Table 1: 7th Brigade Strength States, Bougainville, November 1944–May 19459th Battalion 25th Battalion 61st BattalionOfficersO<strong>the</strong>rRanksOfficersO<strong>the</strong>rRanksOfficersO<strong>the</strong>rRanks26 November 1944(start of operationscentral sector)5 January 1945(start of operationssou<strong>the</strong>rn sector)5 May 1945(end of operationssou<strong>the</strong>rn sector)36 682 34 682 36 67033 608 32 576 35 65233 595 29 554 33 569Source: Appendix C to ‘7 Aust Inf Bde Report on Operations 26 Oct 44 to 16 May 45’,7 Infantry Brigade War Diary, August 1945, Appendices, AWM 52, Item 8/2/7.Table 2: 7th Brigade Casualties, Bougainville, November 1944–May 19459th Battalion 25th Battalion 61st BattalionOfficersO<strong>the</strong>rRanksOfficersO<strong>the</strong>rRanksOfficersO<strong>the</strong>rRanksKilled in action/died of wounds1 26 4 42 1 14Wounded 4 75 9 166 0 35Accidentally killed 0 3 0 3 0 0Accidentally wounded 0 13 0 4 0 8Total all types 122 228 58Source: Appendix LLL to ‘7 Aust Inf Bde Report on Operations 26 Oct 44 to 16 May 45’,7 Infantry Brigade War Diary, August 1945, Appendices, AWM 52, Item 8/2/7.40 — A tale of three battalions
Table 3: 7th Brigade Incidence of Disease Causing Evacuation, Bougainville,November 1944–May 19459th Battalion 25th Battalion 61st BattalionDiarrhoea 28 2 20Skin 81 22 56Malaria 7 3 12Total all types 116 27 88Source: Appendix KKK to ‘7 Aust Inf Bde Report on Operations 26 Oct 44 to 16 May 45’,7 Infantry Brigade War Diary, August 1945, Appendices, AWM 52, Item 8/2/7.He added later, ‘I am not satisfied that, apart from his mental condition, he hasexercised <strong>the</strong> functions of CO efficiently and in a manner which commands <strong>the</strong>respect and loyalty of his officers and men’.172 Faults he listed to justify this conclusionincluded Dexter’s ‘inefficient use of his 2IC in <strong>the</strong> forward area in respect tomaintaining touch with <strong>the</strong> critical situation’; his over reliance on his adjutant;recommendations on officer management that ‘suggested a lack of measuredjudgement’ and, most damning of all, ‘insufficient personal contact with Companiesin <strong>the</strong>ir operational localities’. With respect to this last point it was stated:One Company was not visited by <strong>the</strong> CO for 5 weeks, and <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>rs infrequently in<strong>the</strong> period preceding <strong>the</strong> withdrawal of <strong>the</strong> Battalion. They were all within easy walkingdistance. The effect of this on morale has obviously been highly detrimental.173Aspects of this criticism were corroborated by o<strong>the</strong>rs. The battalion’s RMOconcluded in his April medical report on <strong>the</strong> battalion: ‘I consider that very firmhandling is <strong>the</strong> only [emphasis added] treatment <strong>the</strong>se men need, and a new attitudeof mind needs to be instilled into <strong>the</strong> troops’.174 Ewen related in mid-March that‘This CO is well named “Dugout Dexter”. I’ve only seen him down here forward172 Letter from Field to Bridgeford, 14 April 1945, AWM 3DRL6937, Item 32, sub folder‘W.R. Dexter’.173 Draft report, ‘VX5172 Lt Col W.R. Dexter 61 Aust Inf Bn’, 9 April 1945, p. 2, AWM3DRL6937, Item 32, sub folder ‘W.R. Dexter’.174 ‘Medical Report on 61 Aust Inf Bn, 10 April 1945’, p. 2, AWM 3DRL6937, Item 32,sub folder ‘W.R. Dexter’.A tale of three battalions — 41