Fire on Board the Liberian Passenger Ship Ecstasy, Miami, Florida ...

Factual Information 30 Marine Accident Reportaddress the reliability problems with the high-speed breaker auxiliary voltagesupply arrangement that was installed aboard Ecstasy.In its response, LR states:The high speed circuit breakers to which you refer are those on the motor side ofthe cycloconverters through which the motors receive their power. The voltage(s)supplied from MS 21 appear, from the manufacturer’s data, to be primarily for theelectrical closure of the circuit breakers.…after this fire, we were informed that the voltage supply from MS 21 is alsoused, internally within the cycloconverter, to provide a “circuit breaker closed”signal in order to “enable” the drives to start and to continue operating.The details of these internal connections were not provided to LR during LR’splan approval, and LR’s surveys of the vessel’s construction. Therefore, LR wasnot aware, prior to this casualty, that if these cables were burnt through propulsionwould be lost.LR receives “design” plans for consideration at or before the time of constructionof the vessel. It is these plans that our surveyors review and stamp “approved”against applicable classification requirements. Upon completion of construction“as built” plans are forwarded to LR for record purposes.We have checked the Ecstasy design plans approved by LR at the time ofconstruction and the “as built” plans forwarded to us for record purposes. Neithershow the detailed matters referred to in your letter.There have been no rule changes made since 1987 which address specifically highspeed breaker auxiliary voltage supply arrangements similar to those installedaboard Ecstasy. However, based on the experience gained over the years of whatwas in 1987 an innovative design, the Rules have been changed to take intoconsideration commonality of electrical supplies.U.S. Coast Guard Examinations. The United States requires that ships thatembark passengers from U.S. ports be examined by the Coast Guard for “substantialcompliance” with the construction, equipment, and safety requirements of SOLAS. TheCoast Guard examinations are referred to as Control Verification Examinations (CVEs).These examination procedures are contained in the Coast Guard’s Navigation and VesselInspection Circular (NVIC) No. 1-93, which provides guidance regarding examinationsfor foreign cruise ship operators. The examination process involves three phases: an initialCVE, which is a plan review of new or existing vessels; an annual CVE, which is a reviewof the vessel’s firefighting, lifesaving and emergency systems; and a quarterly CVE,which is a safety review of the vessel’s operations. As of July 1,1998, the Coast Guard’sexamination for passenger vessels included International Safety Management (ISM) Codeprovisions, which are discussed later in this report, under “International SafetyRequirements.”