Fire on Board the Liberian Passenger Ship Ecstasy, Miami, Florida ...

More documents

Recommendations

Info

Factual Information 24 Marine Accident ReportThe propulsion system had many redundant features and isolated componentsdesigned to provide reliability. Each propeller had an independent double-wound motorand each propulsion motor had two cycloconverters. In the event of power failure, thepropulsion system computer had a battery backup, and each motor could use anemergency exciter. Each of the six independent diesel generators supplied isolated maindistribution switchboards.The propulsion system was designed and manufactured by ABB, a subcontractorto Kvaerner Masa, the shipbuilder. The integration of the propulsion system into the ship’sother systems, notably the electrical distribution system, was the responsibility ofKvaerner Masa’s designers. The specifications to the shipbuilder from ABB list therequired voltage and current supplying the propulsion system. The specifications do notindicate that the voltage supply should be provided by independent sources. KvaernerMasa routed the auxiliary voltage for both high-speed breakers through a single externalinterface (MS-21).Officials for ABB, the propulsion system design company, stated that they did notdo a qualitative failure analysis 18 of the propulsion system for the Fantasy class ships,including the Ecstasy, because SOLAS, LR, and Carnival did not require that a systemperformance analysis be conducted.Low-location LightingSOLAS Chapter II-2, Regulation 41 requires that passenger ships constructed afterJanuary 1, 1994, have a low-location lighting system in all accommodation area interiorpassageways and stairways to assist passengers in identifying emergency escape routeswhen smoke impedes visibility. 19The low-location lighting system on board the Ecstasy consisted of a series of lowvoltage,light-emitting diodes (LED) and photoluminescent signs marking exits, doors,and stairways. The electrical power supply for the system was in the emergency dieselgenerator room. In the event of a power loss from the emergency switchboard, a batterypoweredDC/AC inverter provided a power backup for at least 60 minutes.The lighting system was designed such that the loss of a single light, lighting strip,or power supply would not result in a system failure. The system was arranged in a seriesof independent zones. Each zone had two electrical loops that were powered byindependent power transformers; the loss of a one transformer would not cause the failureof a loop. If a condition affecting the performance of the low-location lighting system didoccur, a fault alarm would sound on the system’s control panel, which was located on thenavigation bridge. The system was designed such that the bridge watch could not silencethe audible alarm at the control panel.18 Information about qualitative failure analysis appears in the “Other” section of this report.19 See IMO Resolution A.752 (18).
Factual Information 25 Marine Accident Report<strong>Fire</strong> Protection<strong>Fire</strong> detection. SOLAS Chapter II-2, Regulations 12 and 13 specify the minimumdesign and installation requirements for a passenger vessel’s fire detection system,including power elements, audible and visual alarms, control panels, and detectors. 20Documents indicate that LR issued an approval certificate for the Ecstasy’s fire detectionsystem.Consilium Marine AB of Sweden (Consilium) supplied most of the components inthe Ecstasy’s fire detection system. According to Consilium’s technical data sheets, theSalwico C300 that was installed on the Ecstasy is a conventional fire detection systemwith a single central control unit. Group units, each containing loops of eight detectors,can be added to extend the system’s capability. In the case of the Ecstasy, the vessel had176 separate detector loops, each of which covered 20 to 30 cabins.Two models of Consilium smoke detectors were installed on the Ecstasy; one typeof detector was installed in cabins and staterooms, and a second type was installed instairways and service spaces, including the main laundry. Manual pull alarms installedthroughout the vessel supplemented the automatic smoke and heat detectors. Anindependent module, called the Detector Identification, controlled the zone or detectoraddress function of the system.The vessel’s fire alarm panel, sprinkler fire suppression panel, and variousemergency shutdown and closure controls, including the controls for the FSDs and WTDs,were mounted on a bulkhead immediately aft of the pilothouse. The fire detection panelhad alarms that sounded and lights that illuminated to identify the loop in which anautomatic detector activated or a person pulled a manual alarm station.The control unit for the fire detection system was on the bridge, aft of thepilothouse. Once an operator identified the loop on the detection panel, he could activatethe computerized video surveillance display at the control unit, which showed the area ofthe activated detectors. The control unit also had the capability of indicating individualsmoke detector and circuit failure.The fire detection system included a printer that generated a paper log of allactivated detectors and manual pull alarms. On the day of the accident, the system logged45 detector “events” within 2 minutes of the first alarm, between 1710 and 1712. 21The detection system printer registered alarm locations that did not exist,indicating the system panel had malfunctioned because of an electrical overload.Following this accident, Carnival upgraded the fire detection system on the Ecstasy tocorrect this problem.20 See SOLAS Chapter II-2, Regulation 13.21 The time resolution for the detector log printout was to the nearest minute.
Page 1: PB2001-916401NTSB/MAR-01/01NATIONAL
Page 4 and 5: National Transportation Safety Boar
Page 6 and 7: Contents iv Marine Accident ReportS
Page 8 and 9: viMarine Accident ReportAcronyms an
Page 10 and 11: viiiMarine Accident ReportExecutive
Page 12 and 13: Factual Information 2 Marine Accide
Page 20 and 21: Factual Information 10 Marine Accid
Page 65 and 66: 55 Marine Accident ReportAnalysisGe
Page 67 and 68: Analysis 57 Marine Accident ReportT
Page 69 and 70: Analysis 59 Marine Accident Reportf
Page 71 and 72: Analysis 61 Marine Accident Reports
Page 73 and 74: Analysis 63 Marine Accident Reporti
Page 75 and 76: Analysis 65 Marine Accident ReportA
Page 77 and 78: Analysis 67 Marine Accident ReportF
Page 81 and 82: Analysis 71 Marine Accident ReportM
Page 85 and 86:
Analysis 75 Marine Accident ReportI
Page 87 and 88:
Conclusions 77 Marine Accident Repo
Page 89 and 90:
Recommendations 79 Marine Accident
Page 91:
Recommendations 81 Marine Accident
Page 94 and 95:
84 Marine Accident ReportAppendix B
Page 96 and 97:
Appendix B 86 Marine Accident Repor
Page 98 and 99:
Appendix C 88 Marine Accident Repor
Page 100 and 101:
Appendix D 90 Marine Accident Repor
Page 102 and 103:
92 Marine Accident ReportAppendix F
show all

Fire on Board the Liberian Passenger Ship Ecstasy, Miami, Florida ...

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?