Wasting the Nation.indd - Groundwork
Wasting the Nation.indd - Groundwork
Wasting the Nation.indd - Groundwork
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Chapter 3: The politics of wasteboth of heavy metals and dioxins. The better <strong>the</strong> emission control technology, <strong>the</strong>more toxic <strong>the</strong> ash. It should <strong>the</strong>refore be dumped at hazardous landfills.The second problem is that <strong>the</strong> claims of industry and regulators assume that<strong>the</strong> incinerator is consistently well operated to ensure ‘complete combustion’.Operation is complicated by <strong>the</strong> mixture of rubbish. Some burns fiercely, someabsorbs more energy than it releases and so dampens <strong>the</strong> fire. New generationincinerator managers must <strong>the</strong>refore also control <strong>the</strong> waste stream to exclude toxics,materials that do not burn well and also those that should be recycled. This bringsup ano<strong>the</strong>r contradiction as candidates for recycling include paper and plasticwhich do burn well. As with o<strong>the</strong>r large plants, incinerators do not in fact operatewithout periodic upset conditions or without occasional shut-downs and start-ups.These “non-steady-state conditions … induce dramatic concentration 38 increases ofproducts of incomplete combustion such as dioxins” [Watson 2007: 51]. Moreover,<strong>the</strong> accumulation of dioxins in <strong>the</strong>se conditions creates a ‘memory effect’ thatinduces fur<strong>the</strong>r dioxin formation for up to 24 hours after optimal operating hasbeen restored.Good operating is also compromised by costs. In <strong>the</strong> US several corporate operatorshave been caught by-passing pollution control equipment. At Columbus, Ohio,this was only revealed after people started getting rare illnesses. Connett notesthat this single plant was emitting 5 times more dioxins than <strong>the</strong> EnvironmentalProtection Agency admitted for all US incinerators. In fact, although emissionsvary according to <strong>the</strong> waste that comes in, continuous monitoring of dioxins is notpossible and no-one knows how much is actually emitted. Inspections are rare and<strong>the</strong> corporations are given notice.In Britain, <strong>the</strong> Newcastle City Council allowed <strong>the</strong> corporation running <strong>the</strong> Bykersincinerator to spread ash, as a ‘soil improver’, on footpaths, parks and allotments andso avoid costly landfill. The result was dioxin levels at 2,000 times <strong>the</strong> recommendedlimit for topsoil. The saga ended in 2002 with a paltry fine for <strong>the</strong> council and <strong>the</strong>corporation and <strong>the</strong> termination of waste incineration at Bykers. Girling quotes aleading corporate waste manager’s response to <strong>the</strong> scandal: “only a complete berk”38 In a “sophisticated” Japanese incinerator emissions during a single start-up were equivalent to 2 months’ worthof “normal” or steady-state emissions; in China a single start-up clocked emissions equivalent to 60% of a fullyear’s “normal” emissions [Watson 2007:51].<strong>Wasting</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Nation</strong> - groundWork - 57 -