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THROUGH HEIDEGGER TO ECOLOGYAN ECOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE TO THE HEIDEGGERIAN THINKINGTHESIS SUBMITIED TO THE PONDICHERRY UNIVERSITYFOR THE DEGREE OFDOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHYBYE. P. MATHEWSUPERVISORDR V. C. THOMASSri AUROBINDO SCHOOL OF EASTERN AND WESTERN THOUGHTPONDICHERRY UNIVERSITYPONDICHERRY - 605 014NOVEMBER 1g96

Dr V . C .ThomasProfessor & HeadSl 1 Aurobindo SchcolEasterr- w Western Thoughtpor.d:cherry Ur1iversit:yPondicherr] - 605 014CERTIFICATETh7.s is to certify that the thesis 'TlIROUQHKEIDEOOER TO ECOLOGY: AN ECOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE TO THEHEIDEGGERIAN THINXING' is a bonafide record of researchwork done by Shri E. P. Mathns of Sri Aurobindo Schoolot Eilstern arid Western Thought, Pondicherry Univercityunder my supervision and guidance.It is certifiedL.i,actile abo3ie work has not previously been formed thebasl:, for the award of any degree, diploma,assaclateship, fellowship or any other similar titlesto r.he candidace. This independent research work of thecmcildate is an original contribution towards thedlsclpline of philosophyPiace: Yondi,:!;erryDate: il November 1996

E. P. MathewSrl Aurobindo School of Easternand Western ThoughtPondicherry UniversityPondlcherry - 605 014I hereby declare that the thesis "THROUGHHEIDEGGER TO ECOLOGY: AN ECOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE TO THEHEIDEGGERIAN THINKING" submitted by me for the degreeof Doctor of Philosophy is a record of research workdone by me during the period from August 1992 toNovember 1996 and that the thesis has not formed thebasls for the award of any degree, diploma, associateshlp,fellowship or any other similar titles to me.Place: PondicherryDate: 11 November 1996E. P. Mathew

Acknowledgment1t is rightly said that life is a bundle ofrelations. I have been trying to explore an importantaspect of this relation in this thesis. I acknowledgewith much gratitude the excellent guidance of Dr V. C.Thomas, Professor & Head, Sri Aurobindo School ofEastern and Western Thought.I am specially indebted to Dr R. Balasubramaniam,the former Professor & Head of our Department for hisinterest in my work. I remember with gratitude all thefaculty members and the office staff of the Departmentof philosophy.There are many people who encouraged me all alongand made this work possible. I am deeply indebted tothe Jesuit Order to which I belong, and specially toall my friends at Satya Nilayam, Madras. I gratefullyremember the concern and hospitality of Ms Lucy andfamily. I am deeply indebted to Dr.Johnson, Prasad,Augustine, Denis, and Babu.

CONTENTSPageCHlLeTERONETWOTHREEFOURCertificateDeclarationAcknowledgment . .TOWARDS LOWERINGTHE FOLTNDATIONSHEIDEGGER: THE PHILOSOPHEROF THE WORLDFROM TECHNOLOGY TO ECOLOGY ...FROM HOMELESSNESS TOROOTEDNESS: TOWARDS ANECOLOGICAL DWELLINGii iiiiFIVEHEIDEGGER AND ECOLOGYTOWARDS AN HERMENEUTIC PROCESS ...NOTES 6. REFERENCES . . .BIBLIOGRAPHY ...

CHAPTER ONETOWARDS LOWERING THE FOUNDATIONS************

1.1.0 Ecology: A Lowering of the FoundationSusane K. Langer in her book Philosophy in a New~ey'has employed an imaginative expression, namely, "thelowering of foundations." It is a very usefulexpression in describing philosophical activity, forone can meaningfully apply this expression tointellectual reflections that inquire into thefoundations of reality. The expression further impliesthat serious philosophical reflection is not a finishedproduct like a completed edifice, but one of everwidening horizons. Thus, questions of significance inthe intellectual epoch of humankind are similar to "thelowering of foundations." And when foundations arelowered, higher and better realizations of human lifebecome possible.In the growth and development of WesternPhilosophy one can trace various attempts at "loweringthe foundations." The thoughts of the early Greeks,who laid the foundation of the edifice of philosophy,centered around the basic question: What is thestructure of the universe? To this central questionphilosophers from Thales onwards offered variousanswers. One can trace the development of "thelowering of the foundations' in the reflections of

plato and Aristotle. Plato's theory of ideas andAristotle's intuition of substance have laid firmfoundations for philosophical reflections from ametaphysical point of view. As we further examine thedevelopment of Western Philosophy, the works of Kanthave lowered the foundations to an epistemologicallevel. At this realm the questions have centered onwhat can be known. The Analytic tradition of WesternPhilosophy lowered the foundations by raising thequestion: what can we say meaningfully of thisuniverse? Contemporary developments in Phenomenologyand Existentialism have still lowered the foundationsby offering a different. perspective to this search formeaningfulness. Phenomenology and Existentialism havefocused on the "who' that searches for meaning. Hence,human existence and its various dimensions became aserious concern of this mode of philosophizing.Pllilosophical reflection did not come to an endwith thil; ricr was its foundations firmly laid. We canstill trace efforts at "lowering the foundations.' Herewc would like to take a clue from the imagery of "thelowering the foundations" and develop it in thefollowlnq manner. We have already noted that thecontribution ot Phenomenology and Existentialism havebeen to bring to focus the "who" that searches for

meaning. Philosophers of this orientation havehighlighted well that this "who" is not a solus ipse,but manifests the inter-subjective dimension ofexistence. It is proper that we broaden theimplications of the inter-subjective dimension toresonate with the concerns of ecology. The developmentsin the sciences and the ecological awareness of thelast two decades have been so influential that thepresent age is called an "Age of Ecology.' This 'Age ofEcology" can be seen as a "paradigm shift' whereby webecome capable of thinking beyond a narrow humancentered universe. Klaus Kostermaier observes, "Ecologyunderstood as concern for nature in the mostcomprehensive sense is going to be the master paradigmof the sciences and politics of the future.'' One neednot identify "paradigm shift' with "the lowering offoundations.' But as in the case of any "paradigmshift" a centering of ideas helps to deepen theperspectives, so too in ecology a widening ofperspectives can be recognized. This process can beseen as a "lowering of the foundations' in the sensethat the "who" is understood in its significantinterrelationships.This study is an attempt to understand MartinHeidegger from an ecological perspective. It aims at a

etter understanding of the emerging concerns ofecology in the light of Heideggerian thinking. Beforeentering into the details of the study, it isimperative that we specify some of the emergingconcerns of ecology.1.2.1 Ecology: A Historical PerspectiveThe tern ecology was first referred to by theGerman Zoologist Ernest Haeckel in 1866. He used theterm for the relation of the animal to its organic aswell as inorganic environment. The word ecology isderived from the Greek word Oikos, meaning house orhabitat. The word ecology appeared in the Englishlanguage for the first time in 1873 and it referred toa study of the habitation of the organisms. Thus itbecame a branch of biology and was used as the scienceof interrelationships between living things and theirnatural environment.It is useful to distinguish between environmentand ecology. According to the Webster's Dictionary,environment is "the aggregate of all the externalconditions and influences affecting the life anddevelopment of an organism: Ecology, on the otherhand, is a discipline that deals with the inter-

elationships between living things and other naturalenvironment.One can meaningfully make a distinction betweenecological understanding and ecological awareness.Ecologi~al understanding would broadly refer to theunderstanding and interpretation of the interrelationshipsbetween humans and other organisms of nature ingeneral. And as such ecological understanding is notanything new.Ever since man became capable of understanding andarticulating his life and relationships to nature, healways has manifested an ecological understanding. Butecological awareness, we must affirm, is a contemporarysensibility, and it is a major characteristic of thepresent century. Before we enter into the details ofthe present-day ecological awareness, it is proper thatwe take a look at the salient features of theecological understanding of the Western philosophicaltradition. This will further help us to develop ahistorical perspective to the whole question. It hasbecome customary in environmental thinking to pointout that in the three thousand years of Westernphilosophizing an ecological outlook has been eitherirrelevant or incompatible. It may be too harsh to

lame philosophy for this. But the fact remains thatphilosophy, as the primary source of most of thewestern ideas, is in some way responsible fordeveloping ecologically harmful world views. A closelook at the origins and developments of some of theleading phases of Western philosophy can clarify this.1.2.2 The Pre-Socratic PhaseIt is the speculations about the natural worldthat characterizes the Pre-Socratic philosophy. Thoughthey had some strange ideas regarding matters ofbiology, their speculations about the nature of matterand its interactions with mind were historicallyimportant.Thales of Milietus (640 B.C.) is the firstphilosopher of whom we have some recorded evidence.Three statements have been attributed to him: (1) Thefirst principle of all things is water, (2) thelodestone has a soul because it draws iron, and (3) allthings are full of gods.' ~heie remarks, more thanshedding light on his philosophical views, reflect thekinds of problems and questions that Thales wasconcerned with and the assumptions he made about thenatural world. For Thales water was the firstprinciple, that out of which all things were made. His

interests in the physical world and itsinterrelationship with mind are significant. No onemay have accepted Thales' position regarding theultimate substance. But Philosophers after Thalesagreed that there was an underlying substance and theyoffered their own speculations about what it might be.~hus, for Aneximenes the ultimate substance was air,and for Aneximander the "infinite.' Pythagorasidentified it as 'number,' while Heraclitus suggestedfire, and Xenophanes, the earth. The Pre-Socraticspeculations reveal that the physical composition ofthe world continued to fascinate and puzzle the Westernphilosophers.Thales' and other Pre-Socratic's characterizationof reality might look a bit outdated today. But theirinherent assumption is significant. The point is that2500 years ago they were able to view the realityaround them as having a knowable rational structure.They manifested an enduring optimism in their searchfor the first principles, confident that everythingelse would fall into place once it was found. Adifferent type of thinking is found in some Pre-Socratics like Heraclitus and Parmenides who initiateda debate about the nature of motion and change.Heraclitus based his philosophy on change and

maintained that the world was in a flux. Parmenides, onthe other hand, denied change and demonstrated theillusoriness of it, basing on his logic. What reallyexisted is the "One.' It is in this context that weneed to view the reflections of Plato and Aristotle.~t is not our intention to enter knto the intricaciesand nuances of the thinking of these two greatphilosophers. As philosophers who have influenced andshaped the Western tradition, their thinking issignificant in the process of identifying theecological understanding of Greek phase.1.2.3 Plato and AristotleThe very name of Plato brings to mind thecelebrated theory of Forms. Forms are not conceptualabstractions but something that possess a quality ofbeing and a degree of reality that is superior to theconcrete world. They are the essence of things. Whatis real is the Form and everything else is real becausethey participate in the Forms. For instance, somethingis "beautiful' to the exact extent that the archetypeof Beauty is present in it. The theory of Forms enabledthe Platonic philosopher to make a distinction betweenreality and its appearance. It is evident that Platois indebted to his teacher Socrates who in his ethical

discussions maintained that man as a moral agentrequires the Ideas of justice and goodness for goodlife. So also, in all other fields, be it science orphilosophy, absolute Ideas are required to understandthe world. And it is by this that chaos, flux and thevariety of sensible things can be unified and madeintelligible. Plato directs the philosopher's attentionaway from the external and concrete, from taking thingsat face value and points to a profound level ofreality. One can easily understand that the theory ofForms is an answer to Heraclitus and Parmenides.Aristotle's philosophy brought Platonism down toearth. The crux of their difference lay in the precisenature of the Forms and their relation to the empiricalworld. Aristotle took the empirical world on its ownterms and considered it fully real. True reality was,for him, the perceptible world of concrete objects andnot an imperceptible world of eternal Ideas. Headvocated the doctrine of Categories which maintainedthat a thing can be predicated in many ways. And themany ways of to be inheres in substance which is theprimary reality. The real world for Aristotle, is oneof individual substances. Substances are distinct fromeach other and function as substrata for accidents.

