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was absent.226 Field was a frequent visitor to Matthews’ headquarters during earlyFebruary, aided by its proximity to the coast.227 The fact that the CO was able tocandidly discuss his unit’s problems with the brigade commander may well haveplayed a part in the brigadier’s decision to make the 9th Battalion a priority forrelief, or at least gave Field a clear appreciation of what one of his unit’s was goingthrough. This set of factors did not coalesce for Dexter.With no private records in the public domain to shed light on the innerworkings of the 25th Battalion it is difficult even to know whether it had anymorale problems. Its official report on operations recorded:The troops fought magnificently and showed courage, dash and determination. Theirspirit and morale was reasonably good up to 19 March 45, when B Coy made theirmemorable bayonet charge. After that it soared amazingly – the lads were ‘on top ofthe world’, and it would have taken more than the Japs on Bougainville to reduce theirspirit and enthusiasm. Morale continued to rise if that was possible, until the end of thecampaign, when it was second to none.228This made for good reading and fitted comfortably within the Anzac stereotypebut is unlikely to have been entirely true. Not surprisingly, members of thebattalion displayed signs of extreme combat fatigue after their battles of late Marchand early April. Ewen observed that the troops of the two forward companiescut off in late March ‘cried when the tanks arrived and no wonder they had beenfighting for their lives three days not knowing what had happened to the rest of theBn’.229 Participants recalled the exhaustion and fraying of nerves associated withsuch testing times.230 The speed with which the battalion was relieved after thefinal battle on 5 April was a good indication of the truer state of affairs within theunit. Morale may not have been a problem, but battle fatigue certainly was.226 This was certainly the case when Field became the acting divisional commander inMay 1945. 9 Infantry Battalion War Diary, 21 May 1945, May–July 1945, AWM 52,Item 8/3/46.227 See ‘Record of Movement of Officers – HQ 7 Aust Inf Bde’, February 1945, 7 InfantryBrigade War Diary, February and March 1945, AWM 52, Item 8/2/7.228 ‘25 Aust Inf Bn Report on Operations in South Bougainville 16 January to 14 April1945’, p. 27, 25 Infantry Battalion War Diary, January–April 1945, AWM 52, Item8/3/63.229 Ewen’s diary 2, 1 April 1945, AWM PR89/190.230 James, ‘The Final Campaigns’, p. 273.52 — A tale of three battalions
In many ways the 25th Battalion’s experiences were the complete opposite ofthe 61st’s campaign. It arrived in the south later, after a dramatic unit victory inthe central sector. Although it was never rested in the same manner as the 9thBattalion, it was fortunate to have been on the coastal flank of the advance anddoes not seem to have experienced the difficulties encountered by the 61st or9th Battalions. From mid-March onwards it fought a succession of company andbattalion actions, suffered heavy casualties and was then rapidly withdrawn. Inessence, its primary experience of combat was one of high-intensity, short-durationaction where men had little option but ‘to do or die’. In comparison, the 61st’s waron Bougainville was dominated by sustained patrolling, often uneventful but stillstraining. This suggests that it is misleading to measure battle exhaustion only interms of frequency of battle, number of friendly casualties and kills inflicted on theenemy. Less dramatic exposure to the stresses of the combat zone, over a longertimeframe, could result in breakdown just as easily as more recognisable causes.McKinna features strongly in the March and April battles, and undoubtedlyhis leadership contributed greatly to the battalion’s successes. He was well forwardduring the attacks on 19 and 22 March, personally led the relief party to hisisolated forward companies on 31 March, and was instrumental in coordinatingthe defence of Slater’s Knoll on 5 April. At one point in late March his reconnaissancegroup was contacted and captured a prisoner, light machine gun, sword andsome documents.231 It is difficult to disagree with Dexter’s assessment that he wasa ‘top soldier’, or with Long’s observation that the CO ‘had led his battalion withgreat skill and coolness’.232 Field also felt that McKinna ‘has done a magnificentjob’.233 Given that it was the 25th Battalion that had delivered nearly all of thebrigade’s most dramatic results it is difficult to see how he could have thoughtotherwise. This admiration seems to have been reciprocated. McKinna’s unit reporton operations concluded its general comment by saying:231 ‘25 Aust Inf Bn Report on Operations in South Bougainville 16 January to 14 April1945’, pp. 18–19, 21–23, 25 Infantry Battalion War Diary, January–April 1945, AWM52, Item 8/3/63; ‘Operations in the Puriata River Region, Part 1’, 19 May 1945, pp.7–8, 10, AWM 54, Item 613/6/47; ‘Operations in the Puriata River Region, Part 2’, 24May 1945, pp. 9, 11, AWM 54, Item 613/6/47.232 Dexter, ‘The Battalion – My Home’, p. 167, AWM PR01182; Long, The FinalCampaigns, p. 163.233 Field’s diary, 4 April 1945, AWM 3DRL6937, Item 7.A tale of three battalions — 53
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A tale of three battalions:combat m
Page 3 and 4:
About the AuthorMajor Gavin Keating
Page 5 and 6:
Land Warfare Studies CentreThe Aust
Page 7 and 8:
ContentsAbout the Author ..........
Page 9 and 10: IntroductionTo those who have known
Page 11 and 12: limitations of military efficiency
Page 13 and 14: operations in the most expeditious
Page 15 and 16: II Australian Corps area of operati
Page 17 and 18: AIF. Only two of the battalion 2ICs
Page 19 and 20: Swank and Marchland’s study of Al
Page 21 and 22: for giving meaning to the efforts o
Page 23 and 24: Part One7th Brigade’s Campaign on
Page 25 and 26: attle experience’.81 Matthews lat
Page 27 and 28: Southern Sector—January to May 19
Page 29 and 30: 7th Brigade area of operations, sou
Page 31 and 32: a series of patrol clashes with sma
Page 33 and 34: his officers and men are saying ope
Page 35 and 36: ‘We have been in contact for seve
Page 37 and 38: BM says 61 Bn in bad state, troops
Page 39 and 40: to endeavour to open the LOC with t
Page 41 and 42: Plate 1: Brigadier J. Field, comman
Page 43 and 44: Plate 5: A jeep train, in support o
Page 45 and 46: The brigadier visited a 61st compan
Page 47 and 48: Part TwoExplanations of Morale and
Page 49 and 50: Table 3: 7th Brigade Incidence of D
Page 51 and 52: It has been argued that Dexter’s
Page 53 and 54: Many adverse reports on officers we
Page 55 and 56: There was also irony in Field’s c
Page 57 and 58: That is 60 men they will never see
Page 59: just over a week after it commenced
Page 63 and 64: elieved that his instructions to th
Page 65 and 66: ‘A number of refusals to go on pa
Page 67 and 68: higher proportion of forceful leade
Page 69 and 70: ConclusionPrevious studies of the c
Page 71 and 72: and return to Torokina supports thi
Page 73 and 74: BibliographyUnpublished RecordsAust
Page 75 and 76: Denham, Peter, The Blue Diamonds: H
Page 77 and 78: Land Warfare Studies CentrePublicat
Page 79 and 80: 118 Blaxland, John, Information-era
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