Fire on Board the Liberian Passenger Ship Ecstasy, Miami, Florida ...

Analysis 71 Marine Accident ReportMeans of Communication in CabinsA cabin steward was in his cabin when he smelled smoke and saw smoke comingfrom a vent. He left his quarters and was knocking on other cabin doors to alert othercrewmembers when he heard the general alarm. Another crewmember joined the cabinsteward and the two men attempted to leave the deck only to be blocked by dense smoke.The crewmembers made their way into a cabin shower where they stayed until oneof the men became alarmed by the smoke buildup. He tried to escape by leaving the cabinand feeling his way along the passageway bulkhead. The cabin steward went after the firstman and tried to convince him to return to the safety of the shower. About this time, afirefighting team responding to the fire in the main laundry happened upon the men anddirected them to safety. The cabin steward later stated they were only able to avoid seriousinjuries because they followed emergency survivability procedures, such as soakingthemselves in a shower and breathing air from the shower drain. The crewmembers’accommodation areas had no call system by which the men could signal for help. TheSafety Board concludes that the lack of a means to call for help from the crew cabinsdelayed the rescue of two crewmembers and contributed to the severity of their smokeinhalation injuries.The Safety Board had addressed the need for passenger and crew cabins to beequipped with a means of signaling for emergency assistance for more than 8 years. (Asummary of the safety recommendations issued and actions taken appears in appendix F.)Following its investigation of the fire on the Universe Explorer, the Safety Board askedthat both the Coast Guard and the ICCL take actions regarding emergency call systems oncruise ships. The Safety Board issued Safety Recommendation M-98-32. On October 16,1998, the Coast Guard responded that it would discuss the available options for anynecessary improvements with the SOLAS working group on fire protection and wouldpropose changes to the IMO, if appropriate. Based on this action, the Safety Boardclassified Safety Recommendation M-98-32 “Open—Acceptable Response.” The SafetyBoard issued Safety Recommendation M-98-59 to the ICCL asking that it recommend thatmember passenger ship companies install emergency call systems. The Safety Boardsubsequently advised the ICCL that the Board was disappointed that the association hadnot taken the recommended action and, on February 18, 1999, classified SafetyRecommendation M-98-59 “Closed—Unacceptable Action.”The crewmembers’ inability to signal for help in the Ecstasy fire demonstratesagain that existing SOLAS requirements for emergency communication are not adequate.Even though the Ecstasy’s passageways had telephones, their accessibility depended upona person being able to reach a telephone. In this accident, the cabin steward who firstsmelled and saw smoke tried to alert crewmembers in nearby cabins of the fire. Conditionsworsened considerably during the brief time that he knocked on cabins doors, and dense,suffocating smoke prevented his and another crewmember’s escape. The men did not havethe option to walk to or spend time on a corridor telephone.A similar situation occurred in the Universe Explorer accident, but with fatalconsequences. Rescuers found three dead crewmembers in the passageway and two dead