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this was an entirely healthy trend is questionable, and a personnel system thatenforced a greater two way movement between <strong>the</strong> AIF and <strong>the</strong> militia mighthave been beneficial.The second question concerns <strong>the</strong> extent to which <strong>the</strong> story of combat moraleand battle fatigue in <strong>the</strong> 9th, 25th and 61st Battalions reflected o<strong>the</strong>r systemicproblems in <strong>the</strong> AMF. Long believed that <strong>the</strong> <strong>Army</strong> was ‘in many respects, at<strong>the</strong> peak of its efficiency’ by 1945.262 But in many ways <strong>the</strong> <strong>Army</strong> was more anorganisation that had reached a peak and was commencing a gradual decline.By July Australia was maintaining seven infantry divisions, six of which werein action—a higher number than at any o<strong>the</strong>r time during <strong>the</strong> war.263 The longyears of war since 1939 had taken <strong>the</strong>ir toll. Simpson noted: ‘It is realised, that aswar progresses, so, after a certain time <strong>the</strong> peak quality of manpower in an <strong>Army</strong>commences to show signs of deterioration’.264 As Pratten has remarked, by 1945<strong>the</strong> AMF was ‘facing a potential command crisis’ as it attempted to spread itsincreasingly tired cohort of experienced regimental leaders across an organisationthat was bigger than <strong>the</strong> nation could sustain.265 Perhaps this explains <strong>the</strong> absenceof experienced AIF leaders in <strong>the</strong> 7th Brigade. Some doubt must also be placed on<strong>the</strong> effectiveness of <strong>the</strong> training regime that was charged with preparing for battle<strong>the</strong> emerging junior leaders, who increasingly had no previous combat experience.Half of <strong>the</strong> lieutenants in <strong>the</strong> 7th Brigade joined <strong>the</strong>ir units in 1944, most without<strong>the</strong> benefit of any combat experience, and junior leadership problems do seemto have been a contributing factor to morale problems within <strong>the</strong> formation. On<strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, perhaps this simply demonstrated that <strong>the</strong>re were limits to whattraining could reasonably be expected to achieve in preparing junior leaders for<strong>the</strong> realities of combat. Given <strong>the</strong> complexity of <strong>the</strong>se issues, perhaps <strong>the</strong> onlything that can be said with any confidence is that <strong>the</strong> AMF was indeed fortunatethat it was not required for <strong>the</strong> invasion of mainland Japan in 1946.262 Long, The Final Campaigns, p. 73.263 David Horner, ‘The Final Campaigns of <strong>the</strong> Pacific War’, in Peter Dennis (ed.), 1945:War and Peace in <strong>the</strong> Pacific, <strong>Australian</strong> War Memorial, Canberra, 1999, p. 93.264 Notes by Simpson on <strong>the</strong> official history of <strong>the</strong> Lae and Huon campaigns, 22 April1955, p. 6, AWM 93, Item 50/2/23/474.265 Pratten, ‘The ‘Old Man’, pp. 327, 353. Australia had a greater percentage of its populationserving in <strong>the</strong> <strong>Army</strong> during <strong>the</strong> war than any of <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r Commonwealthcountries and <strong>the</strong> United States. Ellis, The Sharp End, p. 396.60 — A tale of three battalions

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