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this was an entirely healthy trend is questionable, and a personnel system thatenforced a greater two way movement between the AIF and the militia mighthave been beneficial.The second question concerns the extent to which the story of combat moraleand battle fatigue in the 9th, 25th and 61st Battalions reflected other systemicproblems in the AMF. Long believed that the Army was ‘in many respects, atthe peak of its efficiency’ by 1945.262 But in many ways the Army was more anorganisation that had reached a peak and was commencing a gradual decline.By July Australia was maintaining seven infantry divisions, six of which werein action—a higher number than at any other time during the war.263 The longyears of war since 1939 had taken their toll. Simpson noted: ‘It is realised, that aswar progresses, so, after a certain time the peak quality of manpower in an Armycommences to show signs of deterioration’.264 As Pratten has remarked, by 1945the AMF was ‘facing a potential command crisis’ as it attempted to spread itsincreasingly tired cohort of experienced regimental leaders across an organisationthat was bigger than the nation could sustain.265 Perhaps this explains the absenceof experienced AIF leaders in the 7th Brigade. Some doubt must also be placed onthe effectiveness of the training regime that was charged with preparing for battlethe emerging junior leaders, who increasingly had no previous combat experience.Half of the lieutenants in the 7th Brigade joined their units in 1944, most withoutthe benefit of any combat experience, and junior leadership problems do seemto have been a contributing factor to morale problems within the formation. Onthe other hand, perhaps this simply demonstrated that there were limits to whattraining could reasonably be expected to achieve in preparing junior leaders forthe realities of combat. Given the complexity of these issues, perhaps the onlything that can be said with any confidence is that the AMF was indeed fortunatethat it was not required for the invasion of mainland Japan in 1946.262 Long, The Final Campaigns, p. 73.263 David Horner, ‘The Final Campaigns of the Pacific War’, in Peter Dennis (ed.), 1945:War and Peace in the Pacific, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1999, p. 93.264 Notes by Simpson on the official history of the Lae and Huon campaigns, 22 April1955, p. 6, AWM 93, Item 50/2/23/474.265 Pratten, ‘The ‘Old Man’, pp. 327, 353. Australia had a greater percentage of its populationserving in the Army during the war than any of the other Commonwealthcountries and the United States. Ellis, The Sharp End, p. 396.60 — A tale of three battalions
ConclusionPrevious studies of the combat morale and battle fatigue problems experiencedin the 7th Brigade during its campaign on Bougainville haveexplained these mainly in terms of leadership at the CO level, or by generaldiscussion of combat fatigue. The two central themes that emerge from this studyare similar—the critical part of leadership in maintaining combat morale, andthe fact that the stresses of the battlefield inevitably took their toll and had tobe managed accordingly. However, critical factors can be obscured unless thesethemes are examined in all their complexity.The different fates of each of the battalions in the 7th Brigade were stronglyinfluenced by their respective COs, something that validates just about everythingthat has ever been written about command at the regimental level. However,leadership influences also operated at other levels and, while it is tempting tothink of COs as omniscient, this ignores the fact that their leadership, on its own,was not enough. Jungle warfare, in particular, required high-quality leadershipat the company and platoon levels and there were evident problems with this inthe brigade. COs established and maintained esprit de corps, linking wider Armypurposes to the identity of the unit. The junior battalion leaders established andmaintained the primary group cohesion required to keep men motivated to fight.It was very difficult for one to work without the other. The differences in supportthat the COs of the 9th and 61st Battalions received from their 2ICs might alsohave been a factor. The relationship between leaders above the unit level was alsoimportant. Matthews and McKinna enjoyed Brigadier Field’s confidence andsupport. This was not so evident in his relationship with Dexter. Commanderswere responsible for monitoring morale and battle fatigue. It has been argued thatone of the other important leadership failures in the campaign was Field’s slowappreciation of just how badly demoralised and fatigued the 61st Battalion hadbecome. In essence, for whatever reason, it took him too long to understand theseverity of the problem. Perhaps this was partly Dexter’s fault, but the fact thathe actually had to write his letter of 19 March is symptomatic of Field’s failure toA tale of three battalions — 61
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A tale of three battalions:combat m
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About the AuthorMajor Gavin Keating
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Land Warfare Studies CentreThe Aust
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ContentsAbout the Author ..........
Page 9 and 10:
IntroductionTo those who have known
Page 11 and 12:
limitations of military efficiency
Page 13 and 14:
operations in the most expeditious
Page 15 and 16:
II Australian Corps area of operati
Page 17 and 18: AIF. Only two of the battalion 2ICs
Page 19 and 20: Swank and Marchland’s study of Al
Page 21 and 22: for giving meaning to the efforts o
Page 23 and 24: Part One7th Brigade’s Campaign on
Page 25 and 26: attle experience’.81 Matthews lat
Page 27 and 28: Southern Sector—January to May 19
Page 29 and 30: 7th Brigade area of operations, sou
Page 31 and 32: a series of patrol clashes with sma
Page 33 and 34: his officers and men are saying ope
Page 35 and 36: ‘We have been in contact for seve
Page 37 and 38: BM says 61 Bn in bad state, troops
Page 39 and 40: to endeavour to open the LOC with t
Page 41 and 42: Plate 1: Brigadier J. Field, comman
Page 43 and 44: Plate 5: A jeep train, in support o
Page 45 and 46: The brigadier visited a 61st compan
Page 47 and 48: Part TwoExplanations of Morale and
Page 49 and 50: Table 3: 7th Brigade Incidence of D
Page 51 and 52: It has been argued that Dexter’s
Page 53 and 54: Many adverse reports on officers we
Page 55 and 56: There was also irony in Field’s c
Page 57 and 58: That is 60 men they will never see
Page 59 and 60: just over a week after it commenced
Page 61 and 62: In many ways the 25th Battalion’s
Page 63 and 64: elieved that his instructions to th
Page 65 and 66: ‘A number of refusals to go on pa
Page 67: higher proportion of forceful leade
Page 71 and 72: and return to Torokina supports thi
Page 73 and 74: BibliographyUnpublished RecordsAust
Page 75 and 76: Denham, Peter, The Blue Diamonds: H
Page 77 and 78: Land Warfare Studies CentrePublicat
Page 79 and 80: 118 Blaxland, John, Information-era
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