12.07.2015 Views

Fire on Board the Liberian Passenger Ship Ecstasy, Miami, Florida ...

Fire on Board the Liberian Passenger Ship Ecstasy, Miami, Florida ...

Fire on Board the Liberian Passenger Ship Ecstasy, Miami, Florida ...

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS
  • No tags were found...

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

Analysis 64 Marine Accident ReportA passive means for actuating <strong>the</strong> closure of fire dampers in certain areas isrequired by various interpretati<strong>on</strong>s of SOLAS, including Coast Guard regulati<strong>on</strong>s. 48 Themost comm<strong>on</strong>ly required passive closure mechanism is a weight- or spring-activatedfusible link that melts at a given temperature, allowing <strong>the</strong> fire damper to close. A fusiblelink can be designed to actuate at various temperatures, depending <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> metal used in <strong>the</strong>mechanism. It potentially offers a more fail-proof method of closure and, c<strong>on</strong>sequently, agreater margin of fire safety because an external power source is not needed to drive <strong>the</strong>damper.The Safety <strong>Board</strong> c<strong>on</strong>cludes that if <strong>the</strong> main laundry’s fire dampers had beenequipped with a passive means of closure, such as a fusible link, <strong>the</strong> heat from <strong>the</strong> firewould have caused <strong>the</strong> dampers to shut so<strong>on</strong>er, which, in turn, might have prevented <strong>the</strong>spread of fire bey<strong>on</strong>d <strong>the</strong> laundry area.While automatic fire dampers with passive actuating mechanisms are <strong>on</strong>e way toeffectively stem <strong>the</strong> spread of smoke and fire through ventilati<strong>on</strong> systems in high-riskareas, such dampers are not <strong>the</strong> <strong>on</strong>ly method of mitigating <strong>the</strong> danger. The <strong>Board</strong>c<strong>on</strong>siders <strong>the</strong> individual cruise ship companies best qualified to analyze <strong>the</strong>ir vessels’design and engineering arrangements and to devise measures for dealing with <strong>the</strong>problem. The Safety <strong>Board</strong>, <strong>the</strong>refore, believes that Carnival Cruise Lines should, for <strong>the</strong>vessels in its fleet, engineer, design, and implement system modificati<strong>on</strong>s to mitigate <strong>the</strong>spread of smoke and fire from <strong>the</strong> laundry rooms through <strong>the</strong> ventilati<strong>on</strong> ducts to o<strong>the</strong>rareas of <strong>the</strong> vessel. Fur<strong>the</strong>r, cruise ship companies should, for existing vessels withventilati<strong>on</strong> system arrangements similar to Carnival Cruise Lines’ Fantasy Class ships,install an automatic method or system to mitigate <strong>the</strong> spread of smoke and fire fromlaundry spaces through <strong>the</strong> ventilati<strong>on</strong> ducts to o<strong>the</strong>r vessel areas.<str<strong>on</strong>g>Fire</str<strong>on</strong>g> Detecti<strong>on</strong> SystemDuring <strong>the</strong> <strong>Ecstasy</strong> fire, many smoke detectors activated within a few minutes. Thetime and sequence of <strong>the</strong> first five recorded smoke detector alarms are c<strong>on</strong>sistent withreports of where <strong>the</strong> fire started and how <strong>the</strong> fire and smoke spread through <strong>the</strong> ventilati<strong>on</strong>system. The first smoke alarm indicated <strong>the</strong> main laundry room. The next alarms indicated<strong>the</strong> stern thruster room, <strong>the</strong> air c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>er room, and <strong>the</strong> portside steering gear room.According to <strong>the</strong> first officer, about 2 minutes after <strong>the</strong> first alarm, all <strong>the</strong> detector alarms<strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> fire panel appeared to activate at <strong>the</strong> same time, and, as a result, he reset <strong>the</strong> system.The activati<strong>on</strong> of all alarms <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> fire panel resulted from an electrical overload of <strong>the</strong>system. Despite <strong>the</strong> overload, <strong>the</strong> fire detecti<strong>on</strong> system provided an early warning of a fire,correctly identifying not <strong>on</strong>ly <strong>the</strong> fire z<strong>on</strong>e but also <strong>the</strong> time and locati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> firstdetectors. The Safety <strong>Board</strong> c<strong>on</strong>cludes that <strong>the</strong> fire detecti<strong>on</strong> system performed properlyby providing an early indicator of a fire.48 NVIC No. 09-97.

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!