On 9 April he drafted a report to <strong>the</strong> divisional commander, writing that:Due apparently to <strong>the</strong> nervous strain which <strong>the</strong> officer has experienced and whichmay have produced a neuritis, it is evident that he has been unable to perform hisduties as a Commanding Officer to <strong>the</strong> extent necessary to support morale and fightingeffectiveness in operations for a prolonged period.The brigadier’s final recommendation was that ‘I cannot repose any fur<strong>the</strong>rconfidence in this officer, but in view of his long and distinguished war serviceand experience, recommend that he be transferred to a training appointment’.153Ultimately Savige, who knew Dexter from this service in <strong>the</strong> 2/6th Battalion,intervened and arranged to send Dexter out on extended leave, from which hedid not return.154Field moved quickly in an attempt to reconstitute <strong>the</strong> 61st Battalion as aneffective fighting force. On 7 April he informed Major W.G. Fry, <strong>the</strong> 2IC of <strong>the</strong>9th Battalion, that he had <strong>the</strong> ‘task of pulling 61 Bn toge<strong>the</strong>r’.155 Fry had playeda key role in <strong>the</strong> defence of <strong>the</strong> 9th Battalion’s B echelon on 29 March and was ahighly respected officer.156 Field informed Bridgeford that he was ‘<strong>the</strong> only Majorin <strong>the</strong> Brigade who is competent to handle <strong>the</strong> problem and in whom I haveconfidence’.157 Field noted after a visit to Fry on 10 April:discussed <strong>the</strong> fitness of <strong>the</strong> unit for fur<strong>the</strong>r ops. He drew a ra<strong>the</strong>r pessimistic picture of<strong>the</strong> fatigue and <strong>the</strong> nervous tension of <strong>the</strong> men some of whom have cried like childrenunder shell fire. He thinks he could push <strong>the</strong>m for ano<strong>the</strong>r three weeks but is verydoubtful if <strong>the</strong>y run into any stiff fighting. It is a serious business and it would neverdo to risk an anti-climax.153 Draft report, ‘VX5172 Lt Col W.R. Dexter 61 Aust Inf Bn’, 9 April 1945, pp. 1–2,AWM 3DRL6937, Item 32, sub folder ‘W.R. Dexter’. It appears this report was sent toBridgeford with a covering letter on 14 April 1945.154 Notes by Savige on Chapter 6 of Long’s draft of The Final Campaigns, p. 2, AWM3DRL2529, Item 128.155 Field’s diary, 7 April 1945, AWM 3DRL6937, Item 7.156 Schacht, My War on Bougainville, p. 190.157 Letter from Field to Bridgeford, 14 April 1945, AWM 3DRL6937, Item 32, sub folder‘W.R. Dexter’.32 — A tale of three battalions
Plate 1: Brigadier J. Field, commanderof <strong>the</strong> 7th <strong>Australian</strong> Infantry Brigade,April 1945. (Credit: <strong>Australian</strong> WarMemorial Negative Number 091307)Plate 2: Key officers of <strong>the</strong> 61stBattalion, just prior to <strong>the</strong> unit’s moveto Bougainville: (left to right) MajorC.H. Bicks (2IC), Lieutenant ColonelW.R. Dexter (CO) and Captain J.J.S.Hobbs (Adjutant). Although Dexterwas a highly experienced officer<strong>the</strong> battalion’s morale was highlyproblematic during operations onBougainville. (Credit: <strong>Australian</strong> WarMemorial Negative Number 075780)A tale of three battalions — 33