The primacy of substance did not ignore the placeof the universal. The universal. for him. isconceptually distinguishable from the concreteindividual, but is not ontologically independent.According to him, Plato confused categories such asquality with substances.Aristotle maintained thatsubstances are the primary realities and categoriessuch as quality are abstractions which are based on areal aspect of the substance in which it inheres. Theemphasis on the concrete reality made Aristotle focuson the problems of life and this world.In Aristotle and Plato together, then, wefind a certain elegant balance and tensionbetween empirical analysis and spiritualintuition ... with Plato pointing upward tothe heavens, to the invisible and transcendent,while Aristotle motions his handoutward and down to the earth, to the visibleand immanent. 'What does this Greek phase pf philosophy conveyregarding the understanding of ecology?Obviously weshould not find fault with them for not thinking fromthe perspectives of today. But it is clear that theirphilosophical emphases would not have considered anunderstanding of ecological relationships in nature tobe important. In a world dominated by the search forultimate principles, an understanding of objects that

deals with ecological relationships could at best be anopinion. Moreover, they studied physical elements notas phenomena but as substitutes for ultimate element*.Their suspicion of change lad them to view nature, theseat of change, as superfluous phenomena that veiledreality and did not partake of it in any significantdegree.Among the Greek philosophers it is Aristotle whocame close to approaching nature from an ecologicalperspective. Though his interest was metaphysics, hemaintained that the study of ultimate substances mustbe supplemented by the investigation of naturalobjects, plants, and animal^.^ This shift of focushelped Aristotle to do pioneering work in biology andbotany. However, his emphasis on metaphysicalprinciples of finality, and his perception of thehierarchy of living organisms made him view theirexistence for the sole purposes and interests ofhumans.The Greek philosophers appear to have a deepappreciation and admiration for nature and the worldaround. The beautiful was often a serious point ofdiscussion for them. Plato was able to fuse themetaphysical, the aesthetic, and the ethical together

in his concept of the ultimate Form, the Beautiful andthe Good. Plato's Dialogues occasionally show that hegreatly appreciated nature, but his generalphilosophical view forced him to ignore the world ofnature or treat it contemptuously. In his Dialogue,Phaedrus, there is a passage referring to genuinedelight in nat~re.~ However, the superficiality oftheir delight in nature is revealed in his statementwhich says, "You must forgive me, dear friend; I am alover of learning, and trees and open country won'tteach me anything." Plato's commitment to the theory offorms led him to an antipathy to natural objects. Sincethe reality of existence is measured by the degree ofparticipation in Forms, those things without properparticipation in Forms do not exist significantly.1.2.4 The Modem PhaseAnyone familiar with modern philosophy and itsorientation would concede the environmental biasreflected in the understanding of ecologicalrelationships. The key philosopher in the modern phaseundoubtedly is Descartes. He was admired for hisrationalistic bent of mind and disliked for the host ofphilosophical puzzles that his philosophy gave rise to.The appeal of his philosophy is such that even those

who are critical of him work within a Cartesianframework. It is said that Descartes is not only thefather of modern philosophy but he is also the fatherof modern philosophical problems! The environmentalbias that we recognize in modern philosophy is due toits concerns with problems such as the existence of theexternal world, the nature of natural science and theobjectivity of value. Descartes in his most importantbook, Meditations on First Philosophy, looked for anabsolutely certain and self-evident principle to basehis reflections. He found it in the cogito. The cogitogranted him an intuitive certainty of his existence.This first principle enabled him to argue for theexistence of God, other human beings and the externalworld. What is important from the environmentalperspective is the Cartesian legacy. For Descartesthere are two types of substances, the res cogitans(the thinking substance) and the res extensa (theextended substance) . The thinking substance such assubjective experience, spirit, consciousness, etc. arefundamentally different from extended substance such asthe objective world, matter, the physical body, andeverything that humans perceive outside the mind. Inhumans the two realities come together as mind andbody. Both these substances are created by God and

since they are fundamentally different, they areincapable of interacting with each other.God wasneeded not only to maintain the world but also to solvethe problem of interaction.Thus human reason establishes first its ownexistence, out of experiential necessity,then God's existence, out of logical necessity,and then the God-guaranteed reality ofthe objective world and its rational order.'The outcome of such a position was that there waa noappropriate context for human involvement and concern.Everything depended on the exercise of the power ofGod. Moreover, the physical universe came to be viewedas devoid of any purpose or spirit. As purely materialobject, all physical phenomena came to be comprehendedas a machine.The discussion that we have* had so far broughtforth the environmental bias reflected in certaintraditions of Western philosophy. It is not our purposeto make a detailed inquiry of the various phases of thegrowth of Western philosophy. However, it is obviousthat many influential philosophical concepts have hadharmful consequences from the perspective of ecology.

1.3.1 Ecological AwarenessEcological awareness is a Contemporary sensibilityand is a major characteristic of the present century.~t is an awareness of the wider ecological interrelationshipsarising from the increased awareness ofthe state of the earth. Thus today there is muchwider concern than before about the depleting naturalresources, the increasing burden of population on theearth, the militarization of the globe, nuclear wastes,ever growing pollution in alarming magnitudes, and theside effects of ever growing technology. The statisticsin these fields reveal an alarming picture and soserious minded people wonder about the future of theearth and life in general. According to an internaldocument prepared in March 1992 by the Ministry ofEnvironment and Forests, Government of India, we arefacing a very serious situation vis-a-vis ourenvironment .' Today over 250 million children, womenand men suffer from mal-nutrition in spite of theincreased food production. India has a large populationof domesticated animal of around 500 million with agrassland area which is hardly 3.5% of the geographicalarea. Out of a total area of about 329 millionhectares, 175 million hectares of land require special

treatment to restore productivity. Our Forest wealth isdwindling due to overexploitation and unsustainabledevelopments. The recorded forest cover is below therequired minimum, and the annud rate of loss offorests works out to 47,000 hectares. The loss ofhabitat is leading to the extinction of many plant andanimal species. According to the Botanical andZoological Su-wey of India, over 1500 plant and animalspecies are in the endangered category. These humaninflicted wounds on the ecosystems apart, we arefacing serious problems of pollution in urban areas.Pollution arising from toxic wastes and nonbiodegradable consumer articles are on the increase. Alarge number of industries and other developmentprojects have been badly located. Thus the wholescenario of the environment manifests an imbalance, andthis is by Government's own admission.Ecological awareness, arising out ofreflection on contemporary situation, has lead topopular responses known as environmental movements.They radically question the frameworks, assumptions andpresuppositions of a human-centered paradigm. Theliterature that comes out in this area are numerous.For instance, a book by Donald Edward ~avis" gives anannotated bibliography of 283 books, 33 periodicals, 18

organizations related to the intersection of phi-losophy and ecology!From this one can imagine thegrowth of publications in this area in the last four orfive years. Today in contemporary social and politicallife the environmental movements have become asignificant phenomenon.1.3.2 'The Silent Spring'The awareness of the ecological problems andthe consequent birth of environmental movements in thefield of ecology dates back to the publication ofRachel Carson's Silent Spring in the year 1962. l1Theimpact of the book was tremendous. For the first timeit was able to galvanize public concern overenvironmental issues. Carson's forceful statements andanalysis of environmental issues had far reachingconsequences. The book generated fierce controversy andwidespread concern. One can gauge its impact from thefact that it remained on the New York Times best-sellerlist for thirty one weeks.The primary concern of Silent Spring was with thedamage we cause to the ecological world. But the bookhad an important impact on another level. It 'was alsoan indictment of our arrogant conception of our placein the larger scheme of things."" She concluded that

the control of nature is a phrase conceivedin arrogance, born of the Neanderthal age ofBiology and Philosophy, when it was supposedthat nature exists for the convenience of.,.=- 13The net effect of such a critique was far-reaching.Many people came to realize that with regard toecological problems it is not bigger and bettertechnical solutions that are needed, but a "thoroughrethinking of our most fundamental attitudes concerningour place in the larger scheme of things. "'1.3.3 Lyn White and 'Historical Roots'A rethinking on this topic was initiated in 1966by Lyn White Jr., an acknowledged medieval historian.He presented a paper to the American Academy forAdvancement in Science entitled. "The Historical Rootsof our Ecologic Cri~is."'~ He gave a persuasiveanalysis 3f the Western tradition relying on 'recenthistorica: scholarship. He established that "theleadership of the West, both in technology and science,was far older than the so-called Industrial Revolutionof the eighteenth century."" He 'undertook an analysisoi the medieval view of man and nature because ourtechnological and scientific movements gained momentumin the middle ages. According to him, ruthless farming

egan in Northern Europe in the middle ages reflectingtendencies of exploitation of nature. "What people doabout their ecology depends on what they think aboutthemselves in relation to things around them."" Hiscentral thesis is that man's relation to nature isconditioned by religion. Medieval Christianity,especially the tradition that developed in the LatinWest with its linear conception of time, and strikingstory of creation" gave emphatically the message thatphysical creation had no purpose except to serve man'sneeds.White argued that "especially in its Western form,Christianity was the most anthropocentric religion theworld has seen," and that accordingly 'Christianitybears a huge burden of guilt. "I9White's paper unleashed a plethora of literatureespecially in the now famous field of eco-theology.Today, the religious background of the ecologicalcrisis is a much studied topic. In a recent articlea0Elspeth Whitney has questioned White's assumptions.According to him White assumes that religion is thefundamental moving force in history. This assumptioncannot be accepted as it is. The economic and sociopoliticalfactors too are . equally important

