Report and Recommendations - Scottish Government
Report and Recommendations - Scottish Government Report and Recommendations - Scottish Government
2.0.44 These guidelines were superseded in the immediate aftermath of Cadder bythe passing of the Criminal Procedure (Legal Assistance, Detention andAppeals) (Scotland) Act 2010 through emergency legislative procedures inOctober 2010. The 2010 Act provided a statutory right of access to a lawyerfor all suspects being interviewed at a police station; extended the period ofsection 14 detention from six to twelve hours, with a possible furtherextension to twenty-four hours. This then is the regime which is currently inoperation.2.0.45 One of the significant problems which Cadder created was the uncertaintygenerated by the United Kingdom Supreme Court’s failure to define, with anyreal precision, exactly when the right of access to a lawyer commenced.Simply quoting from Salduz meant that it was from the “first interrogation” ofa suspect by the police. But this raised questions of when that “firstinterrogation” occurs. On the one hand, it could be, and was, argued that theCourt was referring only to the point at which a suspect, who had already beenformally arrested or detained under section 14, was interviewed at the policestation under tape recorded conditions. That was, after all, the position inCadder and the suspect in Salduz too had at least been formally detained. Onthe other hand, taken literally, it could be, and again was, argued that it meantany point at which a suspect was questioned by the police. Thus the suspect atthe locus of an incident could not give admissible answers to questionswithout having been afforded access to a lawyer. The same might apply to thesuspect whom the police elected to speak to at his house. Lord Rodger 59 had,59 Cadder, at para 9346
for example, referred to there not being the “remotest chance” that theEuropean Court would consider it compatible with Article 6 for “suspects tobe routinely questioned without having the right to consult a lawyer first”,without qualifying that by reference to any need for the suspect to have beenin detention. Not surprisingly, the uncertainty so created spawned a largenumber of objections to evidence of incriminatory remarks made in the manydifferent circumstances which can arise before a suspect is either arrested ormade the subject to section 14 detention. Several appeals followed hearings inthe Sheriff and High Courts, it being made clear by some of the sheriffs andjudges that they had difficulty in determining how to apply the Cadder dicta.This process culminated in the Lord Advocate referring four cases direct to theUnited Kingdom Supreme Court in order to achieve rapid clarity on the pointof when exactly the right of access to a lawyer arises.Ambrose2.0.46 In Ambrose v Harris 60 and its sister cases 61 , the United Kingdom SupremeCourt 62 did provide some, albeit still limited, clarity on what is an issue ofconsiderable importance in the practical operation of police investigations andpublic prosecutions in court. The Court held that, following especiallyZaichenko v Russia 63 , the right of access to a lawyer does not arise in allsituations where a suspect is to be questioned by the police. In order, for thegeneral Article 6 right to a fair trial to have arisen, the situation of the suspect60 [2011] UKSC 4361 HM Advocate v G and HM Advocate v M; and HM Advocate v P [2011] UKSC 4462 by a 4-1 majority63 18 February 2010 (no 39660/02)47
- Page 1: TheCarloway ReviewReport andRecomme
- Page 4 and 5: highly disruptive to the system gen
- Page 9: LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS1995 Act The C
- Page 13 and 14: 1.0 INTRODUCTIONBackground1.0.1 In
- Page 15 and 16: a solicitor” prior to, and at any
- Page 17 and 18: ole of the Group was to provide the
- Page 19 and 20: of the points made at each of these
- Page 21 and 22: Topics outwith the scope of the Rev
- Page 23: Convention, describes the overall v
- Page 26 and 27: Justice-Clerk (Inglis) stated to a
- Page 28 and 29: arrest and liberty. There was nothi
- Page 30 and 31: he/she does not do so, he/she risks
- Page 32 and 33: e a matter of fact to be determined
- Page 34 and 35: question the suspect until he/she b
- Page 36 and 37: Committee’s report when read as a
- Page 38 and 39: ultimate arbiter of constitutionali
- Page 40 and 41: was cautioned, but not told that he
- Page 42 and 43: at the whole circumstances of the c
- Page 44 and 45: Cadder2.0.35 Mr Cadder was aged 16
- Page 46 and 47: 2.0.39 Compelling reasons would hav
- Page 50 and 51: first required to have been “subs
- Page 52 and 53: The long term implication of this,
- Page 54 and 55: and of society as a whole. The purp
- Page 56 and 57: giving rise to the reasonable suspi
- Page 58 and 59: 3.0.15 The right of silence and the
- Page 60 and 61: complacency must be avoided and the
- Page 62 and 63: unlawful for a public authority to
- Page 64 and 65: 4.0.3 In short, the Review has gras
- Page 66 and 67: The System4.0.7 The recommendations
- Page 68 and 69: window during which these investiga
- Page 70 and 71: operates in a context where the hum
- Page 73 and 74: 5.0 CUSTODY CHAPTERS OVERVIEW5.0.1
- Page 75 and 76: next step, as quickly as possible.
- Page 77 and 78: 5.1 ARREST AND DETENTIONIntroductio
- Page 79 and 80: 5.1.6 The Review has considered whe
- Page 81 and 82: Arrest without warrant5.1.9 A polic
- Page 83 and 84: 5.1.12 It was because of this lack
- Page 85 and 86: 5.1.15 Reasonable suspicion permits
- Page 87 and 88: arrest, without warrant, any person
- Page 89 and 90: interview. The Court stated that th
- Page 91 and 92: of the suspect and subsequent crimi
- Page 93 and 94: appropriate ground for both arrest
- Page 95 and 96: justified by the evidence gathered
- Page 97: (d) may destroy evidence, interfere
2.0.44 These guidelines were superseded in the immediate aftermath of Cadder bythe passing of the Criminal Procedure (Legal Assistance, Detention <strong>and</strong>Appeals) (Scotl<strong>and</strong>) Act 2010 through emergency legislative procedures inOctober 2010. The 2010 Act provided a statutory right of access to a lawyerfor all suspects being interviewed at a police station; extended the period ofsection 14 detention from six to twelve hours, with a possible furtherextension to twenty-four hours. This then is the regime which is currently inoperation.2.0.45 One of the significant problems which Cadder created was the uncertaintygenerated by the United Kingdom Supreme Court’s failure to define, with anyreal precision, exactly when the right of access to a lawyer commenced.Simply quoting from Salduz meant that it was from the “first interrogation” ofa suspect by the police. But this raised questions of when that “firstinterrogation” occurs. On the one h<strong>and</strong>, it could be, <strong>and</strong> was, argued that theCourt was referring only to the point at which a suspect, who had already beenformally arrested or detained under section 14, was interviewed at the policestation under tape recorded conditions. That was, after all, the position inCadder <strong>and</strong> the suspect in Salduz too had at least been formally detained. Onthe other h<strong>and</strong>, taken literally, it could be, <strong>and</strong> again was, argued that it meantany point at which a suspect was questioned by the police. Thus the suspect atthe locus of an incident could not give admissible answers to questionswithout having been afforded access to a lawyer. The same might apply to thesuspect whom the police elected to speak to at his house. Lord Rodger 59 had,59 Cadder, at para 9346