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208 ~ TALIBANbeen disarmed- The economy is a black hole that is sucking in its neighbourswith illicit trade and the smuggling of drugs and weapons, underminingthem in the process. 'It will take at least ten to 15 years beforethere will be a functioning central authority capable of doing the minimumof the administration needed for the development of the country.And that is, in my view, a rather optimistic statement,' said Swedishaid-worker Anders Fange. 4Complex relationships of power and authority built up over centurieshave broken down completely. No single group or leader has the legitimacyto reunite the country. Rather than a national identity or kinshiptribal-basedidentities, territorial regional identities have become paramount.Afghans no longer call themselves just Afghans or even Pashtunsand Tajiks, but Kandaharis, Panjshiris, Heratis, Kabulis or Jowzjanis. Fragmentationis both vertical and horizontal and cuts across ethnicity toencompass a single valley or town. The Pashtun tribal structure has beendestroyed by the loss of common tribal property and grazing grounds, andby war and flight. The non-Pashtun identify their survival with individualwarrior leaders and the valley of their birth.The tribal hierarchy which once mediated conflicts has been killed oris in exile. The old, educated, ruling elite fled after the Soviet invasionand no new ruling elite has emerged in its place which can negotiate apeace settlement. There is no political class to compromise and makedeals. There are lots of leaders representing segments of the population,but no outright leader. In such a scenario, with no end to the war insight, the question of whether Afghanistan will fragment and send wavesof ethnic fragmentation and instability spinning through the region,becomes paramount.Much of the blame for the continuation of the war lies in the hands ofoutsiders who continue to back their proxies in an ever-increasing spiralof intervention and violence. The FSU began the process with its brutalinvasion of Afghanistan, but suffered hugely. 'We brought Afghanistanwith us -T- in our souls, in our hearts, in our memory, in our customs, ineverything and at every level,' said Alexander Lebed, who served as amajor in the Soviet army in Afghanistan and is now a presidential candidate."This feeble political adventure, this attempt to export a stillunproved revolution, marked the beginning of the end,' he added. 5The Afghan Mujaheddin contributed to the demise of the SovietUnion, the Soviet empire and even communism itself. While the Afghanstake all credit for this, the West has gone the other way, barely acknowledgingthe Afghan contribution to the end of the Cold War. The withdrawalof Soviet troops from Afghanistan heralded the end of the Gorbachovexperiment in perestroika and glasnost - the idea that the Sovietsystem could be changed from within. There is a lesson to be learnt hereCONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF AFGHANISTAN ~ 209for today's meddlers - those who intervene in Afghanistan can face disintegrationthemselves — not because of the power of the Afghans, butbecause of the forces that are unleashed in their own fragile societies.By walking away from Afghanistan as early as it did, the USA facedwithin a few years dead diplomats, destroyed embassies, bombs in NewYork and cheap heroin on its streets, as Afghanistan became a sanctuaryfor international terrorism and the drugs mafia. Afghans today remaindeeply bitter about their abandonment by the USA, for whom they foughtthe Cold War. In the 1980s the USA was prepared 'to fight till the lastAfghan' to get even with the Soviet Union, but when the Soviets left,Washington was not prepared to help bring peace or feed a hungry people.Regional powers took advantage of the political vacuum the US retreatcreated, saw an opportunity to wield influence and jumped into the fray.Today the USA, by picking up single issues and creating entire policiesaround them, whether it be oil pipelines, the treatment of women orterrorism, is only demonstrating that it has learnt little. The abortiveUnocal project should have taught many lessons to US policy-makers,but there appear to be no signs of it as US diplomats scurry across CentralAsia trying to persuade oil companies and governments to commit tobuilding a main export pipeline from Baku to Ceyhan. But even that islikely to be indefinitely delayed. The start-up for construction scheduledfor the year 2000 has been progressively delayed to 2003 and mostrecently to 2005. 6The lessons from the Unocal project are several. No major pipelinefrom Central Asia can be built unless there is far greater US and internationalcommitment to conflict resolution in the region - in Afghanistan,Tajikistan, Nagorno-Karabakh, Chechnya, Georgia and with the Kurds.The region is a powder keg of unresolved conflicts. Nor can secure pipelinesbe built without some degree of strategic consensus in the regionIran and Russia cannot be isolated from the region's development foiever. They will resist and sabotage projects as long as they are not a partof them. Nor can pipelines be built when ethnic conflicts are tearingstates apart. Ethnicity is the clarion call of the modern era. Trying toresolve ethnic problems and keep states together needs persistent andconsistent diplomacy rather than virtual bribes to keep various warlordsquiet.Oil companies cannot build pipelines which are vulnerable to civilwars, fast-moving political changes and events, instability and an environmentbeset by Islamic fundamentalism, drugs and guns. The old GreatGame was about perceived threats in which force was never directly used.Russia and Great Britain marked out borders and signed treaties, creatingAfghanistan as a buffer between them. The new Great Game must be onewhere the aim is to stabilize and settle the region, not increase tensions