Fire on Board the Liberian Passenger Ship Ecstasy, Miami, Florida ...

Analysis 73 Marine Accident ReportAdequacy Of Engineering Systems DesignThe fire on the Ecstasy caused the partial or complete failure of three systems:low-location lighting, steering, and propulsion. Although the loss of engineering andemergency systems did not ultimately endanger the ship and its passengers in thisaccident, the potential threat to vessel safety from the failure of vital systems, especiallypropulsive power, is significant.The low-location lighting system was designed to sound an alarm on the bridge inthe event of a power failure to the system. In this accident, the heat from the fire meltedthe wiring insulation on a portion of one lighting loop, triggering an alarm that the ship’sofficers considered intrusive during the emergency operations. When the nature andlocation of the failure was not readily detectable at the lighting system’s main unit, thechief electrician elected to shut down power to the system. After this accident, CarnivalCruise Lines redesigned the low-location lighting system to permit the audible alarm to besilenced without the need to shutdown the entire system.The steering system components were designed to be redundant. The system hadtwo rudder systems that were mechanically, electrically, and hydraulically independent ofeach other. The systems were housed in separate rooms on opposite sides of deck No. 3.The power and control cables for both rudder systems were routed along the overheads oftheir respective steering gear rooms. Thus, when the conflagration on the mooring deckwent unchecked and raged for more than an hour, the intense heat that was conductedthrough the overheads of the steering gear rooms melted the cables, causing the steeringsystem to fail. Despite the failure of the steering system, the crippled Ecstasy could havemaneuvered at low speeds by using the bow thrusters if the ship had not lost propulsion.The most critical system failure in this accident was, therefore, the loss of thepropulsion system. The port and starboard propulsion systems were supposed to beredundant and isolated. The Ecstasy had been built to LR regulations, which clearlystipulate the need to provide independent and isolated power supplies to essentialcomponents of the vessels engineering systems, such as propulsion. The auxiliary voltageto the high-speed breakers for both propulsion systems, however, was routed through thesame distribution panel. When this panel sustained heat damage, both propulsion systemsfailed. The Safety Board, therefore, concludes that the failure to separate the powercircuitry in the design arrangement of the auxiliary voltage supply to the high-speedbreakers of the propulsion systems resulted in inadequate isolation of essential systemcomponents, which, in turn, resulted in the shutdown of both propulsion systems when asingle distribution panel was damaged.Hazardous situations that may result from a ship losing propulsive power includevessel grounding, inability to avoid severe weather conditions, and passenger evacuationat sea. Thus, it is essential that all propulsion system components be redundant andisolated. Following the Ecstasy accident, Carnival Cruise Lines advised the Safety Boardthat it had modified the vessel’s electrical system by adding a backup circuit breaker andwiring to provide an alternate source of electrical power for the high-speed breakers.