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Dexter’s troops had killed the same number of Japanese as the other two battalionscombined. These results were generally obtained in repeated clashes, rather thanlarger, less-frequent actions. Whilst the 9th Battalion’s movement from Mawarakawas undoubtedly arduous, the 61st Battalion was further inland, had a greaterdistance to cover and was suffering supply difficulties.Perhaps the most important aspect of this misunderstanding was the failure atthe brigade level to fully understand the ‘peculiarly insidious strain upon morale’made by jungle operations. Matthews put it best when he wrote: ‘Our tps willgo anywhere if they know they have a great chance of success, but probing bymanpower only into the thick jungle and being shot at from the unseen enemydaunts the strongest heart’.196 Peter Medcalf, a soldier in the 29th Brigade, explainedthat the strain of waiting for a possible encounter with the Japanese was what woredown a man’s nerves.197 The 61st Battalion’s operational report summed it upbest: ‘The long period during which the unit was engaged, although comprisingminor patrol clashes and not big engagements, resulted in a severe sapping ofres[erves] physically and mentally’.198 In essence, whilst the 61st Battalion couldnot point to spectacular successes, by the time it started showing consistent signsof fatigue in early March it had been continuously in the field since mid-January,experiencing all the stresses that jungle warfare inflicted. During the same timethe 9th Battalion had enjoyed a fortnight of rest on the coast and it is doubtfulwhether the 25th Battalion’s coastal moves had exposed it to the same degree ofstress. Ironically, when the situation got so bad that Field was forced to relieveDexter’s men they were moved into a rear security role just at the point when theJapanese commenced their counterattacks throughout the brigade’s entire areaof operations. The battalion was then left in a rear-area security role for anothermonth before being the last unit of the brigade withdrawn from the southernsector, over three and a half months after it had first pushed south of the JabaRiver. In the simplest terms, the ‘countdown to breakdown’ caused by the realitiesof combat had been allowed to continue for far too long.196 Matthews diary 15, 22 April 1945, AWM PR89/079, Item 5.197 James, ‘The Final Campaigns’, p. 358.198 ‘61 Aust Inf Bn Summary of Ops – Period 29 Jan to 7 May 45’, 30 May 1945, p. 2,AWM 54, Item 613/6/48.46 — A tale of three battalions