considerations. Moreover, according to him, Whiteassumed that the medieval Christianity provided thepsychic foundations of modern technological inventiveness.It is to be noted that by the year 1978. Whitehimself had modified his views, noting that the reasonsfor the medieval developments of technology was by nomeans clear.We have already noted Lyn White's contribution inbringing to the fore the religious background of theecological crisis. Since religion is a major force thatshapes our relation, it is important to reflect on howreligion and ecology are interrelated.Religion could rightly be described as man'sresponse to the exigency of human condition, in whichhe is driven to seek security, status and permanence byidentifying himself with a reality, greater or moreworthy thar. himself .22It is no doubt that religion plays a vital role inshaping the life of a person in community, in terms ofhis approach to reality. The great world religions ofhumanity have been the channels' through which the'philosophical triangle' -- that of the World, God, andthe Other -- got articulated, practiced and maintained.As an enormously influencing factor in personal and

social life, the world religions have shaped andcontinue to shape people's approach to theirenvironment. More than ever before, this is recognizedtoday.'' It is not our aim to enter into a detaileddiscussion of the ecological crisis from theperspective of various world religions. However, as animportant influencing factor in the Western traditionand taking into account seriously the observation ofWhite, we propose to deal with the Christianperspective at some length.1.4.1 Ecology and Religion: The Biblical PerspectiveChristianity is the largest of the world religionstoday. According to a recent survey," out of the fivebillion human beings in the world today, 1.95 billionare Christians. Muslims come around one billion andHindus, around 777 million. As the largest livingreligion, it may not be wrong to say that Christianityfor a long period of time shaped the culture of theWestern hemisphere. The mutual influence and synthesisof the Judeo-Christian and Hellenistic tradition arepart and parcel of their world view.A word or two about the use of the term 'worldview' is in order. In contemporary discussions the termworld view is used in such generality that it is often

difficult to fix its meaning. It is quite usual,however, to specify two senses of the term, namely.world view as 'world-image' and world view as'philosophy of life'. World-image (Weltbild) is aconceptual elaboration of the results of empiricalobservations into a scientific view of the world. Worldview as a philosophy of life (Weltanschauung) means atotal view of the nature and origin, value and meaning,goal and aim of the world and human life. Weltbild willprimarily refer to a picture whereas Weltanschauungwill be a view of life in terms of its significance. Inthis second sense a world view is a world of meaning.It is a specific perspective of any traditionexperiencing and expressing itself and its world. Itcovers all the conscious and sub-conscious activitiesof the tradition. It is in this perspective alone thatcertain things make sense and others do not. That iswhy there is a value system that is specific to thattradltinn. Our understanding of any perspective, or acreative investigation or the response to any specificquestion become intelligible when we specify theunderlying world view. At the same time understandingthe world view of our thoughts and actions is asdifficult a process as becoming aware of one's accent.Like our accent these nuances are part of our being and

cannot be easily objectified. It is the listener who isable to notice the styles of our accent. A world viewthus is the specific way in which a tradition views thetotality of God-world-man.Though Christianity has existed for two millennia,until recently its influence has been felt mostly inthe West. The term "Christian* identifies those whofollow the life and teachings of Jesus Christ ofNazareth. The Bible is the Christian scripture whichcontains the Judeo-Christian story of salvation. Thisstory of salvation began with the life and liberationof the Hebrews from the oppression of the Egyptianrulers and progressively unfolded in the life, deathand resurrection of Jesus Christ.The Christian outlook on reality in many ways isshaped by the Biblical world view. Therefore tounderstand this, one needs to be familiar with theJudeo-Christian world view. The Judeo-Christian worldvlew 1s not a monolithic structure but a confluence ofvarious influences. It has been highly influenced bythe Near Eastern mythologies, the Cannanite rituals andpractices, the Persian religions, and most of all bythe Greek philosophy. It is not our aim to enter into adetailed discussion of these aspects. We approach the

Judeo-Christian world view from the perspective ofecology, that is, to understand, evaluate and to seehow far this world view is responsible for theecological disaster of the day.The Israelites were a nomadic people. Theirhistory began with the legendary patriarchs such asAbraham, Isaac and Jacob who were pastoral people, whowith their livestock wandered through the place. The~xodus experience, which is the story of Israel'sliberation form the bondage of the gypt ti an Pharaoh,shaped them into a people. They were backward in manyways compared to their neighbors. A strong monotheismwas the central pillar of the Israelite religion. Forthem Yahweh was the liberator who freed them from thecaptivity of Egypt with a mighty hand. This monotheismtook strong anthropomorphic forms. Thus they expressedthe attributes of Yahweh in human qualities. The exodusexperience brought a strong historical perspective anda sense of destiny to the Hebrew theism. The Hebrewsconceived the revelations of Yahweh in terms ofhistory. And quite often the strong monotheism cameinto fierce conflict with their neighbors who practicedother cults. The Hebrew experience was overborne withexposure to the harsh and hostile forces of nature.Nature to them was a foe from whose malice they had to

keep away. The vagaries of nature were looked uponwith fear. This primitive experience of the Hebrews hasinfluenced the succeeding generations. The conquest ofCanann was an important landmark in their life. Theyfirmly believed that this land was promised to them byYahweh.During their forty years of sojourn in the desert,they mustered enough strength to conquer the promisedland. The Hebrew dislike for nature reached its highpltch during the conquest of Canann. Canannitepractices consisted of nature worship, ritualprost~tution, polytheistic worship, snake and bullcults, fertility rites and festivals. However, thesecontacts brought about some sort of cultural transitiontoo. One can trace the integration between the pastoralcults of the patriarchal religion with the agrarianCananite cults.The prophetic tradition in Israel must be viewedin this background. The monarchical form of governmentand the deviation from the Yahwehism enabled theprophets to be critical of the establishment. The greatexile of 587 B.C. shattered their faith in theircapabilities and achievements. The loss of the temple,and the downfall of monarchy which gave them an

identity, collapsed. In Babylon they were confrontedwith Persian religions of dualistic philosophies.Mythical and theological concepts such as heaven andhell, light and darkness, the great final battlebetween the forces of good and evil, etc. entered intotheir categories. Satan as an arch rival of Yahwehentered into Judaic religious myth during the period ofexile.The present day biblical scholarship hasestablished beyond doubt that the creation myth of the~ook of Genesis is highly influenced by the Babylonianmyths of origin. The post exilic period of Israel wascharacterized by the Hellenistic influence. But by thetime the Greek thought influenced Palestine, the Torah-- the book of Law -- was codified and canonized andwas therefore not open for the intrusion of Greekphilosophical motifs. We can notice the strong Greekinfluence in the intertestamental period and the NewTestament period of the early Christian thought.As far as the early Christian Church wasconcerned, the Greek influence - contributed to thedichotomy between the spiritual and the material realm.It was a direct result of the fonn/matter controversywhere form was considered sublime compared to matter

which was considered crude and base. The Greekdichotomy between the spiritual and the material realmswas easily accepted in the early Christian thought.Another significant Greek influence was the linearconception of time, where time could progress over alinear scale proceeding to a cessation of allhistorical process. This enabled them to look forwardto the fulfillment of their religious aspirations in atrans-historical consummation. The early Christians wholived at a time of national crisis and severepersecutions were enabled to look forward to seecontemporary historical process as the intermediatestage of the final fulfillment. As opposed to this, theJews of the intertestamental period had a calendricaland cyclical conception of time. The shape of thisrellglon changed dramatically with Constantine'saccession to power in 313 A.D. and his embrace ofChrlstlanity. It became the state religion of the RomanEmpire and shortly became a world religion. TheChristian religion was an integral part of the empire'spolltical process. The growth of this religion theworld over, and the cultural impact it had in the livesof peqples are easily noticeable.

We shall move into some of the specific aspects ofChristianity which contributed to the ecological biasthat is reflected. The ecological critiques ofChristianity point out the spec$ficreligious andpsychic vigor that has contributed to the rise ofmaterialistic values, consumerisitic life style, andthe spread of scientific, technological and industrialculture that damage the environment. Perhaps the keytheme that has contributed to this has been the Genesiscommand to exercise dominion over nature. For theIsraelites, nature is something that is to besubordinated to man. In the Book of Genesis we read:Let us make man in our image and likeness;and let them have dominion over the fish ofthe sea, and over the birds of the air, andover the cattle, and over all the earth, andover every creeping thing that creeps uponthe earth. (1/26)Again in the following verse the oft quoted phrase'subdue' and 'dominion' occurs. "Be fruitful andmultiply, and fill the earth and subdue it; and havedominion over the fish of the sea .... V1/28)These two quotations reveal the attitude ofdomination over nature. The term dominion originatesfrom the Hebrew verb radah.15 This term connotesdifferent shades of meaning but all of them point to a

hostile sense of mastery of nature. Some of theimportant imageries that are evoked by this wordinclude the crushing of the grape bunches, and theexercise of power over enemies, a custodian's exerciseof authority under those in custody, and a dictator'suse of absolute might. The term subdue originates fromthe Hebrew verb kabash which connotes threshing,pressing, making someone a slave and conquering ofnations. All these reflect their strong belief thatthe created reality is for the use of man. However,this does not mean that nature is evil or that there isno real existence for it. For everything that iscreated is seen as good by the creator.26 In the finalanalysis, the call to subdue the earth and to havedominion over everything demands that man should strivein such a manner that he will be able to complete theplan of God regarding human life. And he/she is calledupon to create conditions for the fulfillment of thisplan.There is no doubt that these verses have inspiredscientific revolution and the domination theme assumedincreasing popularity. The scientists believed thatdivine sanction for their pursuits had been granted tothem in the affirmation of man's dominant status overall creation. Francis Bacon embodied this spirit and

proclaimed that the conquest of nature was the goal ofscience.There is a second account of creation that givesthe impression of a very concerned attitude. The firstaccount belongs to the priestly tradition while thesecond account belongs to the Yahwhistic tradition."The Lord God took the man and put him in the garden ofEden to till it and keep it. * (2/15) Some scholars reada stewardship motive in this verse as opposed to thedomination theme of the previous account. However itshould be noted that the context of this verse does notlend itself to such an analysis. The command to tilland keep the garden of Eden imply that man has the dutyto protect it. The garden of Eden belonged to Yahwehbut he entrusted it to man to take care of it. By hiswork man exercises power over the created reality. Itis important to note that what is 'expressed in a crudeform in the first account is repeated in the secondaccount in a mild form. Moreover, a similar perspectiveof domination is reflected in Genesis 2/19-20. Here Godbrings every beast of the field and every bird of theair before man to see what he would call them. In theSemitic tradition to name a thing is to have controlover it. And so by naming the creatures, man exercisespower over them.

