Fire on Board the Liberian Passenger Ship Ecstasy, Miami, Florida ...

Factual Information 22 Marine Accident ReportAt the time of the fire, the mooring deck had 11 lengths of line, each measuring220-meters and weighing about 900 pounds. The lines included three lengths ofpolypropylene line that were on the winch drums, seven pallets of polypropylene line, andone pallet of nylon line.Several air handling systems vented to the mooring deck. A discussion and anillustration of the ventilation system appear later in this section.Operating SystemsSteering. The steering system consisted of two rudder systems that weremechanically, electrically, and hydraulically independent of each other. The hydraulicequipment for each rudder system was housed in separate compartments on deck No. 3;one steering gear room was on the port side and the other steering gear room was on thestarboard side. The steering gear rooms were directly below the mooring station on deckNo. 4. The steering system was controlled from the bridge during normal operations, or, inan emergency, locally from the steering gear room.Propulsion. SOLAS Chapter II-1, Part C, states, in part:Administrations shall give special consideration to the reliability of singleessential propulsion components and may require a separate source of propulsionpower sufficient to give the ship navigable speed, especially in the case ofunconventional arrangements.Means shall be provided whereby normal operation of the propulsion machinerycan be sustained or restored even though one of the essential auxiliaries becomesinoperative.The Ecstasy’s main power plant comprised six diesel generators that supplied allelectric power for the vessel, including propulsion. The generators produced electricity at6,600 volts and at a constant frequency of 60 hertz. Transformers and cycloconvertersmodified the voltage and frequency for use in driving the motors of the vessel’s twopropellers. (See figure 7.)Output from the cycloconverters ran through electrical circuit breakers (calledhigh-speed breakers) that were designed to prevent damage to the propulsion motors in theevent of a power overload. The breakers generated a signal indicating their status, that is,whether they were open or closed, to the propulsion system computer. If the propulsionsystem computer did not receive a status indication from either of the breakers, thecomputer would shut down the system power at the cycloconverters.The signals indicating the circuit breakers’ positions passed through a distributionpanel (MS-21) in an electric equipment room on deck No. 5, above the area where the fireoccurred. Power cables from transformers supplying the distribution panel were in theventilation intake plenum that was forward of the aft mooring station.