Ezra Taft Benson and the State of Israel - Brandeis Institutional ...
Ezra Taft Benson and the State of Israel - Brandeis Institutional ... Ezra Taft Benson and the State of Israel - Brandeis Institutional ...
with Britain and France, for their collusion against Egypt in the 1956 Sinai Campaign,they never questioned Israel's legitimacy as a state. 145Perhaps part of the reason the President was able to keep a low profile regardingIsrael was because, by the early 1950s, Israel to a large extent had already faded from theAmerican public awareness. 146Even in the years directly after World War II, Americansupport for a Jewish state was only slightly greater than its opposition. 147In fact, otherthan Evangelical and Jewish support, the lack of opposition seemed to be the mood in theU.S. more than unwavering support. 148 They agreed, like Truman, that the Jews ofEurope needed somewhere to go, 149 and two-thirds of Americans favored the formationof a Jewish state, 150 but by the early and mid-1950s, other concerns filled the publicagenda. Grose explains that the Korean War, combined with the looming threat ofCommunism in both the Soviet Union and China, “evoked much greater publicpassions.” 151American support for Israel took an immediate downturn in the fall of 1956. Thatwas when Britain, France, and Israel colluded, as was later discovered, to invade Egypt'sSinai in an attempt to reclaim the Suez, end Nasser's defiant support of Algerianindependence, and ease pressure from Egyptian fedayeen attacks on Israel from theunruly Sinai border, among various aims. 152 As noted previously, President Eisenhower145146147148149150151152Oren, Power, Faith and Fantasy, 516.Grose, Israel in the Mind of America, 303.Grose, Israel in the Mind of America, chapter 11.Mart, “Christianization of Israel and Jews,” 119.Oren, Power, Faith and Fantasy, 483; Grose, Israel in the Mind of America, 208.Grose, Israel in the Mind of America, 262.Grose, Israel in the Mind of America, 303.For more explanation of the Sinai Campaign of 1956, see Michael B. Oren, “Secret Egypt-Israel PeaceInitiatives Prior to the Suez Campaign,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 26, no. 3 (July, 1990), 351-370;and S. Ilan Troen, “The Protocol of Sèvres: British/French/Israeli Collusion against Egypt,” Israel48
and Secretary Dulles were furious; in the American public, support for Israel declinedsharply, a decline Israel simply couldn't afford. 153That mood of disdain for Israeli aggression against Egypt was not to last long. AsAmerica struggled to find success against Communist forces in Vietnam and observedwith great concern the increasing Soviet involvement with Egypt and the broader MiddleEast, support for Israel as a strategic island of pro-Western forces began to win out overfrustration with the 1956 debacle. Egypt's ruler Nasser evicted from Sinai and the GazaStrip the UN peacekeeping forces that had remained since the Suez Crisis a decadebefore, and made his intention clear to, as the Iraqi leader had put it, “wipe Israel off theface of the map.” 154 Joining forces with Jordan and Syria, Egypt made preparations forwar with Israel, confident of support from the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, Israelileadership, remembering American anger over 1956, remained unsure whether topreemptively strike or await attack. 155 They chose to attack first, but this time, Americalooked much more favorably on the Israeli victory against its Arab neighbors, manyseeing it as a proxy fight in their own Cold War with the Soviets. 156 According to Oren,American support for Israel in 1967 had two major bases: the opinion of manyevangelicals that Israel's victory in the Six-Day War was evidence of divine intervention,and thus that the messianic age was nigh at hand; and politically, the understanding of153154155156Studies, Vol. 1, no. 2 (Fall, 1996), 122-139.Grose, Israel in the Mind of America, 304.Oren, Power, Faith and Fantasy, 525.Oren, Power, Faith and Fantasy, 525.Oren, Power, Faith and Fantasy, 527.49
- Page 2 and 3: AcknowledgementsI am indebted to Pr
- Page 4 and 5: Table of ContentsIntroduction - 1Ch
- Page 6 and 7: elationship in any depth.In researc
- Page 8 and 9: friendships with various Israeli le
- Page 10 and 11: Joseph Smith taught that Latter-day
- Page 12 and 13: Gentiles, and it will be again inha
- Page 14 and 15: for their long suffering. Yet, he,
- Page 16 and 17: focus on both the fulfillment of pr
- Page 18 and 19: Smith and Brigham Young, as previou
