Fire on Board the Liberian Passenger Ship Ecstasy, Miami, Florida ...

More documents

Recommendations

Info

Factual Information 42 Marine Accident Reportresponders who initially reported to an outside muster station said that, because ofhelicopters flying nearby, they occasionally had problems hearing announcementsbroadcast over the loudspeaker system. They said that when they advised thecrewmembers of the problem, they notified “officials” [the cruise director], who thenrelayed status accounts to muster personnel, who, in turn, provided the information to thepassengers.Fifty-three survey responses identified various problems or situations that were notaddressed during the drill. Several people indicated that the drill did not include specificinformation about fire emergencies, including what to do if they encountered smoke orfire. A number of respondents said that they could not report to their station because ofsmoke, and the drill did not provide information about what to do if a muster station wasnot available. Some passengers indicated that they had problems recognizingcrewmembers to direct or assist them during the emergency.Several of the responders expressed dissatisfaction about the lack of consistency inthe crew’s provision of lifejackets to the mustered passengers. During the drill, thepassengers were advised that, in the event of an emergency, if they could not retrieve thelifejackets from their staterooms, they would be provided lifejackets after reporting totheir muster stations. Seventy-nine survey responders said that they either obtainedlifejackets from their cabin or were provided lifejackets by crewmembers. Forty-sevenpassengers said that they never received lifejackets. Two passengers stated that when theyasked for lifejackets, a crewmember started to pass them out and then reportedly wasordered to stop doing so by his superiors because they were concerned that distributinglifejackets might cause panic. One passenger stated that one crewmember told her not toretrieve her lifejacket from her stateroom and later another crewmember told her to get herlifejacket from her cabin; however, when she attempted to do so, she could not reach herstateroom because of the smoke.Seventy-two responders, primarily those who had been in the aft section of theEcstasy, indicated that the emergency alarm and the announcements to muster did notoccur until after they saw or smelled smoke in their cabins and the passageways. Severalpassengers estimated that the time between the first evidence of smoke and the emergencyalarm was 30 minutes or more. Other responders indicated that they first learned about theship’s fire from television news reports.Trapped CrewmenA cabin steward whose cabin was on deck No. 2, close to the main laundry,described to Safety Board investigators how he and another crewmember became trappedby heavy smoke during the fire. About 1805-1810, he was in the passageway when heheard some of the laundry crewmembers talking in Chinese. He returned to his cabinwhere he smelled smoke. When he went back out into the passageway, the laundryworkers were talking, “maybe arguing.” One of the laundry workers told him to close hisdoor, whereupon he returned to his cabin. He then saw a small amount of smoke comingfrom his vent. He returned to the passageway and saw that the laundry crew had left. Hewent back into his cabin to grab a lifejacket and saw heavy gray smoke coming from the
Factual Information 43 Marine Accident Reportvent. He then realized that a fire might have broken out so he left his cabin and startedknocking on cabin doors to alert others.The steward found one other crewmember. The steward said that the two of themattempted to escape from deck No. 2; however, heavy smoke filled the passageways,severely limiting their visibility. The steward said that, based on survival techniques thathe learned from the safety officer and the safety information booklet, he started to takerefuge in a common area toilet facility. He then realized that the other crewmember hadnot followed him but had continued down the passageway. Holding a towel to his face, thesteward felt his way along the bulkhead in the direction of the crewman, who wascoughing and calling for help. The steward told the crewmember to calm down and followhim. They went into the toilet facility, where the steward turned on the water in theshower, and they soaked their hair and clothes.The steward told the crewmember to stay low. Smoke started to enter the showerarea, whereupon the crewmember panicked and tried to open the door. The steward put hisnose toward the shower drain to get air and directed the other crewman do the same. Thesteward said that, when he next opened the door to the corridor, the passageway wastotally black. He began to pound on the bulkhead to attract attention. The crewmemberwent into the passageway. The steward put a towel over his nose and followed thecrewmember into the passageway, where they heard the sounds of the firefighting teamschecking the area and called out to them. The shipboard firefighters then led the twocrewmembers above deck.Emergency ResponseThe local agencies responding to the Ecstasy fire included the Coast Guard, MiamiBeach FD, Miami-Dade FD, Coastal Tug, and Moran Towing, Inc.The response agencies were notified or learned of the Ecstasy fire from varioussources within about a half hour of each other. The MSO-Miami watchstander, afterseeing the Ecstasy with smoke streaming from its stern, telephoned and verified thepresence of a fire with the ship’s master about 1728. About the same time, vessel pilotsreported the fire to the Biscayne Pilots Association, which notified Coastal Tug. Shortlythereafter, about 1745, Miami area residents reported a fire on board a ship in the channelto Miami Beach FD, which contacted Miami-Dade FD. 33The COTP implemented a unified command system employing two operatingbases. Initially, the Coast Guard and Miami Beach FD operated from the MSO-MiamiOperations Center, and Miami-Dade FD, Carnival, port officials, and area police operatedfrom a post established at the Port of Miami. Miami-Dade FD subsequently sent anadditional representative to the MSO-Miami location. The parties remained in telephonecommunications with each other and officers on board the Ecstasy to coordinate activitiesthroughout the incident. The specific actions of the various response agencies aresummarized below.33 Miami-Dade FD had jurisdiction when the ship was at the Port of Miami and Miami Beach FD hadjurisdiction while the ship was in Government Cut Channel and offshore.
Page 1: PB2001-916401NTSB/MAR-01/01NATIONAL
Page 4 and 5: National Transportation Safety Boar
Page 6 and 7: Contents iv Marine Accident ReportS
Page 8 and 9: viMarine Accident ReportAcronyms an
Page 10 and 11: viiiMarine Accident ReportExecutive
Page 12 and 13: Factual Information 2 Marine Accide
Page 20 and 21: Factual Information 10 Marine Accid
Page 65 and 66: 55 Marine Accident ReportAnalysisGe
Page 67 and 68: Analysis 57 Marine Accident ReportT
Page 69 and 70: Analysis 59 Marine Accident Reportf
Page 71 and 72: Analysis 61 Marine Accident Reports
Page 73 and 74: Analysis 63 Marine Accident Reporti
Page 75 and 76: Analysis 65 Marine Accident ReportA
Page 77 and 78: Analysis 67 Marine Accident ReportF
Page 81 and 82: Analysis 71 Marine Accident ReportM
Page 85 and 86: Analysis 75 Marine Accident ReportI
Page 87 and 88: Conclusions 77 Marine Accident Repo
Page 89 and 90: Recommendations 79 Marine Accident
Page 91: Recommendations 81 Marine Accident
Page 94 and 95: 84 Marine Accident ReportAppendix B
Page 96 and 97: Appendix B 86 Marine Accident Repor
Page 98 and 99: Appendix C 88 Marine Accident Repor
Page 100 and 101: Appendix D 90 Marine Accident Repor
Page 102 and 103:
92 Marine Accident ReportAppendix F
show all

Fire on Board the Liberian Passenger Ship Ecstasy, Miami, Florida ...

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?