of <strong>the</strong> remainder of <strong>the</strong> war advancing in this direction. Its ultimate mission wasto ‘To destroy Japanese forces in Sou<strong>the</strong>rn Bougainville’.26Field’s 7th Brigade was a militia formation, consisting of both volunteers andconscripts, as opposed to <strong>the</strong> all-volunteer formations in <strong>the</strong> <strong>Australian</strong> ImperialForce (AIF).27 It consisted of <strong>the</strong> 9th, 25th and 61st Battalions and was <strong>the</strong> first toenter <strong>the</strong> line in November 1944. Its only previous combat experience had beenduring <strong>the</strong> short, but strategically critical, Milne Bay campaign in August–September1942.28 The main fighting lasted a fortnight and <strong>the</strong> 9th Battalion was not heavilyengaged.29 Despite <strong>the</strong> fact that Field estimated less than one third of his troops onBougainville had served with him at Milne Bay,30 this action was very much partof <strong>the</strong> brigade’s identity. Thereafter, however, <strong>the</strong> brigade had spent long periods oftime completing garrison duties in New Guinea, only returning to Australia betweenDecember 1943 and August 1944.31 Field considered this period of relative inactivity‘far too long’ and possibly resulted from a bias in <strong>the</strong> <strong>Australian</strong> <strong>Army</strong> against militiatroops.32 He had previously commanded <strong>the</strong> 2/12th Battalion, an AIF unit, during<strong>the</strong> siege of Tobruk and was awarded a Distinguished Service Order (DSO) for actionat Milne Bay.33 When movement difficulties looked like delaying <strong>the</strong> brigade’s relocationto Bougainville, Field noted that ‘Here is a well trained Brigade, enthusiastic andkeen to get on with <strong>the</strong> job, frustrated from action because of shipping’.3426 ‘2 Aust Corps Operation Instruction No.3’, 23 December 1944, Appendix B to ‘3 AustDiv Report on Operations November 1944-August 1945’, AWM 3DRL2529, Item 75.27 The creation of two different forces within <strong>the</strong> <strong>Army</strong> during <strong>the</strong> Second World Warhas been described as ‘one of <strong>the</strong> great mistakes of <strong>Australian</strong> war policy’. D.M Horner,‘Staff Corps Versus Militia: The <strong>Australian</strong> Experience in World War II’, Defence ForceJournal, Number 26, January/ February 1981, p. 13.28 Notes by Savige on Chapter 4 of Long’s draft of The Final Campaigns, p. 4, AWM3DRL2529, Item 128.29 Gavin Long, The Six Years War: A Concise History of <strong>Australian</strong> in <strong>the</strong> 1939–45 War,<strong>Australian</strong> War Memorial, Canberra, 1973, pp. 210–14; notes by Field on Long’s draftof The Final Campaigns, p. 4, AWM 67, Item 3/126/4.30 Long, The Final Campaigns, p. 97.31 Peter Denham, The Blue Diamonds: History of <strong>the</strong> 7th Brigade, Denham, Melbourne,1987, p. 68.32 Notes by Field on Long’s draft of The Final Campaigns, p. 3, AWM 67, Item 3/126/4.33 Biographical notes on Field, AWM 76, Item B175.34 Field’s diary, 25 October 1945, AWM 3DRL6937, Item 6.6 — A tale of three battalions
II <strong>Australian</strong> Corps area of operations Bougainville, 1944–1945.Source: Keating, The Right Man for <strong>the</strong> Right Job, p. 147. © Cartographic Services,Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, College of Asia and <strong>the</strong> Pacific, The<strong>Australian</strong> National University. Used by permission.A tale of three battalions — 7