- Page 20 and 21: Smith, the members of the group “
- Page 22 and 23: Jews.'” 46Benjamin further descri
- Page 24 and 25: Chapter 2: Benson's Religious Leade
- Page 26 and 27: audiences. The first, called, “Je
- Page 28 and 29: Benson's sense of kinship for the J
- Page 30 and 31: eturn of the Jews to the land of Pa
- Page 32 and 33: general mention of his efforts at s
- Page 34 and 35: Or perhaps it did not aid in his ap
- Page 36 and 37: about Jews and Israel, throughout t
- Page 38 and 39: and Peter Grose describe the frustr
- Page 40 and 41: Israel's victory in the Six Day War
- Page 42 and 43: the Messiah. Indeed, both Benson an
- Page 44 and 45: those visits, as opposed to those o
- Page 46 and 47: U.S. agricultural products on credi
- Page 48 and 49: The American public, though divided
- Page 50 and 51: States.” 133Indeed, a Gallup poll
- Page 54 and 55: many Americans that Israel was now,
- Page 56 and 57: those experiences to give validity
- Page 58 and 59: Benson, “I want you to pray to Go
- Page 60 and 61: gathering. Some of those themes inc
- Page 62 and 63: Ben Gurion and Levi Eshkol, both of
- Page 64 and 65: sending “two Mormon Books,” and
- Page 66 and 67: Yet Ben Gurion's next letter, dated
- Page 68 and 69: on this occasion with Shimon Peres
- Page 70 and 71: cultivate land for crops in the 194
- Page 72 and 73: attitude in the Synagogue Light art
- Page 74 and 75: United States, his views on Israel
- Page 76 and 77: eminded the host that he had not be
- Page 78 and 79: Thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and
- Page 80 and 81: "Though Thy servant is now far from
- Page 82 and 83: BibliographyAlteras, Isaac. Eisenho
- Page 84 and 85: Madsen, Truman G. “Mormon Attitud
<strong>and</strong> Secretary Dulles were furious; in <strong>the</strong> American public, support for <strong>Israel</strong> declinedsharply, a decline <strong>Israel</strong> simply couldn't afford. 153That mood <strong>of</strong> disdain for <strong>Israel</strong>i aggression against Egypt was not to last long. AsAmerica struggled to find success against Communist forces in Vietnam <strong>and</strong> observedwith great concern <strong>the</strong> increasing Soviet involvement with Egypt <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> broader MiddleEast, support for <strong>Israel</strong> as a strategic isl<strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong> pro-Western forces began to win out overfrustration with <strong>the</strong> 1956 debacle. Egypt's ruler Nasser evicted from Sinai <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> GazaStrip <strong>the</strong> UN peacekeeping forces that had remained since <strong>the</strong> Suez Crisis a decadebefore, <strong>and</strong> made his intention clear to, as <strong>the</strong> Iraqi leader had put it, “wipe <strong>Israel</strong> <strong>of</strong>f <strong>the</strong>face <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> map.” 154 Joining forces with Jordan <strong>and</strong> Syria, Egypt made preparations forwar with <strong>Israel</strong>, confident <strong>of</strong> support from <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union. Meanwhile, <strong>Israel</strong>ileadership, remembering American anger over 1956, remained unsure whe<strong>the</strong>r topreemptively strike or await attack. 155 They chose to attack first, but this time, Americalooked much more favorably on <strong>the</strong> <strong>Israel</strong>i victory against its Arab neighbors, manyseeing it as a proxy fight in <strong>the</strong>ir own Cold War with <strong>the</strong> Soviets. 156 According to Oren,American support for <strong>Israel</strong> in 1967 had two major bases: <strong>the</strong> opinion <strong>of</strong> manyevangelicals that <strong>Israel</strong>'s victory in <strong>the</strong> Six-Day War was evidence <strong>of</strong> divine intervention,<strong>and</strong> thus that <strong>the</strong> messianic age was nigh at h<strong>and</strong>; <strong>and</strong> politically, <strong>the</strong> underst<strong>and</strong>ing <strong>of</strong>153154155156Studies, Vol. 1, no. 2 (Fall, 1996), 122-139.Grose, <strong>Israel</strong> in <strong>the</strong> Mind <strong>of</strong> America, 304.Oren, Power, Faith <strong>and</strong> Fantasy, 525.Oren, Power, Faith <strong>and</strong> Fantasy, 525.Oren, Power, Faith <strong>and</strong> Fantasy, 527.49
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