears, has proved incapable of evolving a rationalforeign policy which suits its national interests rather than merely appeasingits domestic Wahabbi lobby. It took Mullah Omar to personally insultthe House of Saud before the Saudis pulled away from the Taliban. TheSaudi export of Wahabbism has now boomeranged back home and isincreasingly undermining the authority of the Royal Family. Osama BinLaden's critique of the corruption and mismanagement of the regime isnot falling upon deaf ears amongst the Saudi population. And unlessAfghanistan moves towards peace, dozens more Bin Ladens are ready andwaiting to take his place from their bases inside Afghanistan.For Muslims everywhere Saudi support for the Taliban is deeply embarrassing,because the Taliban's interpretation of Islam is so negative anddestructive. Increasingly, Western popular perception equates Islam withthe Taliban and Bin Laden-style terrorism. Many Western commentatorsdo not particularize the Taliban, but condemn Islam wholesale for beingintolerant and anti-modem. The Taliban, like so many Islamic fundamentalistgroups today, divest Islam of all its legacies except theology -Islamic philosophy, science, arts, aesthetics and mysticism are ignored.Thus the rich diversity of Islam and the essential message of the Koran —