In <strong>the</strong> last ditch, when <strong>the</strong> ‘Gatling’s jammed and <strong>the</strong> Colonel dead’, <strong>the</strong> soldier will bethinking more of his comrades in his section or platoon than of ‘The Cause’, Democracy,Queen and Country…59It is with <strong>the</strong> troops beside <strong>the</strong>m in battle that a soldier’s personal honour andsurvival ultimately rest. As some have noted, however, strong small-group cohesioncould, in some cases, undermine <strong>the</strong> will to fight.60 Esprit de corps, <strong>the</strong> ‘feelingsof pride, unity of purpose, and adherence to an ideal represented by <strong>the</strong> unit’, was<strong>the</strong> way in which small group-solidarity was linked to <strong>the</strong> attainment of an army’shigher goals.61 Formal acknowledgement of a unit’s achievements in battle helpedfoster this sense of purpose—even one small triumph could be crucial.62Professionally competent leadership was perhaps <strong>the</strong> critical factor for maintainingmorale. Small-group cohesion was <strong>the</strong> province of non-commissionedand junior officers, whilst battalion esprit de corps was influenced primarily by<strong>the</strong> CO and his company commanders. Such was <strong>the</strong> power of a CO’s influencethat it was ‘almost frightening to see how <strong>the</strong> character of a Commanding Officercan be reflected in his battalion’.63 An <strong>Australian</strong> operational report from 1945noted ‘That <strong>the</strong> only time <strong>the</strong> soldier becomes so exhausted as to feel incapable offur<strong>the</strong>r action is when <strong>the</strong> officer in command succumbs to fatigue’.64 Sometimes<strong>the</strong> death of a particularly well-loved leader could be problematic.65 A criticalleadership function in combat was monitoring battle fatigue, and managing <strong>the</strong>finite stock of courage within units.66 This could only be accomplished by leaders,particularly officers, being forward with <strong>the</strong> troops. Leadership was also important59 F.M. Richardson, Fighting Spirit: A Study of <strong>the</strong> Psychological Factors in War, LeoCooper, London, 1978, p. 12.60 Simon Wessely, ‘Twentieth-Century Theories on Combat Motivation and Breakdown’,Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 41, no. 2, 2006, p. 281.61 Anthony Kellett, ‘Combat Motivation’, in Gregory Belenky (ed.), Contemporary Studiesin Combat Psychiatry, Greenwood Press, New York, 1987, p. 208.62 Marshall, Men Against Fire, pp. 120–2.63 Baynes, Morale, p. 110.64 Margaret Barter, Far Above Battle: The Experience and Memory of <strong>Australian</strong> Soldiersin War 1939–1945, Allen&Unwin, Sydney, 1994, p. 243.65 Marshall, Men Against Fire, p. 193.66 Hew Strachan, ‘Training, Morale and Modern War’, Journal of Contemporary History,vol. 41, no. 2, 2006, pp. 222–3.12 — A tale of three battalions
for giving meaning to <strong>the</strong> efforts of <strong>the</strong> frontline soldier, whe<strong>the</strong>r this was in termsof patriotism, ideology or practical reality.67 Discipline and training helped slowdown <strong>the</strong> onset of battle fatigue by underpinning small-group cohesion and unitesprit de corps.68 Sound logistics and administration—<strong>the</strong> provision of adequatefood, rest, o<strong>the</strong>r required military resources and medical support—also playedimportant, but less glamorous, roles in maintaining combat effectiveness.69 Thenature of combat tended to ‘magnify <strong>the</strong> perception of grievances’, particularlyif <strong>the</strong> troops felt <strong>the</strong>y had been in action for too long.70 Dealing effectively withsuch perceptions was also important. Finally, it should be noted that when <strong>the</strong>factors that served to streng<strong>the</strong>n morale failed, and <strong>the</strong> psychological contestagainst battle fatigue was lost, <strong>the</strong> collective decline in will could spread quicklyand make recovery difficult.7167 ‘Notes on Bougainville by Major General H.H. Hammer’, p. 2, AWM 67, Item 3/156.68 Strachan, ‘Training, Morale and Modern War’, pp. 216–18.69 Baynes, Morale, pp. 253–4.70 Kellett, ‘Combat Motivation’, in Belenky (ed.), Contemporary Studies in CombatPsychiatry, p. 228.71 Marshal, Men Against Fire, p. 105 and Holmes, Firing Line, pp. 334–5.A tale of three battalions — 13