~ u t along with this one can also see aspects ofreverence to creatures. In the Book of Deutronomy20/19-20 there is a regulation that in times of war thetrees of the enemies should not be destroyed. Thatmassive destruction of property and vegetation was invogue during war is evident from this order. Again inthe same book, ch.25/4 demands that one shall notmuzzle an ox when it treads obt the grain. Thesereferences, though insignificant and normally unnoticedreflect an attitude of reverence and admiration for thecreated reality.The ambiguity and the intolerance in Israel's viewof nature is understandable in their geo-political andhistorical context. What has taken place is thatparticular historical exigencies favoured interpret-ations that justify domination. In fact the whole ofcreation account of The Book of Genesis is not aimed atimparting a scientific account oforigin but atheological testimony of man's ultimate dependence onthe Lord. The Psalmist captures thio spirit well whenhe proclaimsno.23).that 'the earth is the Lord's'(Psa1mThe mechanistic cosmology of.the sixteenth andseventeenth centuries have also imensely contributed

to the Judeo-Christian disastrous interpretations ofecology. Under the aegis of Newton and Descartes themechanistic view took control of all spheres of lifeand gradually the Christian theology subscribed to thisview in the place of an organic view of life especiallythat of the middle ages.The net effect of a mechanistic view was thesecularization of nature. The Christian theology basedon the anthropocentric motive approached nature as aself-enclosed machine, as a structure without any valueof its own. It is in this context that we have to seethe unholy alliance of the industrial revolution, thescientific progress hd the mechanistic interpretationof the classical Christian theology.If Christianity bears a "huge burden of guilt."does it provide enough inspiration to work for asustainable human-world relationship? It is true thatIn the teachings of Francis of Assisi and theinnumerable mystics, one can find enough inspirationfor enhancing an ecological perspective. More thanthat, the Christian theology must reinterpret thesignificance of the mystery of incarnation of JesusChrist. For this mystery comunicates God's lovemanifested in Jesus Christ who embraced the earthly,

historical limitations of human life. This mysteryprovides ample scope for providing a spirituality ofthe earth, and for overcoming the unwanted emphasis onthe secular and the sacred. Moreover, the ecologicalcrisis of today must be seen as having a bearing on thepresent religious crisis too. And as such all the worldreligions, however unecological they may have been inthe past, would have a perspective to offer. And thecontemporary challenge is to move into an interreligiousframework where religions can learn from eachother so that this crisis could adequately beaddressed.1 .S. 1 Eco-philosophy: Various ConceptionsContemporary writings in eco-philosophy are vastand varied. According to Donald ~orster" ecology hassuffered from a persistent identity problem. He drawsa distinction between the Arcadian and the Imperialvlew polnts. The former urges a simple quiet life inclose harmony with nature while the latter urges theemployment of science to extend humanity's power overthe non-human world. Some others have drawn adistinction between technocratic and eco-centricapproaches. The technocratic ideology is arrogant inits assumption that man is able to understand and

control events. For them science is to manage nature.Ecocentrism is larger in perspective, and emphasizeshumility and responsibility.The term 'Eco-Philosophy' itself has come toprominence with Henryk Skolimowski. The major ideasthat form the backbone of his conception of ecophilosophycan be summed up in the expressionecological humanism."' According to him ecologicalhumanism is distinct from traditional humanism whichemphasizes the nobility of man and appropriates natureto the ends and needs of man. Ecological humanism seesman as part of a larger scheme of nature and cosmos.According to him, ecological humanism is new set oftactics for living.The central pillar of ecological humanism,according to him, is that the world is a sanctuary. Heproposes this against the usual assumption that theworld is a machine. Seeing the world as a sanctuarydemands that we human beings respond to this world withreverence and responsibility, which in turn should formsufficient basis for new tactics for living. Accordingto Skolimowski, eco-philosophy should become a way ofliving characterized by such eco-values as frugality,recycling and the reverence for nature. The perspective

of eco-philosophy is to initiate a philosophicalreconstruction. It aims at providing a new philo-sophical foundation for our civilization by emphasizingthe need for eco-cosrnornlogy, a new concept of humanityas the ecological person, and ecological valuesMurray Bookchin has advocated a perspective knownas social-ecology. Social-ecology refers to 'anapproach that rests on the non-hierarchical nature ofecological communities" and attempts to "overcome thesplit between society and nature, mind and body,thought and reality that makes Western images of theworld."28 According to them the ecological crisisprecipitated not because of anthropocentric perspect-ives but because of authoritarian social structures. Itis found best expressed in capitalism and socialism.The destruction of nature reflects the distorted socialrelations at work in society. Social ecologistsmaintain that humans are nature rendered self-conscious.They call for small-scale, egalitarian anarchisticsocieties, which recognize that humanwell-being is inextricably bound up with thewell being of the natural world on whichhuman 1 if e depends . ''

The social ecologists maintain that many varieties ofenvironmentalism view nature in mechanistic andinstrumental terms. The social ecologists insist thatany attempt to define humanity's relation to the restof nature has profound implications forpolitical and ecological realms of life.socialJoseph Grange in an essay in Soundings hasemployed a distinction between dividend ecology andfoundational ecology. 'Dividend ecology regards theinteraction of humankind and nature solely from theperspective of investments and returns. "I0 Itsmotivation is to restrain our greed and diminish theaggression with which we attack nature. As the titleindicates, it is interested only in the returns.lacks the vision and resources for bringing out lastingchanges. Foundational ecology, on the other hand, seeksthe ground of our relation with nature as well as itscorresponding depths in the human psyche.Foundational ecology is therefore the effortto structure our modes of dwelling so thatthey reflect an essential and authentic wayof being human ."Similarly, John Rodmann identifies four forms ofecological consciousness."ItThe first approach is thatof resource conservation in which the attempt is to

estrain reckless resource exploitation.Here themotive is enlightened self-interest. It amounts to amore prudent form of resource exploitation. The secondapproach is that of wilderness preservation. Some sortof religious or aesthetic value is attached to thepreservation of wilderness and it tries to go beyondthe mere utilitarian and economic frame of reference.In moral extensionism, the third variety. nature isseen as having a value in its own right. An intrinsicvalue is attributed to the members of the non-humanworld. In short, the existing human centered ethicalthinking is extended. The fourth is named as ecologicalsenslbillty. It refers to the cultivation of a complexpattern of perceptions, attitudes, and judgments whichwould constitute a disposition of appropriate conduct.The Norwegien philosopher Arne Naes haspopularized the use of shallow and deep ecologyperspectives.Deep ecology refers to the level ofasking progressively deeper questions about theecological relationships of which we are a part.Thedeep ecological views are derived from fundamentals.The central intuition of deep ecology is that:There is no firm ontological divide inthe field of existence. In other words, theworld simply is not divided up into

independently existing subjects and objects,nor is there any bifurcation in realitybetween the human and non-human realms.Rather all entities are constituted by theirrelationships. To the extent that we perceiveboundaries, we fall short of a deepecological consciousness. "Deep ecology perspective, thus, calls for aprofound empathy and identification with nature.However, it should be noted that their insistence onthe intrinsic value and rights of nature is anerroneous projection of social categories into nature.It is important that humanityand nature are notdissociated but they must be thoughtfully differen-tiated.So far we have made an inquiry into the varietiesof ecological issues. Now we shall, on the backgroundof the investigation, identify the emerging concernsof ecologv.[llThere is a dimension of interrelationshipamong the various realms of existence. Thisinterrelationship flows from the fact that we areconnected to the rest of nature, both materially andspiritually. It is far more intimate than theconventional world view permits us to acknowledge. Thisdimension of interrelationship is articulated by modern

philosophers and scientists in systemic and holisticviews. They would understand various realms ofexistence as systems of integrated wholes and never asthe mechanistic aggregate of parts. The systems-view isone of organized complexity which is beyond theNewtonian views of organized simplicity. The systemsviewpoints to a very complex world of dynamicinterrelationships. Here we do not see simple linearcause-effect relationships but a complex web ofcyclical interconnections across time and geographicalspace. Instead of a world analyzed into parts, we seerelative wholes which are greater than the sum of theirparts.This view of life is opposed to themechanistic and objectivistic framework which isconsidered the legacy of CartesiaA-Newtonian thinking.The chief characteristic of such a view is separationand dissociation. It differentiated mind and body,subject and object, consciousness and content, valueand fact, spirit and matter. These distinctions favoreda particular type of scientific inquiry, but theseschisms are at the heart of the contemporary crisis.Thus, there is a bias in favor of thought over feeling,reason over emotion, fact over value, intellect overintuition, analysis over synthesis, instrumental over

intrinsic goals, and quantitative over qualitativefactors. ''In 1958, Heisenberg, one of the founders ofquantum mechanics wrote:by its intervention, science alters and refashionsthe object of investigation, inother words, method and object can no longerbe separated. The scientific world view hasceased to be a scientific world view in thetrue sense of the word."It amounts to the conclusion that there is noindependent observer of reality but only a participantin that reality. In such a view the classicaldistinctions of subject and object and fact and valueare no more considered important.How facts are investigated, selected, andinterpreted depends on one's values, whichare colored by how one sees the world. Thisdoes not leave us in a frightening morass ofsubjectivity but instead is an essentialawakening to the interactive character of ourrelationship with the world."2. Another level of concern that is reflected invarious ecological discussions is that ananthropocentric perspective is disastrous to theenvironment in the long run. Anthropocentrism or inother words homocentrism means human chauvinism." It

conveys the idea that humans are the 'crown ofcreation' and that they are the source of all values.In short, this perspective emphasizes that 'man is themeasure of all things,' and magnify our sense of selfimportancein the larger scheme of things.What is wrong with being anthropocentric? Can weas human beings in any way escape from ananthropocentric perspective? These are questions ofcentral importance. However, we must affirm thatanthropocentrism in its true sense should not forgetour sense of responsibility.~nthropocentrism doesn't imply that we magnify ourself-importance to the detriment of our environment. Inmany cases we have insisted on the difference of manfrom non-humans to such an extent that we viewourselves as unrelated to other creatures. The factthat one rs critical of anthropocentrism does not implythat one is a misanthropist. Misanthropy, as the termitself suggests, means opposed to being human ornurturing hatred or distrust of mankind.These two perspectives are interrelated, or inother words one implies the other. A genuine emphasison interrelationship presupposes that we go beyond ahuman-centered world view.

