Report and Recommendations - Scottish Government

Report and Recommendations - Scottish Government Report and Recommendations - Scottish Government

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12.07.2015 Views

3.0.15 The right of silence and the privilege against self incrimination have been saidby the European Court to be 11 :“generally recognised international standards which lie at the heart ofthe notion of a fair procedure under article 6. Their rationale lies, interalia, in the protection of the accused against improper compulsion bythe authorities thereby contributing to the avoidance of miscarriages ofjustice and to the fulfilment of the aims of article 6… The right not toincriminate oneself, in particular, presupposes that the prosecution in acriminal case seek to prove their case against the accused withoutresort to evidence obtained through methods of coercion or oppressionin defiance of the will of the accused”.It is interesting to note, therefore, that the Court sees, or at least saw 12 , theissue in terms of preventing miscarriages of justice, presumably because of therisk of false confessions brought about by coercion or oppression.3.0.16 There has been some consideration of whether these subsidiary or impliedrights are absolute or can be modified accordingly to the circumstances of theindividual case. It is made explicit in Salduz that the right of access to alawyer is not absolute 13 , but the Court has been less clear on this subject inrespect of the right to silence. In looking at whether the use of statementsobtained from a suspect violated Article 6, the Court has said that 14 :“This question must be examined by the Court in the light of all thecircumstances of the case. In particular, it must be determinedwhether the applicant has been subject to compulsion to give evidenceand whether the use made of the resulting testimony at his trial11 Saunders v United Kingdom (1996) 23 EHRR 313, para 68, see also Murray v United Kingdom(1996) 26 EHRR 2912 see now Dayanan v Turkey, 13 October 2009 (no 7377/03)13 Salduz at para 51 et seq14 Saunders at para 6956

offended the basic principles of a fair procedure inherent in Article 6(1)of which the right not to incriminate oneself is a constituent part”.The context was a procedure which compelled a person to answer questions 15 .However, the Court appeared to be saying that there were no fixed rules on thesubject. Each case had to be looked at on its own facts to see if there had beenan infringement of the general right to a fair trial. The Court has not, however,normally recognised any circumstances in which this fundamental right can beoverridden by, for example, arguing that forcing persons to answer questionsis a proportionate response when dealing with terrorist suspects 16 . Yet inGafgen v Germany 17 the Court has recently stated that Article 6 does notenshrine any absolute right.Article 3 – Prohibition of Torture3.0.17 Article 3, which proscribes “inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”,was drafted partly as a protection against any oppressive practices in thecriminal justice systems of Convention countries.3.0.18 The Review did not receive any representations expressing significantconcerns about the systemic ill treatment of suspects which might infringeArticle 3. Although this report comments on the Spartan conditions in whichsuspects are detained, the Review did not gain the impression that there was afeeling that such ill treatment was prevalent or common. However,15 DTI investigation under the Companies Act 1985; see esp s 434 and s 43616 Heaney and McGuiness v Ireland (2001) 33 EHRR 12 at paras 53-59, Quinn v Ireland unreported,21 December 2000 paras 53-60; Shannon v UK (2006) 42 EHRR 31 at paras 38-4117 (2011) 52 EHRR 1 at para 17857

3.0.15 The right of silence <strong>and</strong> the privilege against self incrimination have been saidby the European Court to be 11 :“generally recognised international st<strong>and</strong>ards which lie at the heart ofthe notion of a fair procedure under article 6. Their rationale lies, interalia, in the protection of the accused against improper compulsion bythe authorities thereby contributing to the avoidance of miscarriages ofjustice <strong>and</strong> to the fulfilment of the aims of article 6… The right not toincriminate oneself, in particular, presupposes that the prosecution in acriminal case seek to prove their case against the accused withoutresort to evidence obtained through methods of coercion or oppressionin defiance of the will of the accused”.It is interesting to note, therefore, that the Court sees, or at least saw 12 , theissue in terms of preventing miscarriages of justice, presumably because of therisk of false confessions brought about by coercion or oppression.3.0.16 There has been some consideration of whether these subsidiary or impliedrights are absolute or can be modified accordingly to the circumstances of theindividual case. It is made explicit in Salduz that the right of access to alawyer is not absolute 13 , but the Court has been less clear on this subject inrespect of the right to silence. In looking at whether the use of statementsobtained from a suspect violated Article 6, the Court has said that 14 :“This question must be examined by the Court in the light of all thecircumstances of the case. In particular, it must be determinedwhether the applicant has been subject to compulsion to give evidence<strong>and</strong> whether the use made of the resulting testimony at his trial11 Saunders v United Kingdom (1996) 23 EHRR 313, para 68, see also Murray v United Kingdom(1996) 26 EHRR 2912 see now Dayanan v Turkey, 13 October 2009 (no 7377/03)13 Salduz at para 51 et seq14 Saunders at para 6956

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