Fire on Board the Liberian Passenger Ship Ecstasy, Miami, Florida ...
Fire on Board the Liberian Passenger Ship Ecstasy, Miami, Florida ...
Fire on Board the Liberian Passenger Ship Ecstasy, Miami, Florida ...
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Factual Informati<strong>on</strong> 22 Marine Accident ReportAt <strong>the</strong> time of <strong>the</strong> fire, <strong>the</strong> mooring deck had 11 lengths of line, each measuring220-meters and weighing about 900 pounds. The lines included three lengths ofpolypropylene line that were <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> winch drums, seven pallets of polypropylene line, and<strong>on</strong>e pallet of nyl<strong>on</strong> line.Several air handling systems vented to <strong>the</strong> mooring deck. A discussi<strong>on</strong> and anillustrati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> ventilati<strong>on</strong> system appear later in this secti<strong>on</strong>.Operating SystemsSteering. The steering system c<strong>on</strong>sisted of two rudder systems that weremechanically, electrically, and hydraulically independent of each o<strong>the</strong>r. The hydraulicequipment for each rudder system was housed in separate compartments <strong>on</strong> deck No. 3;<strong>on</strong>e steering gear room was <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong> port side and <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r steering gear room was <strong>on</strong> <strong>the</strong>starboard side. The steering gear rooms were directly below <strong>the</strong> mooring stati<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> deckNo. 4. The steering system was c<strong>on</strong>trolled from <strong>the</strong> bridge during normal operati<strong>on</strong>s, or, inan emergency, locally from <strong>the</strong> steering gear room.Propulsi<strong>on</strong>. SOLAS Chapter II-1, Part C, states, in part:Administrati<strong>on</strong>s shall give special c<strong>on</strong>siderati<strong>on</strong> to <strong>the</strong> reliability of singleessential propulsi<strong>on</strong> comp<strong>on</strong>ents and may require a separate source of propulsi<strong>on</strong>power sufficient to give <strong>the</strong> ship navigable speed, especially in <strong>the</strong> case ofunc<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>al arrangements.Means shall be provided whereby normal operati<strong>on</strong> of <strong>the</strong> propulsi<strong>on</strong> machinerycan be sustained or restored even though <strong>on</strong>e of <strong>the</strong> essential auxiliaries becomesinoperative.The <strong>Ecstasy</strong>’s main power plant comprised six diesel generators that supplied allelectric power for <strong>the</strong> vessel, including propulsi<strong>on</strong>. The generators produced electricity at6,600 volts and at a c<strong>on</strong>stant frequency of 60 hertz. Transformers and cycloc<strong>on</strong>vertersmodified <strong>the</strong> voltage and frequency for use in driving <strong>the</strong> motors of <strong>the</strong> vessel’s twopropellers. (See figure 7.)Output from <strong>the</strong> cycloc<strong>on</strong>verters ran through electrical circuit breakers (calledhigh-speed breakers) that were designed to prevent damage to <strong>the</strong> propulsi<strong>on</strong> motors in <strong>the</strong>event of a power overload. The breakers generated a signal indicating <strong>the</strong>ir status, that is,whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong>y were open or closed, to <strong>the</strong> propulsi<strong>on</strong> system computer. If <strong>the</strong> propulsi<strong>on</strong>system computer did not receive a status indicati<strong>on</strong> from ei<strong>the</strong>r of <strong>the</strong> breakers, <strong>the</strong>computer would shut down <strong>the</strong> system power at <strong>the</strong> cycloc<strong>on</strong>verters.The signals indicating <strong>the</strong> circuit breakers’ positi<strong>on</strong>s passed through a distributi<strong>on</strong>panel (MS-21) in an electric equipment room <strong>on</strong> deck No. 5, above <strong>the</strong> area where <strong>the</strong> fireoccurred. Power cables from transformers supplying <strong>the</strong> distributi<strong>on</strong> panel were in <strong>the</strong>ventilati<strong>on</strong> intake plenum that was forward of <strong>the</strong> aft mooring stati<strong>on</strong>.