It allows us to understand that aan is onespecies of system in a complex and embracinghierarchy of nature, and at the same time ittells us that all systems have value andintrinsic worth."1.6.1 Heidegger and EcologyWe have identified two important aspects ofecology, namely, a search for viewing life in itstotality from the perspective of interrelationship anda concerted effort to move away from a human-centeredworld view. Now the guiding question is this: Can weapproach the philosophy of Martin Heidegger from theseperspectives which are significant for ecology as awhole.Ecological awareness is a contemporary phenomenonand therefore, one will not find in Heidegger'spublished works anything directly related to ecology.Here one could raise a question regarding the veryrelevance of the question. Although this is apparentlytrue, from a henneneutic point of view, the ecologicalconcerns are not alien to the 'Being-question.' Thereis ample scope to interpret the implications of the'Being-question' from this perspective. This could beestablished in the following manner.

~t is a very old claim that any great thinker hasessentially one fundamental idea. The truth of thisclaim may be debatable, but the claim remains very muchtrue in the case of Heidegger. As a great thinker ofthis century, he has continuously sought after themeaning of one single question -- the question of Being(Seinsfrage), or in other words, the meaning of Being.This does not mean that till the end of his life, hewas looking for an answer to the same question. Themeaning of the question changed as his thinkingevolved. But till the end of his life he was convincedthat the very questionability of Seinsfrage was hismain thrust. If Heidegger was a man of single thought-- the question of Being -- how could this singlethought lend itself to be interpreted from theperspective of ecology? In other words, what isecological about Seinsfrage? Will it not be goingbeyond the purview of the single-mindedness ofHeidegger? These are genuine questions that stir ustoday.This problematic could be presented in aprovisional manner as follows. What does Heideggerunderstand by Being? "Being, indeed -- What is Being?'-writes Heidegger in his "Letter on Humanism':

[It] is not God, nor [some] ground of theworld. Being is broader than all beings --and yet is nearer to man than all beings.Whether they be rocks, animals, works of art,machines, angels, or God. Being is what isnearest [to man]. Yet [this] nearness remainsfarthest removed from him. . . .''This characterization implies thatfrom theperspective of Sein (Being), Being is not a being or anentity at all but that which enables entitiespresent to man and men to each other.to beFrom theperspective of entities (Seindes), Being encompassesthem all, just as a domain of openness encompasses whatis found within it. "Being is the domain of openness,because it is the lighting-process by which beings arelighted up."" Heidegger's fundamental insight is thatthere is a difference between Being and entities. Weare very familiar with entities ef all types. But wehave great difficulty in specifying the meaning ofBeing. Being cannot be conceived as a type of entitybut "it refers to the self-manifesting, presencing, orrevealing of entities. "" This self-manifesting,presencing is the domain of openness which takes placewithin a clearing and it is called human existence. Oneof the paradoxes of human existence is that we are anentity and at the same time a clearing in whichentities can be or be manifest. In other words, we

human beings are not entities in so far as we are theclearing. We are no-things at all but the clearing inwhich things can reveal themselves. This is whereHeidegger's insightful use of the term Dasein becomessignificant. He uses this term to describe this humanexistence which is the there in which things orentities can be. Heidegger always emphasized that thisclearing is no human possession. He furthercharacterized this basic openness as time. Time is thethree dimensional realm in which entities can showthemselves in various ways. The time itself is not athing but is the realm in which things can appear. Itenables him to avoid the mistake of seeing time asindependent of human existence. If time is seen fromthe perspective of human existence then the humantemporality is essentially historical. It implies thatentities manifests themselves in different ways indifferent times. If this is the case, we err inaccepting one interpretation of reality as universallyvalid and in the framework of which we understand therelation between Being and entities.The Cartesian framework has been of such type. Inthat framework human beings became the self-conscioussubject for whom all other entities are objects to beknown and to be utilized for personal ends. In such a

frame of reference the material world is reduced to anobject to be dominated. In fact Heidegger's critique ofmodern technology is developed from this perspective.~hus the question of Being, which searches for themeaning of Being, begins with the existential analyticof Dasein, prepares a ground for critiquing 'substanceontology,' and proceeds through the winding paths ofthe thinking of Being as such. In the Being-process,man becomes a receptive listener to the beckoning ofBeing. This Denkweg manifests basically an ecologicalorientation, though much of it remains unsaid. It goeswell with Heidegger who always maintained that what isthe most important in any thinker is what remains"unsaid."In a certain sense, the philosophical works ofMartin Heidegger belongs to history.But as Gadamerremarked, "each age has to determine anew its positionin relation to, or its attitude towards. his work.'"Taking clue from the observation of Gadamer, we canpoint out that the effort of reading Heidegger from anecological perspective isa way of continuing themovement of thought initiated by Heidegger's questions.Consequently, we wouldfocus .on three areas ofHeidegger's thought. The first area will deal with thefundamental ontology where we shall focus on

Heidegger's philosophy of the world. The second areawill deal with his critique of technology. Theimplications of these analyses for man as a dwellerwill form the third area of the study.Reading Heidegger from the perspective of ecologyis relatively a new phenomenon. Although some scholarshave made attempts in this line, a full-length study isnot yet available. The very first attempt in this line1s that of George J. ~eidel" who in 1971 published anarticle entitled "Heidegger: philosopher forEcologists?" In the article he discussed at lengthHeldegger's examination of technology. Towards the endof the article, he maintained that Heidegger's views ofthe true nature of human knowing point to Heidegger asa possible philosopher for the ecologists." Trueknowing is far from the forceful and aggressivethinking. On the other hand true knowing "lets Beingbe." This reflects a basic attitude which man shouldexhibit towards nature. And man is called upon to watchover nature rather than to dominate it thoughtlessly.Another attempt 18 found in Joseph range,'^ whodistinguished between dividend(anthropocentric) ecologyand foundational (respectful) ecology. He quotedHeidegger to elaborate his concept of foundationalecology. He understood ecology as, 'the effort to

structure our modes of dwelling so that they reflectan essential and authentic way of being human. ""A seminal contribution in this field is made byMichael Zimmerman, an acknowledged Heidegger scholar.In 1983, he published an article in EnvironmentalEthlcs entitled "Toward a ~eideggerian Ethos forRadical Environmentalism.*" Again, in 1986, heexplored the implications of Heidegger's thought fordeep ecology." In these studies, he has provided athoughtful account of the themes and the development ofHeidegger's thought on nature, nature's fate and on theplace of animals and humans in nature. He has seen allthese in the context of Heidegger's critique oftechnology, in the new ethos that He wanted topropagate, namely, "a new paradigm for understandingwhat we and other beings are:" But in 1993, MichaelZimmerman published another article again inEnvironmental Ethics 50 which was an attempt to rethinkthe Heidegger-Deep Ecology relationship. The recentrevelations concerning Heideger's thought and his ownversion of National Socialism which led the author torethink his earlier efforts to portray Heidegger as aforerunner of deep ecology. Though Zimmerman wascritical of the fascist tendencies both in Heidegger as

well as in Deep ecology, he was in agreement with themain line of the arguments.we can find another source of thinking in A.T.Nuyen5' who tried to think the relevance of theHeideggerian existential ethic for the humanenvironment. He maintained that in the context ofenvironmental degradation some thinkers propagate"ecological ethics" and the main claim of this movementis that nature has an 'intrinsic value." This is tocounteract the domination attitude. He suggested theHeideggerian existential ethics which condemns thepurely instrumental view of nature which treats naturalobjects merely as objects fit for commercialexploitation. According to him, the "Heideggerianexistential ethics provides an ontological groundingfor our protective dealings with nature.*" Accordingto Bill Devall and George sessions5', Heidegger madethree contributions to Deep, long-range ecologyliterature. First, he provided a solid critique of thedevelopment of Western philosophy. The anthropocentricdevelopment of Western philosophy paved the way for atechnocratic mentality which encourages the dominationof nature. Second, Heidegger initiated his readers to adangerous path of thinking. This thinking is closer tothe Taoist process of contemplation rather than the

analytical thinking of the Wesp Third, Heideggercalled us to dwell authentically on this earth.A recent contribution to the field of Heideggerand Ecology is edited by Ladelle ~c~hoter.'' The book,which is the result of a conference on "Heidegger andthe Earth," is a collection of articles by a fewHeidegger scholars. In the papers, the authors make anattempt to reflect on ecology along with the thinkingthat arises out of the texts of Martin Heidegger. It ispresented as a response to a call and an attempt tothink as Heidegger did. Though the claim is a loftyone, the final outcome does not match the claim.The first essay, "Guilt as Management Technology:A Call to Heideggerian Reflection,' presents anoverview of Heidegger's thinking on technology. Itdiscusses the Heideggarian distinction of calculativeand meditative thinking. As the title indicates, theessay is more of an invitation to be aware of thecalculative moral consciousness. There is another essayin the volume which has "Heidegger and ~cology' as thetitle. Here the author makes an attempt to see theconnection between Heidegger's thought and ecologicalthinking. He examines some of Heidegger's fundamentalnotions in their relation to ecology. But it should be

noted that the author concentrates on the laterHeidegger with concepts such as "dwelling' which areecologically very significant. The rest of the essayshave a focus on the earth. They attempt to think beyondthe traditional modes of thought. One author tries todo so by "Singing the Earth" which itself is a title ofone presentation. The orientation of the book and itscontribution to the field of Heidegger and ecologycould be judged from the acknowledgment of the editor,"This book is a beginning, an opening, an attempt, and,we hope, in the best Nietzschean sense of the word atemptation for further thought. ""It is this "temptation for further thought' thatbeckons us to reflect further. Many of the studiesreferred to have been beginnings in the field ofHeidegger and ecology. Heidegger scholars often pointout the significance of notions such as "care" or"dwelling" in relation to ecology. As we have mentionedearlier, a comprehensive study is yet to be found. Itis true that the later Heidegger can be used veryeasily for ecological thinking. But then how do weaccount for the ecological dimension of the 'Beingquestion' itself? What is the ecological significanceof fundamental ontology and specially that of Being-inthe-World?We propose to make an inquiry along these

lines with the guiding perspectives on ecology that wehave identified.

