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Fire on Board the Liberian Passenger Ship Ecstasy, Miami, Florida ...

Fire on Board the Liberian Passenger Ship Ecstasy, Miami, Florida ...

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Analysis 61 Marine Accident Reportshould revise <strong>the</strong> SMS to include processes for preventing unauthorized flame cutting,grinding, or o<strong>the</strong>r activities that might ignite a fire.Adequacy Of <str<strong>on</strong>g>Fire</str<strong>on</strong>g> Protecti<strong>on</strong> SystemsSprinkler SystemSprinkler systems are designed to provide an appropriate level of protecti<strong>on</strong> for <strong>the</strong>space that <strong>the</strong>y occupy and <strong>the</strong> amount of combustibles that are present. On <strong>the</strong> <strong>Ecstasy</strong>, apassenger cruise ship, sprinklers were installed mainly in accommodati<strong>on</strong> areas, includingstaterooms and cabins. The sprinkler system, <strong>the</strong>refore, was designed for spaces thatc<strong>on</strong>tained furniture, carpeting, paneling, and so forth.In <strong>the</strong> <strong>Ecstasy</strong> accident, however, c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong>s occurred that put unusual demands <strong>on</strong><strong>the</strong> sprinkler system. In <strong>the</strong> main laundry <strong>on</strong> deck No. 2, <strong>the</strong> fire’s area of origin, <strong>the</strong>igniti<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> comparatively small amount of lint across <strong>the</strong> floor released insufficien<strong>the</strong>at to trigger <strong>the</strong> heat-activated sprinklers in <strong>the</strong> overhead. The small flames spread firstto <strong>the</strong> mangle’s vertical exhaust ducts and <strong>the</strong>n its overhead exhaust ducts where <strong>the</strong> highlint buildup fueled a larger fire. The mangle’s overhead exhaust duct, c<strong>on</strong>structed ofn<strong>on</strong>combustible metal, c<strong>on</strong>tained <strong>the</strong> fire, and <strong>the</strong> air flow within <strong>the</strong> duct carried <strong>the</strong> firefrom <strong>the</strong> laundry to <strong>the</strong> exhaust plenum <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> mooring deck. The fire exited <strong>on</strong>to <strong>the</strong>mooring deck, which lacked fire protecti<strong>on</strong>, and ignited <strong>the</strong> lint debris that, in turn, led to<strong>the</strong> development of <strong>the</strong> major c<strong>on</strong>flagrati<strong>on</strong>.Before <strong>the</strong> ventilati<strong>on</strong> system in MVZs 1 and 2 was shut down, ventilati<strong>on</strong> fansdrew intense heat from <strong>the</strong> large fire <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> mooring deck to various ship areas that wereprotected by sprinklers, which caused <strong>the</strong>m to activate. In additi<strong>on</strong>, <strong>the</strong> heat from <strong>the</strong>mooring deck fire was so great that it triggered sprinklers in deck areas immediately aboveand forward of <strong>the</strong> mooring deck. Although <strong>the</strong> sprinkler discharge in areas that wereremote from <strong>the</strong> mooring stati<strong>on</strong> had no effect <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> fire and heat source, <strong>the</strong> dischargesprevented <strong>the</strong> spread of fire fur<strong>the</strong>r into <strong>the</strong> vessel.The discharge area, that is, <strong>the</strong> number of sprinklers discharging water, was twiceas great as <strong>the</strong> design capabilities of <strong>the</strong> ship’s water delivery system. Even though <strong>the</strong>number of sprinklers that opened created a demand for water that taxed <strong>the</strong> water supply,<strong>the</strong> sprinkler system provided proper protecti<strong>on</strong> in this accident. The Safety <strong>Board</strong>c<strong>on</strong>cludes that <strong>the</strong> vessel’s automatic sprinkler system limited <strong>the</strong> spread of fire from <strong>the</strong>mooring stati<strong>on</strong> to adjoining decks, <strong>the</strong>reby preventing a significantly worse fire thatwould have caused greater damage and perhaps additi<strong>on</strong>al injuries.When <strong>the</strong> <strong>Ecstasy</strong> was built in 1991, Carnival Cruise Lines had until 2006 tocomply with SOLAS requirements for automatic sprinklers. Never<strong>the</strong>less, <strong>the</strong> companyelected to install sprinkler protecti<strong>on</strong> in <strong>the</strong> <strong>Ecstasy</strong>’s cabins and staterooms at <strong>the</strong> time ofc<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong>. After <strong>the</strong> fire <strong>on</strong> board <strong>the</strong> <strong>Ecstasy</strong>, Carnival Cruise Lines modified <strong>the</strong> firesuppressi<strong>on</strong> system of <strong>the</strong> MV Paradise, <strong>on</strong>e of its ships under c<strong>on</strong>structi<strong>on</strong>, to include

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