Report and Recommendations - Scottish Government

Report and Recommendations - Scottish Government Report and Recommendations - Scottish Government

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12.07.2015 Views

He concluded 50 :“Although two witnesses are needed to incriminate an accused, asingle witness to each fact in a chain of circumstantial evidence can besufficient in law to warrant a conviction”.If the latter statement were the law, then it is not one grounded upon therequirement of corroboration, at least strictly.7.1.20 The contention, that having only one police officer to speak to each fact wasinsufficient, was specifically commented upon by the Lord Justice-Clerk(Thomson) as follows 51 :“If law were an exact science or even a department of logic, theremight be something to be said for this argument. By relying on thedisparate qualities of space and time the logician can prove that in arace the hare can never overtake the tortoise. But law is a practicalaffair and one has to approach its problems in a mundane commonsense way. We cannot expect always to have a tidy and interrelatedpicture, in real life a surrealistic element is apt to creep in, and thepicture, although untidy and unharmonious, may be a picture all thesame… The analytical approach to the problem is over subtle andover-simplifies the problem. When one views that problem as apractical issue, the only risk is that the knob was not pressed at theprecise moment; in other words that the presser was unreliable forsome reason or another. The safeguard against this risk is whether thetribunal believes the witness, and that is the safeguard which mayoperate whenever a link in the chain or a tile in the mosaic or a piecein the jigsaw is spoken to by one witness only”.50 at 3851 at p 40252

7.1.21 The chain analogy 52 is not consistent with the traditional view of therequirement and the dicta in Gillespie has been strongly criticised asinconsistent with it 53 . The criticism can be simply stated 54 :“…whereas Hume insisted on concurrence of testimonies the Court inGillespie’s case relied on testimonies which were only set outconsecutively. Whereas Hume regarded the testimonies in parallel, theCourt in Gillespie regarded them in series. Whereas two testimoniesin parallel confirm one another, two testimonies in series do not.Whereas two testimonies in parallel reduce the risk of error, twotestimonies in series (as in Gillespie’s case) may increase that risk”.That criticism is well made, in so far as it argues that Gillespie is out of kilterwith the requirement for corroboration as understood in Romano-canonicalterms. This is so even although the reasoning in Gillespie was effectivelyregularly followed in the context of circumstantial cases 55 . But it should notbe assumed that the judges in that case were not aware of the implications oftheir analyses and that they had fallen into some form of academic ortheoretical error. Given their backgrounds as lawyers well versed in thesubject in both the civil and criminal spheres, it is more likely that they knewexactly what they were doing, which was engaging in the continuing processof altering, or bending, the requirement for corroboration to meet the needs ofmodern society. Thus, the criticism is sound if it is presupposed that Scots lawmust remain thirled to the requirement in its Romano-canonical sense. If it52 see Scott v Jameson 1914 JC 18753 see Macphail: Revised Research Paper on Evidence para 23.04, Walker & Walker : Evidence (1st ed)para 387, references in fn 74; Wilson: The Logic of Corroboration (1960) 76 Sc Law Rev 101contrasting the “old” preferred theory with the “new” Gillespie theory founded on Lees v Macdonald(1893) 3 White 46854 1958 SLT (news) 13755 see e.g. Little v HM Advocate 1983 JC 16, LJG (Emslie) at 20, under reference to Morton v HMAdvocate 1938 JC 50, LJ-C (Aitchison) at 52; Al Megrahi v HM Advocate 2002 JC 99, LJG (Cullen) atpara 31 under reference to Hume ii, 383-4; Mack v HM Advocate 1999 SCCR 181, LJG (Rodger) at185253

He concluded 50 :“Although two witnesses are needed to incriminate an accused, asingle witness to each fact in a chain of circumstantial evidence can besufficient in law to warrant a conviction”.If the latter statement were the law, then it is not one grounded upon therequirement of corroboration, at least strictly.7.1.20 The contention, that having only one police officer to speak to each fact wasinsufficient, was specifically commented upon by the Lord Justice-Clerk(Thomson) as follows 51 :“If law were an exact science or even a department of logic, theremight be something to be said for this argument. By relying on thedisparate qualities of space <strong>and</strong> time the logician can prove that in arace the hare can never overtake the tortoise. But law is a practicalaffair <strong>and</strong> one has to approach its problems in a mundane commonsense way. We cannot expect always to have a tidy <strong>and</strong> interrelatedpicture, in real life a surrealistic element is apt to creep in, <strong>and</strong> thepicture, although untidy <strong>and</strong> unharmonious, may be a picture all thesame… The analytical approach to the problem is over subtle <strong>and</strong>over-simplifies the problem. When one views that problem as apractical issue, the only risk is that the knob was not pressed at theprecise moment; in other words that the presser was unreliable forsome reason or another. The safeguard against this risk is whether thetribunal believes the witness, <strong>and</strong> that is the safeguard which mayoperate whenever a link in the chain or a tile in the mosaic or a piecein the jigsaw is spoken to by one witness only”.50 at 3851 at p 40252

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