Report and Recommendations - Scottish Government
Report and Recommendations - Scottish Government Report and Recommendations - Scottish Government
contingent on the existence of evidence, as distinct from suspicion, far less ona corroborated case.Section 14 Detention5.1.11 Arrest was perceived as a status which required to be accompanied by acharge, at which time questioning had to stop. It could hardly, therefore, beused as an investigative tool. As already noted, the only alternative for thepolice was to “persuade” a suspect to accompany them to a police station to“help with their enquiries”. The Thomson Committee was concerned thatsuch a suspect did not have the rights of a person arrested and charged 17 .These rights included, and still include, intimation to, and later consultationwith, a solicitor prior to appearance in court on the next lawful court day 18 .The Committee recognised, as was indeed the case, that the absence of apower to take a suspect into custody as part of an investigation presented thepolice with considerable problems. It reported that 19 :“The policeman’s real difficulty arises in investigations where hewants to interview a suspect or prevent him from interfering withevidence such as stolen property. At present the police are powerlessto act without the consent of the very person who is likely to havemost interest in refusing to give that consent. Clearly the policeshould not be entitled to arrest anyone they want to interview but itseems plainly wrong, for example, that a suspected violent criminalwith significant evidence on his clothing has to be left at large whilethe police seek other evidence of his guilt sufficient to entitle them tocharge”.17 para 3.1018 1995 Act s 13519 para 3.1380
5.1.12 It was because of this lack of power that the Committee recommended 20 thatthere should be a separate investigative procedure whereby a person suspectedof an offence could be “detained” on reasonable suspicion, but only for a verylimited period and for specific narrowly defined purposes, includingquestioning. Detention was conceived by the Committee as a compromise inwhich there was no right of access to a lawyer prior to or during questioning,although it was not prohibited, and the suspect had to be either arrested andcharged or released within six hours. This was an extremely short period inEuropean, if not global, terms and was far less than that subsequentlyauthorised in England and Wales under PACE or in Ireland under the CriminalJustice Act 1984. It may be that the requirements of modern policing mighthave meant that such a short detention period would have struggled to surviveas a maximum in any event. But, perhaps not surprisingly given thealternative, there was little pressure from defence solicitors to change it. Thiswas not because “nobody thought that there was anything wrong with thisprocedure” 21 . There have been debates amongst lawyers about this subject foryears, not least at the time of the Thomson Committee 22 . Rather, manydefence lawyers considered that the system worked reasonably well for allconcerned, including suspects, distinguishing, in the context of an adversarialsystem, between what was acceptable as part of an investigation and whatcould be done when, and if, a prosecution had commenced. In this context,the short maximum period was seen as a particularly important consideration.Cadder, by placing a duty on the police to facilitate a suspect’s access to alawyer within the period of detention, effectively put an end to this particular20 para 3.2421 Cadder, Lord Hope at para 422 paras 5.08 and 7.1681
- Page 32 and 33: e a matter of fact to be determined
- Page 34 and 35: question the suspect until he/she b
- Page 36 and 37: Committee’s report when read as a
- Page 38 and 39: ultimate arbiter of constitutionali
- Page 40 and 41: was cautioned, but not told that he
- Page 42 and 43: at the whole circumstances of the c
- Page 44 and 45: Cadder2.0.35 Mr Cadder was aged 16
- Page 46 and 47: 2.0.39 Compelling reasons would hav
- Page 48 and 49: 2.0.44 These guidelines were supers
- Page 50 and 51: first required to have been “subs
- Page 52 and 53: The long term implication of this,
- Page 54 and 55: and of society as a whole. The purp
- Page 56 and 57: giving rise to the reasonable suspi
- Page 58 and 59: 3.0.15 The right of silence and the
- Page 60 and 61: complacency must be avoided and the
- Page 62 and 63: unlawful for a public authority to
- Page 64 and 65: 4.0.3 In short, the Review has gras
- Page 66 and 67: The System4.0.7 The recommendations
- Page 68 and 69: window during which these investiga
- Page 70 and 71: operates in a context where the hum
- Page 73 and 74: 5.0 CUSTODY CHAPTERS OVERVIEW5.0.1
- Page 75 and 76: next step, as quickly as possible.
- Page 77 and 78: 5.1 ARREST AND DETENTIONIntroductio
- Page 79 and 80: 5.1.6 The Review has considered whe
- Page 81: Arrest without warrant5.1.9 A polic
- Page 85 and 86: 5.1.15 Reasonable suspicion permits
- Page 87 and 88: arrest, without warrant, any person
- Page 89 and 90: interview. The Court stated that th
- Page 91 and 92: of the suspect and subsequent crimi
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- Page 95 and 96: justified by the evidence gathered
- Page 97: (d) may destroy evidence, interfere
- Page 100 and 101: Current law5.2.3 In terms of sectio
- Page 102 and 103: 5.2.5 Particularly in view of the t
- Page 104 and 105: individuals were being detained wit
- Page 106 and 107: significant crimes, reflected that
- Page 108 and 109: ConsiderationThe period before char
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- Page 112 and 113: ignored. There are about 100 detent
- Page 114 and 115: 5.2.26 Scotland is a small jurisdic
- Page 116 and 117: 5.2.29 Continuing with the custody
- Page 118 and 119: 5.2.32 The sheriffs principal and s
- Page 120 and 121: jurisdictions where judicial or oth
- Page 122 and 123: where they are uncertain of what th
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- Page 128 and 129: procurator fiscal consider that the
- Page 130 and 131: the standard bail conditions and, i
contingent on the existence of evidence, as distinct from suspicion, far less ona corroborated case.Section 14 Detention5.1.11 Arrest was perceived as a status which required to be accompanied by acharge, at which time questioning had to stop. It could hardly, therefore, beused as an investigative tool. As already noted, the only alternative for thepolice was to “persuade” a suspect to accompany them to a police station to“help with their enquiries”. The Thomson Committee was concerned thatsuch a suspect did not have the rights of a person arrested <strong>and</strong> charged 17 .These rights included, <strong>and</strong> still include, intimation to, <strong>and</strong> later consultationwith, a solicitor prior to appearance in court on the next lawful court day 18 .The Committee recognised, as was indeed the case, that the absence of apower to take a suspect into custody as part of an investigation presented thepolice with considerable problems. It reported that 19 :“The policeman’s real difficulty arises in investigations where hewants to interview a suspect or prevent him from interfering withevidence such as stolen property. At present the police are powerlessto act without the consent of the very person who is likely to havemost interest in refusing to give that consent. Clearly the policeshould not be entitled to arrest anyone they want to interview but itseems plainly wrong, for example, that a suspected violent criminalwith significant evidence on his clothing has to be left at large whilethe police seek other evidence of his guilt sufficient to entitle them tocharge”.17 para 3.1018 1995 Act s 13519 para 3.1380