204 ~ TALIBANintrude our country's air space to airlift supplies to airports controlled bythe opposition. The grave consequencs of such interference will rest withIran which is the enemy of Islam. Afghanistan is capable of harbouringopponents of the Iranian government inside Afghan territory and thus ofcreating problems for Iran,' the statement said. 19However, it was the killing of the Iranian diplomats in Mazar in 1998that nearly forced Iran into war with the Taliban. There was enormouspopular support for an Iranian invasion of western Afghanistan, whichwas further manipulated by hardliners in Tehran wanting to destabilizePresident Khatami. Even the reticent Foreign Minister Kamal Kharraziwas forced to adopt extremely tough language. 'The Taliban are Pushtunsand cannot sideline all the other ethnic groups from the political scenewithout sparking continuing resistance. In such circumstances there willbe no peace in the country. I warn the Taliban and those who supportthem that we will not tolerate instability and conspiracy along our borders.We had an agreement with Pakistan that the Afghan problem wouldnot be resolved through war. Now this has happened and we cannotaccept it,' Kharrazi said on 14 August 1998. 20Iran felt betrayed by Pakistan on several counts. In 1996, just whenPresident Burhanuddin Rabbani, under Iranian advice, was trying tobroaden the base of his government and bring in Pashtuns and othergroups, the Taliban captured Kabul. Iran was convinced that Pakistan hadsabotaged Rabbani's effort. In June 1997, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharifvisited Tehran. Together with President Khatami the two leaders calledfor a cease-fire in Afghanistan and declared that there could be no militarysolution. But Iran considered that Pakistan had no intention ofsticking to the agreement. 'Pakistan has left no room for our trust and hasdestabilized its position with the Iranian people. We cannot accept seeingPakistan cause problems for our national security,' wrote the Jorrihuriklami. 21Then, in the summer of 1998, Pakistan persuaded Iran to participatein a joint diplomatic peace mission. Mid-level Iranian and Pakistani diplomatstravelled together for the first time to Mazar and Kandahar on 4July 1998 to talk to the opposing factions. Just a few weeks later, theTaliban attacked Mazar and slaughtered the Iranian diplomats, scuttlingthe initiative. The Iranians were convinced that Pakistan had duped themby pretending to launch a peace initiative, just as the ISI was preparingthe Taliban for the attack on Mazar. Moreover, Iran claimed that Pakistanhad promised the safety of its diplomats in Mazar. When they were killed,Iran was furious and blamed the Taliban and Pakistan. Iranian officialssaid that Mullah Dost Mohammed, who allegedly led the Taliban seizureof the Iranian Consulate, had first gathered the diplomats in the basementSHIA VERSUS SUNNI: IRAN AND SAUDI ARABIA ~ 205of the building and spoken by wireless to Kandahar before shooting themdead. 22The Taliban replied, correctly as it appeared, that the Iranians werenot diplomats but intelligence agents involved in ferrying weapons to theanti-Taliban alliance. Nevertheless, in the diplomatic skirmishing thatfollowed, trust between Iran and Pakistan evaporated. 23 The Iranians werealso furious that the Taliban actions had endangered its growing rapprochementwith the USA. US Secretary of State Madeleine Albrighthad said in June 1998, the critical role that Iran plays in the region,'makes the question of USA-Iran relations a topic of great interest andimportance to this Secretary of State. 24 'The Iranians had been encouraged that the USA was taking themseriously for the first time. USA-Iran co-operation on Afghanistan, 'certainlycan be an exemplary case and shows that the US has a betterunderstanding of the reality in this region and the role that Iran can playfor the promotion of peace and security,' Kamal Kharrazi told me. 'Wehave been trying for a long time to tell them [the USA] that Iran is a keyplayer in the region.' 25 Iran and the USA had also drawn closer because ofWashington's changed perceptions about the Taliban. Both countries nowshared the same views and were critical of the Taliban's drug and genderpolicies, their harbouring of terrorists and the threat that the Taliban'sbrand of Islamic fundamentalism posed to the region. Ironically for theUSA, the new threat was no longer Shia fundamentalism, but the Sunnifundamentalism of the Taliban.The Taliban were now even proving an embarrassment to SaudiArabia, which helped bring Tehran closer to Riyadh. The Taliban's harbouringof Bin Laden had exposed their extremism and posed a threat toSaudi stability. Significantly, the rapprochement between Iran and SaudiArabia did not falter, even when Iran was threatening to invade Afghanistanin 1998. In May 1999, President Khatami visited Saudi Arabia, thefirst Iranian leader to do so in nearly three decades.The Taliban pose a security threat to the Saudis, especially throughtheir support for Saudi dissidents. In the past the Saudis had deferred tothe Taliban's fundamentalism, without giving due thought to what kindof state, political compromises and power-sharing should evolve inAfghanistan, but they could no longer afford to take such a casual attitude.With so much of Saudi foreign policy run on the basis of personalrelationships and patronage rather than state institutions, it has becomedifficult to see how a policy towards Afghanistan, geared more to Saudinational self-interest and stability in the region, rather than Wahabbism,can evolve.If President Khatami were to push forward his reform agenda at home,the Iranian regime would increasingly desire and need a peace settlement
206 — TALIBANin Afghanistan - to end the drain on its resources from funding the anti-Taliban alliance, stop the drugs, weapons and sectarian spillover fromAfghanistan and move towards a further rapprochement with the USA.Ironically, the Taliban's extremism had also helped bring Iran and SaudiArabia closer together and weakened Pakistan's relationship with bothcountries. The big loser from Iran's return to the diplomatic mainstreamwas Pakistan. However, to end its isolation from the West, Iran neededto demonstrate that it was a responsible and stabilizing member of theinternational community. Its first and biggest test could be in helping tobring peace to Afghanistan.16CONCLUSION:THE FUTUREOF AFGHANISTANA fghanistan has become one of 'the world's orphaned con-/-\ flicts - the ones that the West, selective and promiscuous•L 3L in its attention happens to ignore in favour of Yugoslavia', saidformer UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1995. 1 The worldhas turned away from Afghanistan, allowing civil war, ethnic fragmentationand polarization to become state failure. The country has ceased toexist as a viable state and when a state fails civil society is destroyed.Generations of children grow up rootless, without identity or reason tolive except to fight. Adults are traumatized and brutalized, knowing onlywar and the power of the warlords. 'We are dealing here with a failedstate which looks like an infected wound. You don't even know where tostart cleaning it,' said UN mediator Lakhdar Brahimi. 2The entire Afghan population has been displaced, not once but manytimes over. The physical destruction of Kabul has turned it into theDresden of the late twentieth century. The crossroads of Asia on theancient Silk Route is now nothing but miles of rubble. There is no semblanceof an infrastructure that can sustain society - even at the lowestcommon denominator of poverty. In 1998 the ICRC reported that thenumber of Afghan families headed by a widow had reached 98,000, thenumber of families headed by a disabled person was 63,000 and 45,000people were treated for war wounds that year alone. There was not evenan estimate of those killed. The only productive factories in the countryare those where artificial limbs, crutches and wheelchairs are produced bythe aid agencies. 3Afghanistan's divisions are multiple - ethnic, sectarian, rural andurban, educated and uneducated, those with guns and those who have
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