Report and Recommendations - Scottish Government

Report and Recommendations - Scottish Government Report and Recommendations - Scottish Government

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arrest and liberty. There was nothing in between, whereby a suspect could bedetained on “suspicion” and questioned prior to charge 12 .2.0.5 The remarkable circumstances in Chalmers were that, once suspicion hadfallen upon the appellant, he had been “taken” to a police station andcautioned. He was not formally arrested. Within five minutes of the start ofquestioning, he had effectively broken down and had ultimately taken thepolice to where the deceased’s purse could be found. This incriminated him inthe deceased’s murder. The Lord Justice General (Cooper) regarded all of theevidence concerning the police’s dealings with the appellant to beinadmissible, as he had essentially been the suspect and thus, it was reasoned,in the same category as someone who had been arrested and ought therefore tohave been charged. He could not legitimately be questioned. The LordJustice General expressly stated that, whilst he had sympathy with the policein the difficult position in which they were often placed, it was not thefunction of the police to “direct their endeavours to obtaining a confessionfrom the suspect to be used as evidence against him at the trial”. Only“spontaneous” voluntary statements were admissible. Thus, at the initial stageof an investigation, the police were free to question anyone with a view toacquiring information which may lead to the detection of the criminal.However, when the stage of suspicion was reached (in the sense of the personbeing regarded as the likely perpetrator of the crime) further interrogation ofthat person became “very dangerous” and would essentially render anyresponses inadmissible. It was in this celebrated part of his Opinion that the12 see Swankie v Milne 1973 JC 1, Lord Cameron at 12326

Lord Justice General referred to the ordinary citizen regarding the venue of apolice station as “sinister”, where the dice were loaded against the suspect 13 .There followed this passage, in which he outlined what he viewed to havebeen the law for over almost a century 14 :“The accused cannot be compelled to give evidence at his trial and tosubmit to cross examination. If it were competent for the police attheir own hand to subject the accused to interrogation and crossexamination and to adduce evidence of what he said, the prosecutionwould in effect be making the accused a compellable witness, andlaying before the jury, at second hand, evidence which could not beadduced at first hand, even subject to all the precautions which areavailable for the protection of the accused at a criminal trial”.2.0.6 Contrary to what the Thomson Committee subsequently considered to be thetrue position 15 , this was thus advanced as the legal basis in pre-ConventionScots criminal law for the exclusion of evidence of confessions notspontaneously given. Logically, it was reasoned, because an accused personcould not be forced to give evidence, he/she could not be forced to answerquestions at an earlier stage either. As will be seen, this view was lateradopted by Lord Rodger, when he was Lord Justice General 16 .2.0.7 Whether this analysis of principle is correct is debatable, but the analogy is notquite right. If an accused person elects to give evidence in court, he/shecannot do so by answering only some questions on the grounds that theanswers to others might incriminate him/her. Once he/she starts to testify,he/she must answer every question posed relative to the crime charged. If13 His opinion found favour with the Supreme Court of the United States in Miranda v Arizona (1966)384 US 436, Warren CJ at 47814 at 7915 at para 7.0216 Brown v Stott 2000 JC 328 at 34627

arrest <strong>and</strong> liberty. There was nothing in between, whereby a suspect could bedetained on “suspicion” <strong>and</strong> questioned prior to charge 12 .2.0.5 The remarkable circumstances in Chalmers were that, once suspicion hadfallen upon the appellant, he had been “taken” to a police station <strong>and</strong>cautioned. He was not formally arrested. Within five minutes of the start ofquestioning, he had effectively broken down <strong>and</strong> had ultimately taken thepolice to where the deceased’s purse could be found. This incriminated him inthe deceased’s murder. The Lord Justice General (Cooper) regarded all of theevidence concerning the police’s dealings with the appellant to beinadmissible, as he had essentially been the suspect <strong>and</strong> thus, it was reasoned,in the same category as someone who had been arrested <strong>and</strong> ought therefore tohave been charged. He could not legitimately be questioned. The LordJustice General expressly stated that, whilst he had sympathy with the policein the difficult position in which they were often placed, it was not thefunction of the police to “direct their endeavours to obtaining a confessionfrom the suspect to be used as evidence against him at the trial”. Only“spontaneous” voluntary statements were admissible. Thus, at the initial stageof an investigation, the police were free to question anyone with a view toacquiring information which may lead to the detection of the criminal.However, when the stage of suspicion was reached (in the sense of the personbeing regarded as the likely perpetrator of the crime) further interrogation ofthat person became “very dangerous” <strong>and</strong> would essentially render anyresponses inadmissible. It was in this celebrated part of his Opinion that the12 see Swankie v Milne 1973 JC 1, Lord Cameron at 12326

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