12.07.2015 Views

View the pdf - Australian Army

View the pdf - Australian Army

View the pdf - Australian Army

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

just over a week after it commenced operations. This was perhaps a good exampleof how quickly a ‘collective decline in will’ could spread through a unit. Mat<strong>the</strong>ws’leadership, <strong>the</strong> deficiency in experienced junior officers and NCOs already notedand <strong>the</strong> particularly difficult nature of <strong>the</strong> terrain all combined to wear downrapidly much of <strong>the</strong> unit’s morale within <strong>the</strong> space of two to three weeks. Whe<strong>the</strong>rMat<strong>the</strong>ws’ change in approach alone would have been sufficient to overcome <strong>the</strong>seproblems over an extended exposure to combat is debatable. In retrospect, <strong>the</strong> reliefof <strong>the</strong> battalion in late February, enforced on <strong>the</strong> brigade for reasons that had littleto do with morale, was most fortunate. The fortnight of collective rest that <strong>the</strong> 9thBattalion enjoyed on <strong>the</strong> beach in early March must be seen as a critical factor inits ability to continue functioning effectively until its final relief in early May. Even<strong>the</strong>n signs of battle fatigue and lowered morale became evident after this break.Had fortunes been reversed, and <strong>the</strong> 61st Battalion been given such rest, it is byno means a sure thing that <strong>the</strong> 9th Battalion would not have suffered <strong>the</strong> samedisintegration suffered by Dexter’s unit. It should be remembered that when hisbattalion was relieved in late March it did not enjoy any real rest but instead becameembroiled in <strong>the</strong> Japanese counterattacks of late March and April. In commentingon Dexter’s removal Mat<strong>the</strong>ws wrote, somewhat uncharitably, ‘he has shown hisinability to comd. “Uneasy lies <strong>the</strong> head”’.223 As Pratten noted, however, Mat<strong>the</strong>wsprobably should have added ‘There but for <strong>the</strong> grace of God …’224O<strong>the</strong>r factors also contributed to <strong>the</strong> stabilisation of <strong>the</strong> 9th Battalion’sperformance. It had already won accolades for its activities in <strong>the</strong> central sectorand thus had creditability with brigade headquarters. Mat<strong>the</strong>ws seems to haveenjoyed a better relationship with his 2IC, Major Fry, who probably provided muchneeded support to <strong>the</strong> CO during his ‘crisis of command’ in early February.225At <strong>the</strong> very least Fry was present in <strong>the</strong> unit at this critical time—unlike Bicks.Perhaps most importantly, Mat<strong>the</strong>ws seems to have enjoyed a stronger relationshipwith his brigade commander than Dexter. This should not be surprising becauseMat<strong>the</strong>ws had been a CO in <strong>the</strong> 7th Brigade since early 1943 and, as <strong>the</strong> seniorunit commander, would have administered <strong>the</strong> brigade on occasions when Field223 Mat<strong>the</strong>ws diary 16, 27 April 1945, AWM PR89/079, Item 5.224 Pratten, ‘The ‘Old Man’, p. 351.225 For instance, Fry accompanied Mat<strong>the</strong>ws on his visit to B Coy on 1 February when <strong>the</strong>latter was challenged by one of <strong>the</strong> lieutenants. Mat<strong>the</strong>ws diary 13, 1 February 1945,AWM PR89/079, Item 5.A tale of three battalions — 51

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!