CHAPTER TWOHEIDEGGERTHE PHILOSOPHER OF THE WORLD

2.1.0 The World: Preliminary Considerationswe identified in the previous chapter twoperspectives that are significant for ecology. First,the present-day ecological discussions aim atdeveloping a framework of interrelationship inexistence. Second, they aim to move away from a humancentered framework in thinking. Can we see theseconcerns reflected in the philosophy of MartinHeidegger? Heidegger establishes a relational worldview in his fundamental ontology the result of which isthe analytic of Dasein as Being-in-the-world. Theelucidation of his understanding of the world bringshim to confrontation with the Cartesian philosophy ofthe subject-object divide, and helps him to move beyonda subject dominated world view.Normally we understand by the world as theuniverse, the sum-total of everything that exists.Quite often we use it in very specific ways. Thus theearth with all its countries and people is world forus. Sometimes we use it in an attributive way; as forexample, English is a world language. At the outset itshould be made clear that Heidegger does not make useof the term 'world' in any such normal usage. Hisconcern is ontological to the core and he makes use of

the term from this perspective to draw out itsimplications.Heidegger himself has clarified his meaning of theconcept of 'world' in his writings. We shall make useof two texts to commence our analysis. The first textis from The Letter on ~umanism.' Here Heideggeremphatically states that theworld signifies theopenness of Being and it does not at all signify beingsor any realm of beings. "world is the lighting of Beinginto which man stands out on the 'basis of his thrownessence. "'World in this sense would be the "beyond' withinexistence. Man is not to be seen as a subject relatedto objects but before that he should be seen in hisessence as eksistent into the openness of Being. Thesecond text where Heidegger himself clarifies themeaning of the concept of world is in The BasicProblems of Phenomenology.' In this text Heideggerobserves that since Descartes, in German Idealism theontological constitution of the subject has beendetermined by way of self-consciousness. What is notimportant is the clarification of the concept of self-consciousness but Dasein's self-understanding.Thisself-understanding is clarified by way of the structure

of existence. The path for this is 'reflection in thesense of self-understanding by way of the thingsthemselves. "' Our very comprehension of thingspresupposes that they have the character offunctionality. This leads to a functionality-totalitythat is meaningful only when something as a world isunveiled for us. Thus here too Heidegger elucidates hisunderstanding of the world.These texts bring us to the very problematic ofHeidegger clarified especially in Being and Time. It iswell known that the world of philosophy is caught up inpuzzles, and it does not need any proof. Manyphilosophers spent their energy in proving the worldfor a long time. According to Heidegger such questionsare not only scandalous but the 'scandal of philosophy'is that, "Such proofs are expected and attempted againand again. "' The puzzles are due to a particular way ofunderstanding the nature of reality. This outlook canbe characterized as "substance ~ntology,'~ and it meansthat what is ultimately real is that which underliesproperties andremains continuously present. The"substance ontology" is that which leads to themetaphysics of enduring presence, and a whole lot ofdualistic thinking. Heidegger challenges thatconceptionand points out that reality need not be

viewed in that way. The essential thing for him is notto submit to that metaphysical picture.Such a radical challenge is not aimed atneglecting the importance of questions of mind ormatter or any of the themes in classical discussions.Heidegger's point of view is that they are allderivative phenomena and the result of theorizing froma detached standpoint. Such a detachedand objectiveapproach kills the world. What is more primary thanthese derivative approaches are the analyses of realityat the pre-reflective level. That is why he has raisedanew the question of Being and the world.The central intuition of Heidegger is that Being(to be) means presencing. "Being (Sein) understood inthe active sense of the infinitive 'to be' means theself-revealing orthe self-manifesting of beings(Seinden)."' Thus Being does not mean a mysterious"substance" that grounds a thing's predicates, nor doesit imply a supreme entity that creates all otherentities; rather Being is the Being-process. It is themanifesting of an entity within the historical-temporalclearing constituted through human existence calledDasein. For metaphysics Being means Seindheit, thereality of the real, but for Heidegger it means "to be

manifest." According to him entities are, in so far asthey reveal themselves through the clearing thatconstitutehuman existence. Thus human existence orDasein lets the intelligibility of what is revealed.2.2.1 Dasein AnalysisHeidegger is a master craftsman in the useappropriate expressions and his ingenuity lies in hischoice of words. Dasein is one such expressionHeidegger has popularized and Being and Time provides aprofound elucidation of it. This German word, hardlytranslatable into English, generally stands for anykind of Being or 'existence' in the traditional Germanphilosophy.'ofIn a narrower sense it stands for thekind of Being which belongs to persons. It connotes'existence,''life,' and 'presence.'9 In a unified anddeepened way Heidegger has retained all these shades ofmeaning. Dasein is the presence of Being, in particularhuman life and situations. The human person is the onewho has an understanding of Being. The very first timehe uses the term Dasein in Being and Time he conveysthis idea. "This entity which each of us is himself andwhich includes inquiring as one of the possibilities ofits Being, we shall denote by the term 'Dasein'.""

Dasein is the horizon in which something like Being ingeneral becomes intelligible.~hough this term cannot be accurately translatedinto English, there has been a divided opinion amongcommentators as to the rendering of the term. Somescholars would provide a literal translation such'there-being,'I1 while others woule take the meaning ofthe German term da as here. Since this term hasvarious shades of meaning, and it does not refer to afixed entity, it is customary to leave it untranslated.We should not attempt to define Dasein. Ratherkeeping true to the method of Heidegger we should ask:how does Dasein stands in relation to Being? It is anentity Iseindesl like any other and yet it is an entitywhich has an understanding of Being. Dasein is aclearing of Being. It is the process by which aclearing is made so that beings may make theirappearance. Thus we can describe Dasein as a 'window toBeing. 'laDasein, is not to be equated with humanreality per se. At the same time Heidegger wouldmaintain that, "The Being of any such entity is in eachcase mine."" It is not to be equated with self but theprocess of becoming 'self."asIt is a process thathappens within a human being. That is why Heidegger can

speak of Dasein as "in" man. The process of Dasein issuch that in the Being of this entity there is aconcern about its ability "to be.'his process ofbecoming a Dasein is a neutral one in the sense that itmay happen in an "I" or in a "thou,' in male or infemale. It does not mean that Dasein is an impersonalprocess but a pre-personal process."priori that renders individual selves possible.It is the aDasein is not a conscious s~bject'~in theCartesian sense. One major aim of Heidegger is toovercome the Cartesian dualism of mind and body. It iswith this aim in mind that he has chosen the termDasein. As a pre-personal process Dasein should be seenmuch more basic than the self and the mental states.Dasein is that upon which both self and mental statesare rooted. In his postscript of 1943 to "at isMetaphysics" Heidegger stated as follows:To characterize with a single term both theinvolvement of Being in human nature and theessential relation of man to the openness("there") of Being as such, the name of(being there) Dasein was chosen for thatsphere of being in which stands as man.... Any attempt, therefore, to re-think Beingand Time is thwarted as long as one issatisfied with the observation that, in hisstudy, the term 'being there' is used inplace of 'consciousness.'""

2.2.2 The Primacy of DaseinHeidegger has some significant reflections on thepriority of Dasein. He would say that, 'Dasein itselfhas a special distinctiveness as compared with otherentities. "I7 This distinctiveness lies in the factthat, "Understanding of Being is itself a definitecharacteristic of Dasein 's Being. 'loAt this juncture it is important to note thatHeidegger's Dasein analytic is based on a significantpresupposition.1g The presupposition is that in thehuman person there is a comprehension of Being. It isthis starting point that enables him to develop thenotions of existence, transcendence, Dasein and thelike. HOW can one justify a presupposition in a radicalphilosophizing and all the more when one is inspired bya phenomenological method? Heidegger himself is awareof this problem." He admits the circular nature ofreasoning involved here but denies the justificationfor reproach. His response to the objection ofcircularity is that the basic comprehension of Being isnot an explicit, conceptual awareness. Initially, theunderstanding of Being is vague, obscure, dark,nebulous and average. His aim is to make this vague,average understanding explicit and thematic. So the

movement of thought is from a vague comprehension to aclear understanding. This process is not a viciouscircle in the logical sense but a victorious circle"in the philosophical sense." The Philosopher's task isnot to deny the circle but rather toendeavor to leap into the 'circle,' primordiallyand wholly, so that even at the start ofthe analysis of Dasein we make sure that wehave a full view of Dasein's circularBeing. 23Dasein's understanding of Being is not accidentalbut a definite characteristic that renders the questionof Being possible. It is the capacity to understandBeing that distinguishes Dasein from all otherentities. Heidegger thus speaks of athree-foldpriority of Dasein. This is based on a distinctionbetween ontic and ontological types of inquiries. Theseterms are used abundantly but are not clearly defined.Ontological inquiry has a concern for Being whileontical inquiry has a bearing on entities and the factsabout. them."possesses an ontic primacy.The first priority is that DaseinThe ontic priority ofDasein consists in the fact that Dasein is ontological.Dasein has an ontological primacy because only Daseinis capable of understanding Being. This constitutes thesecond level of primacy of Dasein. The third level is

what Heidegger calls the ontico-ontol'~ica1 priority.It consists in the fact that not only Dasein is capableof understanding its Being but also the Being of otherentities.2.2.3 Characteristics of DaseinOur description of Dasein brings out two essentialnatures of Dasein. They are existence and mineness.Existence is the specific quality of Dasein. Entitiesare, but only Dasein exists. "The essence of Daseinlies in its e~istence."~~ Heidegger makes use of theetymology of the word 'existence' almost virtually. Theword existence arises from the Latin root ex-sistereand it means "to stand out from". Dasein stands outfrom all other entities in the sense that it is opento itself and to the world. Existence for Heidegger isan "ex-position" of the thinker. One is taken into analtogether different position, and it is from thisposition that one is able to ask the all-importantquestion of Being." Thus Dasein is the only existingbeing.In a later text, clarifying the meaning ofexistence, Heidegger writes thus: "In B.& T, the term'existence' is used exclusively for the being ofman."" He further notes: 'The word designates a mode

f Being: specifically, the Being of those beings whostand open for the openness of ~eing in which theystand, by standing it."" This implies that Dasein isnot a finished product but a process. It is a dynamicreality to be achieved. Hence possibilities becomeimportant. Moreover Dasein should not be approachedfrom the perspective of fixed properties or stablecategories but from existentials. "By 'existentiality'we understand the state of Being that is constitutivefor those entities that exist."" Thus Dasein's ways ofbeing are existentials as opposed to existentiell thatrefers to categories and ~ntic inquiries. In otherwords, existential is that structure which pertains toDasein's comprehension of the Being-structure ofentities. It refers to those categories which belongexclusively to Dasein. Thus it refers to theontological dimension of Dasein. It should be clearlydistinguished from Existentiell that refers to theontic dimension of entities. Moreover, these dimensionsof existential and existentioll are only distinguishable,not separable. They are different dimensions of aunified phenomenon of ~asein.~'The second characteristic of Dasein is 'mineness.'It expresses the unique individuality of each Dasein.It is always one's own existence and it is a state of

