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limitations of military efficiency’.8 Whilst <strong>the</strong>se studies are valuable <strong>the</strong>y do notexamine in detail <strong>the</strong> causes of <strong>the</strong>se morale problems, beyond <strong>the</strong> role of unitCOs, or why <strong>the</strong> brigade’s third unit, <strong>the</strong> 25th Battalion, did not seem to havesuffered similar issues.9 This paper will trace <strong>the</strong> fortunes of <strong>the</strong> 7th Brigade’sbattalions during <strong>the</strong>ir operations on Bougainville in late 1944 and early 1945,and re-assess <strong>the</strong> reasons why one battalion disintegrated under <strong>the</strong> weight ofcombat stress, one was placed under considerable pressure and one appeared toescape relatively unaffected.BackgroundThe main <strong>Australian</strong> campaign on Bougainville began with <strong>the</strong> relief of <strong>the</strong> XIVUS Corps in November 1944 by Savige’s II <strong>Australian</strong> Corps. The US forces hadsecured a foothold at Torokina a year earlier, but had done little beyond developingthis area as a base for subsequent operations and protecting <strong>the</strong> perimeter.This relief was part of <strong>the</strong> larger movement to replace all US forces in Australia’smandated territories, something that effectively tied up two-thirds of <strong>the</strong><strong>Australian</strong> <strong>Army</strong> throughout 1945. General Sir Thomas Blamey, Commander-in-Chief <strong>Australian</strong> Military Forces (AMF), ordered ‘such offensive operations to beundertaken as would not commit major forces’.10 These offensives became an issueof intense debate, both during and after <strong>the</strong> war, prompting some to claim that<strong>the</strong>y were unnecessary and wasted lives.11 It is a complex issue and involved highlevelstrategic considerations—including <strong>the</strong> continuation of sufficient militaryactivity to secure Australia’s status in post-war settlement talks and <strong>the</strong> desirabilityof <strong>Australian</strong>s liberating <strong>the</strong> indigenous peoples in <strong>Australian</strong> territories.12 For8 Mark Johnston, At <strong>the</strong> Frontline: Experiences of <strong>Australian</strong> Soldiers in World War II,Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 1996, pp. 57–62.9 No unit history exists for <strong>the</strong> 25th Battalion and <strong>the</strong> <strong>Australian</strong> War Memorial doesnot appear to hold any personal diaries from unit members.10 ‘Report on Operational and Administrative Activities 2 Aust Corps in <strong>the</strong> NorthSolomons Area October 1944–August 1945’, p. 1, AWM 3DRL6643, Item 3/83.11 See Peter Charlton, The Unnecessary War: Island Campaigns in <strong>the</strong> South-West Pacific1944–45, MacMillan, Melbourne, 1983.12 For <strong>the</strong> debate see D.M. Horner, ‘Strategic Policy-Making, 1943–45’, in M. McKernanand M. Browne (eds), Australia: Two Centuries of War and Peace, <strong>Australian</strong> WarMemorial, Canberra, 1988, pp. 289–94.A tale of three battalions — 3