Report and Recommendations - Scottish Government
Report and Recommendations - Scottish Government Report and Recommendations - Scottish Government
arrest and liberty. There was nothing in between, whereby a suspect could bedetained on “suspicion” and questioned prior to charge 12 .2.0.5 The remarkable circumstances in Chalmers were that, once suspicion hadfallen upon the appellant, he had been “taken” to a police station andcautioned. He was not formally arrested. Within five minutes of the start ofquestioning, he had effectively broken down and had ultimately taken thepolice to where the deceased’s purse could be found. This incriminated him inthe deceased’s murder. The Lord Justice General (Cooper) regarded all of theevidence concerning the police’s dealings with the appellant to beinadmissible, as he had essentially been the suspect and thus, it was reasoned,in the same category as someone who had been arrested and ought therefore tohave been charged. He could not legitimately be questioned. The LordJustice General expressly stated that, whilst he had sympathy with the policein the difficult position in which they were often placed, it was not thefunction of the police to “direct their endeavours to obtaining a confessionfrom the suspect to be used as evidence against him at the trial”. Only“spontaneous” voluntary statements were admissible. Thus, at the initial stageof an investigation, the police were free to question anyone with a view toacquiring information which may lead to the detection of the criminal.However, when the stage of suspicion was reached (in the sense of the personbeing regarded as the likely perpetrator of the crime) further interrogation ofthat person became “very dangerous” and would essentially render anyresponses inadmissible. It was in this celebrated part of his Opinion that the12 see Swankie v Milne 1973 JC 1, Lord Cameron at 12326
Lord Justice General referred to the ordinary citizen regarding the venue of apolice station as “sinister”, where the dice were loaded against the suspect 13 .There followed this passage, in which he outlined what he viewed to havebeen the law for over almost a century 14 :“The accused cannot be compelled to give evidence at his trial and tosubmit to cross examination. If it were competent for the police attheir own hand to subject the accused to interrogation and crossexamination and to adduce evidence of what he said, the prosecutionwould in effect be making the accused a compellable witness, andlaying before the jury, at second hand, evidence which could not beadduced at first hand, even subject to all the precautions which areavailable for the protection of the accused at a criminal trial”.2.0.6 Contrary to what the Thomson Committee subsequently considered to be thetrue position 15 , this was thus advanced as the legal basis in pre-ConventionScots criminal law for the exclusion of evidence of confessions notspontaneously given. Logically, it was reasoned, because an accused personcould not be forced to give evidence, he/she could not be forced to answerquestions at an earlier stage either. As will be seen, this view was lateradopted by Lord Rodger, when he was Lord Justice General 16 .2.0.7 Whether this analysis of principle is correct is debatable, but the analogy is notquite right. If an accused person elects to give evidence in court, he/shecannot do so by answering only some questions on the grounds that theanswers to others might incriminate him/her. Once he/she starts to testify,he/she must answer every question posed relative to the crime charged. If13 His opinion found favour with the Supreme Court of the United States in Miranda v Arizona (1966)384 US 436, Warren CJ at 47814 at 7915 at para 7.0216 Brown v Stott 2000 JC 328 at 34627
- Page 1: TheCarloway ReviewReport andRecomme
- Page 4 and 5: highly disruptive to the system gen
- Page 9: LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS1995 Act The C
- Page 13 and 14: 1.0 INTRODUCTIONBackground1.0.1 In
- Page 15 and 16: a solicitor” prior to, and at any
- Page 17 and 18: ole of the Group was to provide the
- Page 19 and 20: of the points made at each of these
- Page 21 and 22: Topics outwith the scope of the Rev
- Page 23: Convention, describes the overall v
- Page 26 and 27: Justice-Clerk (Inglis) stated to a
- Page 30 and 31: he/she does not do so, he/she risks
- Page 32 and 33: e a matter of fact to be determined
- Page 34 and 35: question the suspect until he/she b
- Page 36 and 37: Committee’s report when read as a
- Page 38 and 39: ultimate arbiter of constitutionali
- Page 40 and 41: was cautioned, but not told that he
- Page 42 and 43: at the whole circumstances of the c
- Page 44 and 45: Cadder2.0.35 Mr Cadder was aged 16
- Page 46 and 47: 2.0.39 Compelling reasons would hav
- Page 48 and 49: 2.0.44 These guidelines were supers
- Page 50 and 51: first required to have been “subs
- Page 52 and 53: The long term implication of this,
- Page 54 and 55: and of society as a whole. The purp
- Page 56 and 57: giving rise to the reasonable suspi
- Page 58 and 59: 3.0.15 The right of silence and the
- Page 60 and 61: complacency must be avoided and the
- Page 62 and 63: unlawful for a public authority to
- Page 64 and 65: 4.0.3 In short, the Review has gras
- Page 66 and 67: The System4.0.7 The recommendations
- Page 68 and 69: window during which these investiga
- Page 70 and 71: operates in a context where the hum
- Page 73 and 74: 5.0 CUSTODY CHAPTERS OVERVIEW5.0.1
- Page 75 and 76: next step, as quickly as possible.
- Page 77 and 78: 5.1 ARREST AND DETENTIONIntroductio
arrest <strong>and</strong> liberty. There was nothing in between, whereby a suspect could bedetained on “suspicion” <strong>and</strong> questioned prior to charge 12 .2.0.5 The remarkable circumstances in Chalmers were that, once suspicion hadfallen upon the appellant, he had been “taken” to a police station <strong>and</strong>cautioned. He was not formally arrested. Within five minutes of the start ofquestioning, he had effectively broken down <strong>and</strong> had ultimately taken thepolice to where the deceased’s purse could be found. This incriminated him inthe deceased’s murder. The Lord Justice General (Cooper) regarded all of theevidence concerning the police’s dealings with the appellant to beinadmissible, as he had essentially been the suspect <strong>and</strong> thus, it was reasoned,in the same category as someone who had been arrested <strong>and</strong> ought therefore tohave been charged. He could not legitimately be questioned. The LordJustice General expressly stated that, whilst he had sympathy with the policein the difficult position in which they were often placed, it was not thefunction of the police to “direct their endeavours to obtaining a confessionfrom the suspect to be used as evidence against him at the trial”. Only“spontaneous” voluntary statements were admissible. Thus, at the initial stageof an investigation, the police were free to question anyone with a view toacquiring information which may lead to the detection of the criminal.However, when the stage of suspicion was reached (in the sense of the personbeing regarded as the likely perpetrator of the crime) further interrogation ofthat person became “very dangerous” <strong>and</strong> would essentially render anyresponses inadmissible. It was in this celebrated part of his Opinion that the12 see Swankie v Milne 1973 JC 1, Lord Cameron at 12326