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There was also irony in Field’s criticism of Dexter for not visiting <strong>the</strong> forwardtroops often enough because <strong>the</strong> brigade’s records indicate that <strong>the</strong> brigadiervisited <strong>the</strong> 61st Battalion only once during March, on <strong>the</strong> 3rd.199 Field explainedthat ‘The conduct of operations and <strong>the</strong> period of absence entailed away from myHQ made personal visits to this Battalion on my part irregular and infrequent.Numerous visits were however, made with great regularity by members of myStaff ’.200 This was true and Dexter’s location on <strong>the</strong> inland flank made personalcontact more difficult. Field also noted that ‘Assurances were conveyed to me that<strong>the</strong> Unit would carry out its allotted role in <strong>the</strong> advance to <strong>the</strong> Hongorai Riveralthough it was reiterated on a number of occasions that <strong>the</strong> troops were tired’.201Dexter’s memoir and his letter to Field of 19 March suggest a sense of frustrationin getting his concerns through to <strong>the</strong> brigade headquarters, and it is temptingto speculate that more frequent visits by <strong>the</strong> brigade commander in late Februaryand <strong>the</strong> first half of March might have resulted in prompter recognition of <strong>the</strong>battalion’s state.202 Interestingly, <strong>the</strong> 9th Battalion’s CO complained in late Aprilthat Field had not visited his battalion’s troops in over five weeks.203Undoubtedly a multitude of o<strong>the</strong>r factors played a part in <strong>the</strong> 61st Battalion’sdemise. The lack of any noteworthy victory, and corresponding lack of recognitionby <strong>the</strong> military hierarchy, was important. The battalion did not get <strong>the</strong> sameopportunity as <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r units to have a limited exposure to combat in <strong>the</strong> centralsector. One observer has suggested that <strong>the</strong> death of Lieutenant Robinson was afactor.204 Dexter noted <strong>the</strong> obvious ramifications of <strong>the</strong> misunderstanding over<strong>the</strong> cancelled relief on 1 March.205 Dexter’s personal relationship with his brigadecommander may also have been a factor—Dexter was <strong>the</strong> newest of <strong>the</strong> COs within<strong>the</strong> brigade and probably did not have a well-developed understanding with hiscommander. A relatively obscure issue that seemed to generate considerable angst199 See ‘Record of Movement of Officers – HQ 7 Aust Inf Bde’, March 1945, 7 InfantryBrigade War Diary, February and March 1945, AWM 52, Item 8/2/7.200 Draft report, ‘VX5172 Lt Col W.R. Dexter 61 Aust Inf Bn’, 9 April 1945, p. 1, AWM3DRL6937, Item 32, sub folder ‘W.R. Dexter’.201 Ibid.202 Dexter, ‘The Battalion – My Home’, pp. 166–7, AWM PR01182; Letter from Dexter toField, 19 March 1945, AWM 3DRL6937, Item 32, sub folder ‘W.R. Dexter’.203 Mat<strong>the</strong>ws diary 16, 26 April 1945, AWM PR89/079, Item 5.204 Schacht, My War on Bougainville, p. 185.205 Dexter, ‘The Battalion – My Home’, p. 167, AWM PR01182.A tale of three battalions — 47