View the pdf - Australian Army
View the pdf - Australian Army
View the pdf - Australian Army
You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles
YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.
elieved that his instructions to <strong>the</strong> divisional commander had been ignored.238It was this that actually initiated <strong>the</strong> 9th Battalion’s immediate relief. BrigadierField felt so badly treated by Savige’s interference that he drafted a resignationletter which explained <strong>the</strong> difficulties of both fighting and maintaining <strong>the</strong> supplyroutes. He reiterated that ‘I have no confidence that such a result [placing forcesat <strong>the</strong> decisive point and maintaining <strong>the</strong> tracks] will be achieved by operationsbased on one Bn inland and sea movement on an unfavourable coast’.239 UltimatelyField was forced to accept <strong>the</strong> order but it was largely <strong>the</strong> 61st Battalion, operatinginland, that was left to deal with <strong>the</strong> repercussions. As <strong>the</strong> campaign progressedhigher policy was refined to <strong>the</strong> point where it allowed one brigade to be in actionwhile ano<strong>the</strong>r was deployed forward to provide rear-area security and maintain<strong>the</strong> lines of communication.240 In this respect <strong>the</strong> 7th Brigade suffered from being<strong>the</strong> first formation to undertake protracted operations in <strong>the</strong> south. As always,<strong>the</strong> people who bore <strong>the</strong> results of such deliberations were <strong>the</strong> frontline soldiers.It is not surprising that <strong>the</strong> 61st Battalion’s historian made a number of generalreferences to <strong>the</strong> unrealistic expectations of higher headquarters.241The o<strong>the</strong>r area where this basic underestimation of <strong>the</strong> challenges facing <strong>the</strong>brigade was demonstrated was in <strong>the</strong> limited offensive support provided for itsoperations. Mat<strong>the</strong>ws was critical of <strong>the</strong> artillery ammunition allocations availableto <strong>the</strong> 9th Battalion, both in <strong>the</strong> central and sou<strong>the</strong>rn sectors.242 During <strong>the</strong>brigade’s relief in late April Mat<strong>the</strong>ws wrote: ‘Brig is very annoyed with 15 Bde,<strong>the</strong>y get all <strong>the</strong>y ask for particularly arty fire. Says he should now apologise tohis COs for all <strong>the</strong> restrictions he has placed on <strong>the</strong>m in <strong>the</strong> past’.243 Although238 Field’s diary, 25–26 February 1945, AWM 3DRL6937, Item 7; ‘Telephone conversationGOC 2 Aust Corps and GOC 3 Aust Div’, 25 February 1945, AWM 3DRL2529, Item32.239 Draft letter from Field to Bridgeford, undated (probably 26 February 1945), p. 3,AWM 3DRL6937, Item 32.240 ‘3 Aust Div Report on Operations November 1944–August 1945’, pp. 31–2, AWM3DRL2529, Item 75. Compare ‘2 Aust Corps Operation Instruction No 7’, 26 February1945 to ‘Operational Directive Issued by Comd 2 Aust Corps to GOC 3 Aust Div, 19April 1945’, 3DRL2529, Item 88.241 Watt, History of <strong>the</strong> 61st Infantry Battalion, pp. 209–10.242 Mat<strong>the</strong>ws diary 13, 3 February 1945, AWM PR89/079, Item 5; Mat<strong>the</strong>ws diary 14,23 April 1945, AWM PR89/079, Item 5.243 Mat<strong>the</strong>ws diary 16, 27 April 1945, AWM PR89/079, Item 5.A tale of three battalions — 55