Fire on Board the Liberian Passenger Ship Ecstasy, Miami, Florida ...

Analysis 66 Marine Accident ReportThe Safety Board concludes that although most survey respondents indicated thatthe Ecstasy practice drill adequately prepared them for the actual fire emergency, the drillcontent lacked information about actions to take if you see smoke or fire or if your musterstation is unavailable that might have better prepared some passengers who encounteredsuch conditions.Before the Ecstasy fire, the vessel safety officer had purchased bright green hatsfor crewmembers in safety sensitive positions to wear to distinguish them from othercrewmembers. He had not had the opportunity to distribute the hats before the ship sailed.At the suggestion of Safety Board investigators, Carnival Cruise Lines revised its vesselemergency drill procedures to advise passengers that crewmembers wearing the green hatsare specifically assigned to assist them during an emergency. Based on the surveyresponses from Ecstasy passengers, the company needs to provide passengers withadditional safety information. The Safety Board, therefore, believes that Carnival CruiseLines should revise the safety information disseminated to passengers to include actions totake if they encounter smoke or fire and/or if their muster station is not available.Immediately following the accident, a party to the investigation questionedwhether the noise generated by local news helicopters created communications problemsbetween the crew and passengers during the emergency. All survey respondents indicatedthat they heard frequent announcements. Some respondents who were assigned to theoutside muster station stated that when they advised crewmembers that the helicopternoise made it difficult to hear the loudspeakers announcements, the crewmembers quicklynotified the bridge, and the cruise director then relayed necessary information and statusaccounts by having his assistants go to the muster station. The smoke from the firesubsequently necessitated moving the passengers at the outside muster station, whicheliminated the problem. The Safety Board concludes that although the noise from thenews helicopters may have interfered somewhat with the communications with passengerson the outside deck, crewmembers were able to effectively communicate with themustered people and manage the emergency.Accountability ProceduresShipboard personnel used two methods to account for passengers during the fireemergency. At the muster stations, the crewmembers noted the letters imprinted on thelifejackets worn by passengers to ensure that they had reported to the correct station. Themuster station crews did not have a list, by name, of passengers assigned to the respectivestations. In the passenger accommodation areas, crewmembers checked each stateroom todetermine whether it was empty. They then wrapped a towel around the doorknob to showother searchers that the stateroom had been checked. Neither of these procedures providesassurance that the vessel has accounted for all passengers. Depending upon the time andlocation of a fire or emergency condition, passengers might not be able to report to theirmuster station. In this accident, three MVZs were closed as a result of the fire andpassengers had to go to other MVZs to find a muster station.Identifying which people are missing by searching the staterooms and cabinsassumes that an occupant will remain in his or her quarters and not go to another location.