Fire on Board the Liberian Passenger Ship Ecstasy, Miami, Florida ...
Fire on Board the Liberian Passenger Ship Ecstasy, Miami, Florida ...
Fire on Board the Liberian Passenger Ship Ecstasy, Miami, Florida ...
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Factual Informati<strong>on</strong> 24 Marine Accident ReportThe propulsi<strong>on</strong> system had many redundant features and isolated comp<strong>on</strong>entsdesigned to provide reliability. Each propeller had an independent double-wound motorand each propulsi<strong>on</strong> motor had two cycloc<strong>on</strong>verters. In <strong>the</strong> event of power failure, <strong>the</strong>propulsi<strong>on</strong> system computer had a battery backup, and each motor could use anemergency exciter. Each of <strong>the</strong> six independent diesel generators supplied isolated maindistributi<strong>on</strong> switchboards.The propulsi<strong>on</strong> system was designed and manufactured by ABB, a subc<strong>on</strong>tractorto Kvaerner Masa, <strong>the</strong> shipbuilder. The integrati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> propulsi<strong>on</strong> system into <strong>the</strong> ship’so<strong>the</strong>r systems, notably <strong>the</strong> electrical distributi<strong>on</strong> system, was <strong>the</strong> resp<strong>on</strong>sibility ofKvaerner Masa’s designers. The specificati<strong>on</strong>s to <strong>the</strong> shipbuilder from ABB list <strong>the</strong>required voltage and current supplying <strong>the</strong> propulsi<strong>on</strong> system. The specificati<strong>on</strong>s do notindicate that <strong>the</strong> voltage supply should be provided by independent sources. KvaernerMasa routed <strong>the</strong> auxiliary voltage for both high-speed breakers through a single externalinterface (MS-21).Officials for ABB, <strong>the</strong> propulsi<strong>on</strong> system design company, stated that <strong>the</strong>y did notdo a qualitative failure analysis 18 of <strong>the</strong> propulsi<strong>on</strong> system for <strong>the</strong> Fantasy class ships,including <strong>the</strong> <strong>Ecstasy</strong>, because SOLAS, LR, and Carnival did not require that a systemperformance analysis be c<strong>on</strong>ducted.Low-locati<strong>on</strong> LightingSOLAS Chapter II-2, Regulati<strong>on</strong> 41 requires that passenger ships c<strong>on</strong>structed afterJanuary 1, 1994, have a low-locati<strong>on</strong> lighting system in all accommodati<strong>on</strong> area interiorpassageways and stairways to assist passengers in identifying emergency escape routeswhen smoke impedes visibility. 19The low-locati<strong>on</strong> lighting system <strong>on</strong> board <strong>the</strong> <strong>Ecstasy</strong> c<strong>on</strong>sisted of a series of lowvoltage,light-emitting diodes (LED) and photoluminescent signs marking exits, doors,and stairways. The electrical power supply for <strong>the</strong> system was in <strong>the</strong> emergency dieselgenerator room. In <strong>the</strong> event of a power loss from <strong>the</strong> emergency switchboard, a batterypoweredDC/AC inverter provided a power backup for at least 60 minutes.The lighting system was designed such that <strong>the</strong> loss of a single light, lighting strip,or power supply would not result in a system failure. The system was arranged in a seriesof independent z<strong>on</strong>es. Each z<strong>on</strong>e had two electrical loops that were powered byindependent power transformers; <strong>the</strong> loss of a <strong>on</strong>e transformer would not cause <strong>the</strong> failureof a loop. If a c<strong>on</strong>diti<strong>on</strong> affecting <strong>the</strong> performance of <strong>the</strong> low-locati<strong>on</strong> lighting system didoccur, a fault alarm would sound <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> system’s c<strong>on</strong>trol panel, which was located <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong>navigati<strong>on</strong> bridge. The system was designed such that <strong>the</strong> bridge watch could not silence<strong>the</strong> audible alarm at <strong>the</strong> c<strong>on</strong>trol panel.18 Informati<strong>on</strong> about qualitative failure analysis appears in <strong>the</strong> “O<strong>the</strong>r” secti<strong>on</strong> of this report.19 See IMO Resoluti<strong>on</strong> A.752 (18).