Fire on Board the Liberian Passenger Ship Ecstasy, Miami, Florida ...

Factual Information 24 Marine Accident ReportThe propulsion system had many redundant features and isolated componentsdesigned to provide reliability. Each propeller had an independent double-wound motorand each propulsion motor had two cycloconverters. In the event of power failure, thepropulsion system computer had a battery backup, and each motor could use anemergency exciter. Each of the six independent diesel generators supplied isolated maindistribution switchboards.The propulsion system was designed and manufactured by ABB, a subcontractorto Kvaerner Masa, the shipbuilder. The integration of the propulsion system into the ship’sother systems, notably the electrical distribution system, was the responsibility ofKvaerner Masa’s designers. The specifications to the shipbuilder from ABB list therequired voltage and current supplying the propulsion system. The specifications do notindicate that the voltage supply should be provided by independent sources. KvaernerMasa routed the auxiliary voltage for both high-speed breakers through a single externalinterface (MS-21).Officials for ABB, the propulsion system design company, stated that they did notdo a qualitative failure analysis 18 of the propulsion system for the Fantasy class ships,including the Ecstasy, because SOLAS, LR, and Carnival did not require that a systemperformance analysis be conducted.Low-location LightingSOLAS Chapter II-2, Regulation 41 requires that passenger ships constructed afterJanuary 1, 1994, have a low-location lighting system in all accommodation area interiorpassageways and stairways to assist passengers in identifying emergency escape routeswhen smoke impedes visibility. 19The low-location lighting system on board the Ecstasy consisted of a series of lowvoltage,light-emitting diodes (LED) and photoluminescent signs marking exits, doors,and stairways. The electrical power supply for the system was in the emergency dieselgenerator room. In the event of a power loss from the emergency switchboard, a batterypoweredDC/AC inverter provided a power backup for at least 60 minutes.The lighting system was designed such that the loss of a single light, lighting strip,or power supply would not result in a system failure. The system was arranged in a seriesof independent zones. Each zone had two electrical loops that were powered byindependent power transformers; the loss of a one transformer would not cause the failureof a loop. If a condition affecting the performance of the low-location lighting system didoccur, a fault alarm would sound on the system’s control panel, which was located on thenavigation bridge. The system was designed such that the bridge watch could not silencethe audible alarm at the control panel.18 Information about qualitative failure analysis appears in the “Other” section of this report.19 See IMO Resolution A.752 (18).