eing owned. Therefore, Dasein cannot be grasped as aninstance or special case of some genus of the thingspresent-at-hand." This entity in each case is mine.The question of 'mineness' enables Heidegger tointroduce the concept of authenticity. Since Dasein iss. project it has to choose from the possible ways opento it. Choosing the ways open to it and making themone's own will be a way of existing authentically.Such an option could very well be given up. One canlive in a routine manner following the dictates ofothers and the pressures of society. This will be aninauthentic mode of existence according to Heidegger.To be inauthentic means to objectify oneselfas a continuing ego-subject, thereby concealingthe fact that one is really openness oremptiness. To be authentic means resolving toaccept the openness which, paradoxically, onealready is. One can be open to other peopleand to possibilities only when freed from thedistortion of egoism.12The inauthentic mode leads to an average everydayexistence and he would call it das Man that is usuallytranslated as the 'they' or the 'one.' It need notrefer to a collective group but it could be the'anyone' who is not in possession of oneself asexisting. We could point out that Dasein is the

authentic pole of exsisting whereas das man is theinauthentic axis of being human.2.3.1 Dasein as Being-in-the-WorldThe fundamental constitution and the innermostreality of Dasein is that it is Being-in-the-world.This is the most important existential, or the way ofBeing of Dasein. For Heidegger, "world" is not the sumtotal of the things nor is it a theological category.33It means primarily the manner in which the things arein the whole as related to Dasein"World" in Heidegger's philpsophy is essentiallyrelated to the existential analysis of Dasein theresult of which could be summarized as follows: Daseinrefers to the human person who has an awareness ofBeing. In the concept of Dasein what is referred to isthe state of Being and not the entitiness of the humanperson. There is an essential ontological unity betweenthe Being of the human person and the Being of theentities.'heidegger believes that the elucidation ofsignificant ontological structures must begin with theexposition of 'everydayness' of Dasein. This term thatis quite common in Heidegger's vocabulary refers to theuncritical mode of daily life in which Dasein findsitself. ~t portrays our everyday relationship to the

entities around us. His descriptibn of everydayness iscarried out with the sole purpose of clarifying abackground understanding that makes all types ofeveryday experiences possible.In this everydayness there are certainstructures which we shall exhibit -- not justany accidental structures, but essential oneswhich, in every kind of Being that facticalDasein may possess, persist as determinativefor the character of its ~eing."Traditional philosophy neglected everydayness becausethey viewed our relation to entities from a theoreticalperspective rather than a pragmatic approach."The existential structures of Dasein's averageeverydayness reveal that we are Being-in-the-world. Thedescription of our everyday relation to entities withinthe world is the appropriate way for Heidegger toarrive at a notion of the world. It is brought about byclari.fying three crucial and different notions of worldin Heidegger. The first notion is the world of thetheoretical subject. The second one is the world of thepractical subject." The third notion is the worldhoodof the world.

2.3.2 The World of the Practical SubjectThis is the realm ofthe active, involvedparticipant who uses objects. One of Heidegger'sfundamental discovery is that our primary sense ofthings is not as objects of perception and knowledge.He would consider this as a derivative level. The basiclevel is that we make use of objects as equipmentswhichactivity.fit naturally into our ordinary practicalThe kind of dealings which is closest to usis as we have shown, not a bare perceptualcognition, but rather that kind of concernwhich manipulates things and puts them touse.This also implies that our fundapental awareness ofourselves is not as passive, disinterested, observersbut as purposefully involved participants at home inthe practical world.Heidegger would show this by a graphicdescripti~n.'~ For instance, we use the door knob toopen the door and to get into the next office. Here wedo not attend to its perceptual characteristics. Ourattention is directed towards where we are going to andwhat we are doing. The door knob is used soautomatically in familiar surroundings like these that

it withdraws from our view and serves its instrumentalfunction invisibly. In other words, the perceivableproperties of the things that we use for the most partare not explicitly noticed. Heidegger's often repeatedexample of the hammer makes this obvious again. Theskilled carpenter uses the hammer to drive the nails tobuild the house to shelter his family thereby providingfor his family either directly or indirectly. Explicitattention is typically directed toward the work ratherthan the equipment used to accomplish it.Heidegger should be credited for pointing out thatin our natural movement towards things we never thinkof a single isolated thing. We always think of a thingas part of a wider context. Things are not given to usas a jumbled heap "but as environs, surroundings,which contain within itself a closed, intelligiblecontexture. "'OAn equipment functions only in a networkof relationships. We become aware of this network ofrelationships only when there is a breakdown. When thepractical activity is interrupted by the failure of theinstrument, then we see the network of relations inwhich the functioning of the instrument is embedded.Here Heidegger introduces a complex expression called"ready-to-hand" (Zuhanden) to describe the way objectsare for us in the midst of practical activity. .The

kind of Being which equipment possess -- in which itmanifests itself in its own right-- we call 'readinessto-hand."" Thus readiness-to-hand refers to the Beingof the equipment manifested in its usability as aspecific instrument. It is not a quality that we candiscover from the outward appearance. Thus world hereis a network of relationships.Here we can recognize internal relations amongtools reflected in various assignments and externalrelations maintained in the purposes of the humanbeings who use them for their various goals. Thepractical world is more fundamental than the traditionalsense of the world as a collection of things inobjective space. This priority comes about because itis in this practical world that we inhabit first beforewe engage in scientific reflection. Moreover, the worldin the traditional sense can be understood from theworld in the practical sense but we cannot proceed theother way around.2.3.3 The World of the Theoretical SubjectThis is the world of the passive observer and canbe seen in the traditional scheme of the knower(subject) and the known(object). Heidegger calls thisas the theoretical standpoint. It is the standpoint of

the disinterested spectator. Such an observation ismotivated by a kind of curiosity about the true natureof things. Descartes is the representative thinker inthis realm. The components of this world are a mindwhose contents are mental representations, and anindependent substantial reality capable of beingrepresented. To adopt this standpoint is equivalent tolooking at things simply as perceivers and encounteringthe properties they present to us. Here the wholeproblematic is as simple as Fichte's remark:"Gentlemen, think of the wall, and then think of theone who thinks the wall."42 The attitude of viewingthings from the perspective of the theoreticalstandpoint is what Heidegger names the present-at-hand(Vorhanden) view. Traditional ontology is the ontologyof the present-at-hand, because they take thisperspective as the most basic.The main arguments of Heidegger against thepriority of this traditional present-at-hand view couldbe summarized as follows: First, the traditionalproblem of knowledge resulting in skepticism arisesfrom this perspective. The picture of subjects withtheir internal private representations confronting aworld of independent public objects is the source forSuch a position. The best way to avoid this problem is

to avoid the picture of reality that gives rise to sucha position ." Second, the traditional explicationcannot satisfactorily account for the transition toobjects with value predicates that seem to depend onthe relations of the object to us. He concludes thatthe priority assigned to the present-at-hand is thebasis for the fact-value dichotomy and its associatedproblems."Heidegger arrived at the distinctions of theready-to-hand and the present-at-hand from our approachto reality from the perspective of the practical andtheoretical standpoints. It is obvious that they arenot two separate realms but are perspectives that wetake towards objects.2.3.4 The Worldhood of the WorldThere is a third and most important meaning of theworld for Heidegger. The way to grasp the meaning ofthis third level is to approach it through the realm ofthe ready-to-hand. The world of the ready-to-handPresupposes something more fundamental than theyordinarily reveal. In the example of the hammer, it"refers" to the nails and boards with which it is used.The "being" of the hammer or for that matter anyequipment whatsoever consists of such "reference"

elations to other equipments in an equipmentaltotality. The point that Heidegger wants to drive homeis that we are able to make use of a particularequipment precisely because we havebackgroundfamiliarity and skills for coping with practicalenvironments. More than that our day-to-day activitiesof using things and instruments are not a blindactivity. It is a guided activity and our dealing withequipment subordinates them to a goal orientation. Ouruse of the equipments points to a directionality or an'in-order-to."5 It means that certain use or functiondetermines the equipmentality of instruments.This way of understanding points out that anequipment has an assignment -- that for which it isused. This assignment is never in isolation butfunctions always in relation to other equipments and ina totality of relations. This totality of relationshipis manifested in the following way. An equipment has anassignment to Dasein that has produced it, to thematerials it has been produced out of, to the naturethese materials have been extracted from, and so on.46Anyequipment seen as ready-to-hand possesses a greatrange of assignments beyond itself. These assignmentswill intersect with those belonging to other ewipmentin a most complex pattern. All these assignments and

the intricate System belonging to the sum of ourequipment are the referential totality for Heidegger.The referential totality or any portion of it isoriented towards some "for-the-sake-of-which." Therealization of this is the final goal of someparticular network of equipment."This way of assigning an end to itself is also away for Dasein to understand itself in terms of theend. Moreover, Dasein understands equipment byreference to the contribution it makes to this end. 1tis at this point that we ourselves are drawn into thereferential totality. The structure of referentialtotality does not stand independently over and againstus in such a way that we could have a detachedacquaintance with it. We already possess a priorfamiliarity with our own ends and with the means forachieving them. For example, we do not discover any'in-order-to' of any particular hammer by observing itsstructure. 1t is already contained in our priordirectedness that may be achieved with hammers, and inour prior ability or preparedness to employ the hammerin achieving those ends. It is on the basis of this apriori familiarity with the assignments belonging tohammers, that it is possible for us to see or use someparticular hammer as hammer. Thus we discover some

entity as a tool not because we have mastered anyconcepts, but because we are already pursuing some setof ends, and have a generalized competence over thesystem of equipment needed to achieve them.This pursuit and this competence have astheir object the whole system of assignmentsbelonging to this end and other equipment.And it is precisely this system of assignments,understood as embodied within thiscompetent directedness, that Heidegger refersto as the 'world.'''In order to refer to the ontological nature ofthis concept of the world he uses the expression"worldhood of the world." It is the most generalstructure of involvement and of all human behavior. Aspecific situation of ready-to-hand or a present-at-hand is just a particular case of this generalworld!!ood."Things show up for us or are encountered aswhat they are only against a background of familiarity,competence, and concern that carves out a system ofrelated roles into which things fit."49 This is thebroader and more basic background'level of familiarityand competence without which things ~.nd others couldnot be encounteredThe worldhood of the world may thus beidentified with significance as the relationalstructure of referential totalities, or inother words, the whole of the referential --

and significance -- totalities is the worldhoodof the world.50~hus world is not a sum of the entities within theworld, but a structure of Dasein. The phenomenon of"world" in Heidegger's own language isThe "whereinx of an act of unerstanding whichassigns or refers itself, is that for whichone lets entities be encountered in the kindof Being that belongs to involvements; andthis "wherein" is the phenomenon of theworld. And the structure of that to which[woraufhin] Dasein assigns itself is whatmakes up the worldhood of the world."We have so far tried to put forward positivelywhat Heidegger meant by the "world". This would becomefurther clarified if we examine what the world is notfor Heidegger. The world is not nature. The world isnot cosmos in the Greek sense of the term. According tothe Greeks, cosmos is an ordering principle whichrefers to the how of the beings in their totality.Heidegger would distance himself from the Cartesiansense of the world. World in the Cartesian sense is anobject that stands against a consciousness. Neitherwould he approve of a Kantian sense of the world.According to Kant 'world' belongs to the regulativeideas of reason. It is the totality of causally relatedphenomena.

