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company position, which <strong>the</strong>n also came under attack. On 31 March McKinna leda composite relief force of infantry, engineers and a tank troop, which had beenreleased for <strong>the</strong> brigade’s use given ‘evidence of <strong>the</strong> vigorous counter offensive by<strong>the</strong> enemy’,144 to <strong>the</strong> besieged companies. Over <strong>the</strong> course of this fighting eight<strong>Australian</strong>s were killed, fifty-eight wounded and 130 Japanese confirmed killed.145On <strong>the</strong> morning of 5 April <strong>the</strong> 25th Battalion’s headquarters group at Slater’s Knollwas attacked in great strength, and later two of <strong>the</strong> forward companies were alsoattacked. By early afternoon airstrikes, artillery fire and infantry and tank counterattackshad succeeded in defeating <strong>the</strong>se attacks, which cost <strong>the</strong> enemy 296 dead atSlater’s Knoll alone.146 McKinna was awarded an immediate DSO and by 14 April<strong>the</strong> entire battalion had been relieved by a unit from <strong>the</strong> 15th Brigade.147Both <strong>the</strong> 9th and 61st Battalions were involved in this hard fighting in lateMarch. For example, <strong>the</strong> 9th Battalion’s B echelon at Barara was attacked on <strong>the</strong>night of 28–29 March, resulting in twenty-three Japanese dead, while a companyof <strong>the</strong> 61st, located near McKinna’s B echelon, was similarly attacked on <strong>the</strong> samenight. The following morning <strong>the</strong> same company was tasked with clearing <strong>the</strong>track to Slater’s Knoll, but after a forty-five minute firefight, resulting in two<strong>Australian</strong> dead, was unable to dislodge what was estimated to be an entrenchedforce of seventy Japanese.148 The 25th Battalion’s report pointedly noted that on 30March, ‘Although <strong>the</strong> responsibility of opening <strong>the</strong> LOC [lines of communication]to 25 Bn HQ was that of A Coy 61 Bn, <strong>the</strong> CO decided not to wait any longer, but144 ‘7 Aust Inf Bde Report on Operations 26 Oct 44 to 16 May 45’, p. 8, 7 Infantry BrigadeWar Diary, August 1945, Appendices, AWM 52, Item 8/2/7.145 ‘25 Aust Inf Bn Report on Operations in South Bougainville 16 January to 14 April1945’, pp. 22–3, 25 Infantry Battalion War Diary, January–April 1945, AWM 52, Item8/3/63; Long, The Final Campaigns, pp. 161–162.146 Long, The Final Campaigns, pp. 162–3; ‘25 Aust Inf Bn Report on Operations in SouthBougainville 16 January to 14 April 1945’, p. 25, 25 Infantry Battalion War Diary,January–April 1945, AWM 52, Item 8/3/63.147 Field’s diary, 8 April 1945, AWM 3DRL6937, Item 7; ‘25 Aust Inf Bn Report onOperations in South Bougainville 16 January to 14 April 1945’, p. 26, 25 InfantryBattalion War Diary, January–April 1945, AWM 52, Item 8/3/63.148 61 Infantry Battalion War Diary, 29 March, February–March 1945, AWM 52, Item8/3/96; ‘25 Aust Inf Bn Report on Operations in South Bougainville 16 January to 14April 1945’, p. 21, 25 Infantry Battalion War Diary, January–April 1945, AWM 52,Item 8/3/63.30 — A tale of three battalions

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