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this study, suffice to say that such considerations were not readily appreciated bysoldiers at the tactical level, particularly as US forces advanced further north. Asone observer wrote:At Salamaua [New Guinea, 1943] men went after the Jap because every inch of groundwon meant so much less distance to Tokyo. But what did an inch of ground – or amile – mean on Bougainville? Nothing! Whether Bougainville could be taken in a week,or a year, would make no difference to the war in general.13Whilst such attitudes probably hardened with the value of hindsight, they didindicate that the strategic value of the campaign was not a motivating factor forthe troops and instead served as a negative background influence. As BrigadierNoel Simpson, the 29th Brigade’s second commander on Bougainville, noted, therewas ‘a tendency among all ranks including officers, to question the purpose andsoundness of operations in the Solomons’.14 The political sensitivity of operationsalso placed pressure on all levels of command to minimise casualties, resultingon Bougainville in what was called a corps ‘no casualties policy’.15 This createdconsiderable dilemmas for tactical-level commanders who had to reconcile therequirement to achieve their tasks, and maintain an aggressive fighting spirit intheir troops, with such constraints. It also resulted in Corps headquarters placinghighly restrictive conditions on subordinate formations.16There were a number of other background issues which probably impactedindirectly on general morale throughout II Corps. Manpower problems inAustralia and shipping limitations severely restricted the number of availablereinforcements, particularly infantrymen.17 The low priority placed on thecampaign by the United States meant that the resources required to prosecute13 S.E. Benson, The Story of the 42nd Australian Infantry Battalion, Dymock’s BookArcade, Sydney, 1952, p. 147. See also Peter Medcalf, War in the Shadows: Bougainville1944–45, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1986, p. 87.14 ‘Bougainville, Report on Operations 29 Australian Infantry Brigade, May to August1945’, p.2, AWM 3DRL 2529, Item 79.15 ‘Report on Operations of 23 Australian Infantry Brigade Group, Solomon Islands1944–1945’, p. 54, AWM 54, Item 613/6/37.16 Gavin Keating, The Right Man for the Right Job: Lieutenant General S.G. Savige as aMilitary Commander, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, pp. 152–3.17 ‘Report on Operational and Administrative Activities 2 Aust Corps in the NorthSolomons Area October 1944–August 1945’, p. 82, AWM 3DRL6643, Item 3/83.4 — A tale of three battalions