View the pdf - Australian Army
View the pdf - Australian Army
View the pdf - Australian Army
You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles
YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.
It has been argued that Dexter’s strong identification with his AIF backgroundmilitated against him forming an effective attachment to his command.181 Hemade it clear in his memoir that he never felt comfortable in a militia unit and tha<strong>the</strong> found <strong>the</strong> 61st Battalion’s fighting spirit lacking, even before its commitmentto action.182 How much of this was retrospective it is difficult to tell. However, itmight shed light on Dexter’s apparent problems with his 2IC, Major C.H. Bicks.Bicks had been with <strong>the</strong> battalion since 1939, initially as a private, and won a DSOat Milne Bay as a company commander. He told Long that he had not joined <strong>the</strong>AIF because his age would have precluded him getting a commission.183 This alonewas not something likely to endear him to Dexter and <strong>the</strong>y were twelve years apartin age. Evidence of a clash is suggested by Field’s explanation of Dexter’s misuseof his 2IC.This officer [Bicks] has had a long and distinguished service with <strong>the</strong> Battalion,possessed my confidence and was held in high respect throughout. He should havebeen employed by his CO to assist him in his responsibilities.184Regardless of <strong>the</strong> state of <strong>the</strong>ir relationship, Bicks left <strong>the</strong> battalion some timein March for Europe to assist with <strong>the</strong> repatriation of prisoners of war, just as <strong>the</strong>battalion started to break down.185While Dexter’s leadership undoubtedly had a significant impact on <strong>the</strong> 61st’smorale, it is hard to see how an officer accused of not having enough contactwith his forward troops could have had such a thoroughly negative impactupon <strong>the</strong>m. Although <strong>the</strong> RMO’s report pointed to <strong>the</strong> requirement for a newmindset, one that <strong>the</strong> CO was beholden to provide, it did point out that <strong>the</strong> ‘lackof self confidence reflected by officers and NCOs’ was a significant factor in <strong>the</strong>soldiers’ anxiety states. Private Ewen wrote in late April, ‘Even <strong>the</strong> officers have181 Pratten, ‘The ‘Old Man’’, p. 350; James, ‘The Final Campaigns: Bougainville 1944–1945’,p. 254.182 Dexter, ‘The Battalion – My Home’, pp. 158–60, AWM PR01182.183 Long’s conversation with C.H. Bicks, 10 February, AWM 67, Item 2/71.184 Draft report, ‘VX5172 Lt Col W.R. Dexter 61 Aust Inf Bn’, 9 April 1945, p. 2, AWM3DRL6937, Item 32, sub folder ‘W.R. Dexter’.185 ‘Adjutant’s Operation and Action Diary – February 1945’, p. 5, 61 Infantry BattalionWar Diary, February–March 1945, AWM 52, Item 8/3/96; ‘A Branch InformationSummary No. 11’, 14 March 1945, 3 <strong>Australian</strong> Division Adjutant and QuartermasterGeneral Branch War Diary, January–March 1945, AWM 52, Item 1/5/6/27.A tale of three battalions — 43