Fire on Board the Liberian Passenger Ship Ecstasy, Miami, Florida ...
Fire on Board the Liberian Passenger Ship Ecstasy, Miami, Florida ...
Fire on Board the Liberian Passenger Ship Ecstasy, Miami, Florida ...
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Analysis 68 Marine Accident ReportLifejacket Distributi<strong>on</strong>In 1997, LR certified that <strong>the</strong> number, type, and arrangement of lifesavingequipment <strong>on</strong> board <strong>the</strong> <strong>Ecstasy</strong> met <strong>the</strong> requirements of SOLAS 74, as amended in 1998.At that time, <strong>the</strong> ship carried 4,094 lifejackets to outfit a full crew and passengercomplement of 3,560 people. The <strong>Board</strong> is pleased to note that Carnival Cruise Linessubsequently elected to exceed <strong>the</strong> minimum SOLAS requirement for extra lifejackets,increasing <strong>the</strong> number by more than 20 percent, to a total of 4,946. On <strong>the</strong> day of <strong>the</strong> fire,<strong>the</strong> ship was carrying 3,481 people, meaning that <strong>the</strong> ship had 1,465 extra lifejackets.Despite having more than enough lifejackets <strong>on</strong> board <strong>the</strong> vessel, some passengersperceived a lack of available lifejackets when <strong>the</strong> acti<strong>on</strong>s of <strong>the</strong> crewmembers were notc<strong>on</strong>sistent with informati<strong>on</strong> provided at <strong>the</strong> practice drill and posted <strong>on</strong> stateroomplacards. Before <strong>the</strong> emergency, passengers were told to obtain lifejackets from <strong>the</strong>irstaterooms when <strong>the</strong> general alarm sounded and to proceed immediately to <strong>the</strong>ir musterstati<strong>on</strong>s. They were also told that if <strong>the</strong>y were unable to obtain <strong>the</strong>ir lifejackets from <strong>the</strong>irstaterooms at <strong>the</strong> time of <strong>the</strong> alarm, <strong>the</strong>y should proceed immediately to <strong>the</strong>ir musterstati<strong>on</strong> and lifejackets would be issued to <strong>the</strong>m. During <strong>the</strong> emergency, <strong>the</strong> cruise directorreinforced <strong>the</strong>se instructi<strong>on</strong>s when he announced that passengers who could not obtain<strong>the</strong>ir lifejackets from <strong>the</strong>ir staterooms should proceed immediately to muster stati<strong>on</strong>s.The resp<strong>on</strong>ses from <strong>the</strong> passengers who answered <strong>the</strong> Safety <strong>Board</strong> survey showedthat 79 of 126 people ei<strong>the</strong>r obtained lifejackets from <strong>the</strong>ir cabin or were providedlifejackets by crewmembers. Forty-seven passengers said that <strong>the</strong>y never receivedlifejackets. Two passengers stated that <strong>the</strong>y became c<strong>on</strong>cerned when <strong>the</strong>y asked forlifejackets and a crewmember started to pass <strong>the</strong>m out and <strong>the</strong>n reportedly was ordered tostop doing so. One passenger stated that <strong>on</strong>e crewmember told her not to retrieve herlifejacket from her stateroom and later ano<strong>the</strong>r crewmember told her to get her lifejacketfrom her cabin; however, when she attempted to do so, she could not reach her stateroombecause of <strong>the</strong> smoke.At <strong>the</strong> public hearing <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Ecstasy</strong> accident, <strong>the</strong> master testified that he wanted tomaintain a calm envir<strong>on</strong>ment and avoid panic am<strong>on</strong>g <strong>the</strong> passengers by c<strong>on</strong>veying <strong>the</strong>impressi<strong>on</strong> that <strong>the</strong> situati<strong>on</strong> was under c<strong>on</strong>trol and did not warrant <strong>the</strong> distributi<strong>on</strong> oflifejackets. While <strong>the</strong> lack of uniformity in distributing <strong>the</strong> lifejackets did not cause a masspanic, it did cause several passengers to become uneasy. Moreover, when a c<strong>on</strong>cernedpassenger attempted to return to her stateroom to retrieve her lifejacket, she was put at riskof potential injury. The Safety <strong>Board</strong> c<strong>on</strong>cludes that <strong>the</strong> lack of c<strong>on</strong>sistency between <strong>the</strong>informati<strong>on</strong> about lifejacket distributi<strong>on</strong> provided at <strong>the</strong> practice drill and <strong>the</strong> actualprovisi<strong>on</strong> of lifejackets at <strong>the</strong> muster stati<strong>on</strong>s created unnecessary c<strong>on</strong>fusi<strong>on</strong> am<strong>on</strong>g somepassengers <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Ecstasy</strong>.After <strong>the</strong> <strong>Ecstasy</strong> fire, in fall 1998, Carnival Cruise Lines began requiring itssenior deck, engineering, and o<strong>the</strong>r officers to attend courses in crisis management andhuman behavior and crowd management so that <strong>the</strong>y met <strong>the</strong> STCW training standardsthat became effective in January 1999. The company also required crewmembers insafety-related positi<strong>on</strong>s to attend crowd management training.