Fire on Board the Liberian Passenger Ship Ecstasy, Miami, Florida ...

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92 Marine Accident ReportAppendix FSafety Recommendations on Call SystemsIn a 1993 special investigation report concerning passenger ship accidents, 50 theBoard made the following safety recommendation to the Coast Guard:M-93-39Analyze the desirability and feasibility of equipping passenger staterooms with anemergency call system by which trapped passengers can signal their plight.The Coast Guard ultimately advised the Safety Board that it had discussed thedesirability and feasibility of installing emergency call systems in passenger stateroomswith the SOLAS Working Group on <strong>Fire</strong> Protection and, based upon that discussion,determined that “an additional emergency call system would not improve passenger-tocrewcommunications and would require additional maintenance.”The Safety Board disagreed with the Coast Guard’s actions and, on May 21, 1997,classified Safety Recommendation M-93-39 “Closed—Unacceptable Action,” based, inpart, on the Coast Guard’s failure to perform the analysis requested.Following its investigation of the fire on the Universe Explorer, the Safety Boardasked that both the Coast Guard and the ICCL take actions regarding emergency callsystems on cruise ships. The Safety Board issued the following recommendation to theCoast Guard:M-98-32Recommend to the IMO that passenger and crew cabins on cruise ships berequired to be equipped with an emergency call system so that people trappedduring a fire emergency have a means of signaling their location.On October 16, 1998, the Coast Guard responded that it would discuss theavailable options for any necessary improvements with the SOLAS working group on fireprotection and will propose changes to the IMO, if appropriate. The Safety Boardfollowed up by advising the Coast Guard that the current regulations were not sufficient inthe event of a fire with heavy smoke. Based on the Coast Guard’s indicating that it wouldwork with the SOLAS working group, the Safety Board classified M-98-32 “Open—Acceptable Response.”The Safety Board issued the following recommendation to the ICCL:50 For additional information, read Special Investigation Report—Accidents Involving Foreign Passenger ShipsOperating from U.S. Ports 1990-1991 (NTSB/SIR-93/01).
Appendix F 93 Marine Accident ReportM-98-59Recommend that member passenger ship companies install emergency callsystems in passenger staterooms and crew cabins so that people trapped during afire emergency will have a means of signaling their location.The ICCL responded that it had distributed the recommendation to its members forreview and consideration. The Safety Board followed up by urging specific action toencourage the installation of emergency call systems as requested in the recommendation.The ICCL subsequently advised that SOLAS requirements and recent amendmentsstipulated a number of fire safety improvements addressing, among other measures,means of escape, low-location lighting, and smoke alarms. Moreover, SOLAS requiredcruise ship companies to train and designate crewmembers to search the ship for peoplewho might be in their cabins or in non safety-designated locations.On February 18, 1999, the Safety Board responded that it was disappointed thatthe ICCL had not recommended that member companies install emergency call systems.The Board stated:A telephone system might not be able to handle the number of calls that might bemade in an emergency. An emergency call system could identify the stateroom inwhich a passenger or crewman is trapped. Because the ICCL has only discussedthis recommendation with its technical committee and has not recommended thatmember companies install emergency call systems, M-98-59 has been classified‘Closed—Unacceptable Action.’
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PB2001-916401NTSB/MAR-01/01NATIONAL
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National Transportation Safety Boar
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Contents iv Marine Accident ReportS
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viMarine Accident ReportAcronyms an
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viiiMarine Accident ReportExecutive
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Factual Information 2 Marine Accide
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Page 52 and 53: Factual Information 42 Marine Accid
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Page 67 and 68: Analysis 57 Marine Accident ReportT
Page 69 and 70: Analysis 59 Marine Accident Reportf
Page 71 and 72: Analysis 61 Marine Accident Reports
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Page 75 and 76: Analysis 65 Marine Accident ReportA
Page 77 and 78: Analysis 67 Marine Accident ReportF
Page 81 and 82: Analysis 71 Marine Accident ReportM
Page 85 and 86: Analysis 75 Marine Accident ReportI
Page 87 and 88: Conclusions 77 Marine Accident Repo
Page 89 and 90: Recommendations 79 Marine Accident
Page 91: Recommendations 81 Marine Accident
Page 94 and 95: 84 Marine Accident ReportAppendix B
Page 96 and 97: Appendix B 86 Marine Accident Repor
Page 98 and 99: Appendix C 88 Marine Accident Repor
Page 100 and 101: Appendix D 90 Marine Accident Repor
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Fire on Board the Liberian Passenger Ship Ecstasy, Miami, Florida ...

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