What we call the universe is not the world forHeidegger. He would state that the universe is within-the-world. This expression should be clearlydistinguished from Being-in-the-world that is thecharacteristic of Dasein whereas the entities arewithin-the-world.The world comes not afterward but beforehandin the strict sense of the word. The world isnot the sum total of extant entities. It isnot extant at all. It is a determination ofbeing-in-the-world, a moment in the structureof the Dasein's mode of being. The worldis something Dasein-ish, it is not extant asthings but is a da, there-here, like theDasein, the being-da (das Da-sein) which weourselves are: that is to say it exists.. . .The world is not extant but rather ite~ists.~'Dasein as Being-in-the-world brings out the essentialpeculiarity of Dasein that it projects a world foritself. Dasein does this not subsequently andoccasionally, but the very projecting of the worldbelongs to the Being of Dasein. In this projection,Dasein has already stepped out beyond itself.for Heidegger is a 'wherein,'Worldand this 'wherein' is aconfluence of various dimensions. Here we can recognizethe convergence of the environmental world and thecommunal world. Thus,

The world, then, is a non-ontic, nonthematic,pre-disclosed 'there' whereinThere-Being encounters the purposeful beingswith which it is preoccupied in its everydaycommerce with the world about."It is clear from the discussions so far that indescribing the phenomenon of world, Heidegger has beentrying to get behind the intentionality of subjectsdirected towards objects. In the whole analysis he istrying to highlight a context or a background on thebasis of which every kind of directedness takes place.In the third chapter of Being and Time Heidegger laysout the various ways in which the term world is used.5'In this section he lists out four senses of 'world."(1) "World" can mean a universe in the sense of atotality of objects of a certain kind. In this sense itis used as an ontical concept. (2).World' as anontological term signifies the Being of the entitiesunder consideration. For instance, when we use theexpression "the world of the physical objects", wewill be referring to what all physical objects have incommon. (3) Another way of seeing 'world' is as 'thatwherein a factical Dasein as such can be said tolive.'55This sense of the world is reflected in suchexpressions as "a child's world," 'theworld offashion, " etc. It is something like what Khun calls a

"disciplinary matrix" -- "the entire constellation ofbeliefs, values, techniques, and so on shared by themembers of a given community. " 56 (4) As an ontologicoexistentialconcept "world" designates the concept ofworldhood. The worldliness is the way of being, commonto our most general use of equipment. It is an "apriori" in the sense of something existing beforehand.Worldhood is that previous dimension given as alreadystructuring a particular sub-region.The above analysis goes against any private 'myworld.' For Heidegger there is no private sphere ofexperience and meaning which is self-sufficient andintelligible in itself. It is meaningful always in ashared public world and this is more fundamental thanthe private 'my world.' It is the Cartesian legacythat starts with 'my world' and then accounts for theshared world. Heidegger maintains that it belongs tothe very idea of a world that it be shared. Thus theworld is always prior to 'my world.'The phenomenon of the world reveals itself in twoways. The first case is at the occurrence ofdisturbance, or breakdown. It means that worldannounces itself in the context of a breakage or someform of disturbance in the form of functioning of any

equipment. The idea is that when an equipment becomesunusable due to a breakdown, the whole context ofinterlocking practices, the equipment, and the skillsfor using them become manifest. In Heidegger's words.the context of equipment is lit up, not assomething never seen before, but as atotality constantly sighted beforehand incircumspection. With this totality, however,the world announces itself.5'Heidegger's account reveals that disturbance orbreakdown makes us aware of the function of equipmentin a total context and thus a mode of the existence ofthe world is revealed.Disturbance or breakdown is not the only contextwhere the revelation of the world happens. There is asecond situation where the revelition of the worldhappens, and Heidegger refers to this as 'signs.' Signsprovide a context for becoming aware of the relationalwhole of significance without the presence ofdisturbance or breakdownA sign is something ontically ready-to-hand,which functions both as this definiteequipment and as something indicative of[was.. .anzeigtJ the ontological structure ofreadiness-to-hand, of referential totalities.and of worl dhood.

Signs function against a background and they directattention to which they presuppose. For example thesign of a traffic light or an indicator light in a caris not only available for the driver but also for theothers who drive along with him. Moreover, this signfunctions within the total context of trafficrey1:lation. Heidegger is pointing to the fact that wecope with particular signs without being thematicallyaware of them. This is also the case with the wholeinterconnected pattern of activity into which they areintegrated." Thus signs do the function of pointingout a world of shared practical activity.We have discussed at length the meaning of 'world"for Heidegger. Being-in-the-world is the most importantstructure of Uasein. If this is the case, a commonobjection could be raised here. If the world belongs toDasein is it not then something subjective? If thisobjection cannot be adequately met, it would followthat nature and other objects are really subjective. Inother words, Heidegger's philosophy would become somesort of a subjective idealism. Heidegger is aware ofthis problem. He is of the opinion that this problemmust be posed at a different level which goes beyondthe compartmentalization of idealism and realism.The principal problem is to determine exactly the

subjectivity of the subject. It is this search that haslead to the phenomenon of the world. The world issomething "subjective" in the sense that it belongs to~asein. "The world is something which the "subject'"projects outward, " as it were, from within it~elf:'~We should note that "inner' and "outer" are not theappropriate categories. This projection does not meanthat the world is a piece of myself in thesense of some other thing present in me as ina thing and that I throw the world out ofthis subject-thing in order to catch hold ofthe other things with it."62Instead Dasein exists in such a way that a world iscast forth. The meaning of existence is such that amongother things it means that a world is cast forth. Thusworld is thrown beforehand, in advance, and it is an aprioriof Dasein. Thus without any contradictionHeidegger can maintain that world is only if, and aslong as, Dasein exists.The structure of being-in-the-world makesmanifest the essential peculiarity of theDasein, that it projects a world for itself,and it does this not subsequently andoccasionally but, rather, the projecting ofthe world belongs to the Lmsein's being. Inthis projection the Dasein has always alreadystepped out beyond itself, ex-sistere, it isin a world."

This description brings out the fact that there isnever anything like a subjective inner space.Dasein is Being-in-the-world. Heidegger is veryquick to observe that this compound expression, Being-in-the-world, stands for a unitary phen~menon,~' andthat it should be seen as a whole. This does not meanthat it cannot be explicated into its constitutivestructures. This one phenomenon may be looked at inthree ways. However. 'Emphasis upon any one of theseconstitutive items signifies that the others areemphasized always with it.'65Firstly, this unitaryphenomenon can be viewed with the purpose of,"inquiring into the ontological structure of the'world,' and defining the idea of worldhood asSecondly, this phenomenon can be viewed from theperspective of "that entity which in every case hasBeing-in-the-world as the way in which it is.'6'elucidation of worldhood and Dasein hasOurdealt withthese two elements of this unitary phenomenon. Thirdly,this unitary phenomenon can be seen from theperspective of Being-in as such. ~eing-in clarifies theway Dasein is in the world. Here we should followHeidegger in his precise explanations of the 'in' ofBeing-in. ~onnally we are inclined to understand theBeing-in as 'Being-in-something.' We understand it

perfectly well in such expressions as "the pen is inthe box," or the "shirt is in the cupboard.' Thesespatial relations are characteristic of all present-at-hand. It is natural for us to think that this sense of,in,' reflecting physical inclusion, is the most basicphenomenon. Heidegger, on the other hand, will showthat the physical sense is derived from a much moreprimordial usage. He shows that 'in' reflects themeaning of "to reside," "to dwell." Even the expression"I am" primarily means 'I dwell.' He quotes authoritiesto support his view that the preposition is derivedfrom the verbal usage, and not the other way around.68In short, we can distinguish two senses of 'in.'The first one is a spatial sense, such as a pen is inthe box. The second one is an existential sense,conveying involvement.For example, when one is inlove, it is no more the spatial sense that iscomm~nicated.~~ Being-in thus consists of the variousways in which Dasein takes up relationship to theworld. Heidegger calls this orientation of Dasein asconcern .'OBeing-in is not a 'property' which Daseinsometimes has and sometimes does not have,and without which it could be just as well asit could with it. ... Dasein is never'proximally' an entity which is, so to speak,

free from Being-in, but which sometimes hasthe inclination to take up a 'relationship'towards the world. Taking up relationshiptowards the world is possible only becauseDasein, as Being-in-the-world, is as it is."The upshot of this description is that Being-in is notan occasional affair, but the basic state of Dasein.Being-in, as the basic state of Dasein, is dwelling.This dwelling is not a mere "inhabiting' based on asubject-object model of relationship. It is a dwellingbased on the a priori of Being-in-the-world that makesit possible to take up a relationship towards theworld.2.4.1 Being-in as DisclosednessThe term disclosedness hap a specific meaning inBeing and Time. It stands for the character of havingbean laid open. Disclosedness should be clearlydifferentiated from "discoveredness,' which refers to adirection towards a particular piece of equipment. Inthat sense it is an ontic transcendence. The basic ideathat Heidegger wants to convey by the use of these twoterms is as follows. "Disclosedness' refers to theprimary background familiarity of Dasein by which weare masters of our world. Just as our eyes constantlyaccommodate light, we have a capacity to adapt

constantly to our situations. This basic activity is sopervasive and constant that he calls it Being-in-the-world. "The world which has already been disclosedbeforehand permits what is within-the-world to beencountered. '" For Heidegger, "disclosedness" wouldrefer to the holistic background of Being-in-the-world."Discoveredness" would be the appropriate dealing inparticular circumstances.The originary transcendence of (disclosing)is the condition of the possibility of ontictranscendence (discovering), and on the sideof the world, disclosedness is the conditionof the possibility of anything beingdiscovered .'IIn this connection it is highly instructive to quote aparagraph from The History of the Concept of Time11925) which preceded the publication of Being andTime.My encounter with the room is not such that Ifirst take in one thing after another and puttogether a manifold of things in order thento see a room. Rather, I primarily see areferential whole...from which the individualpiece of furniture and what is in the roomstand out. Such an environment of the natureof a closed referential whole is at the sametime distinguished by a specific familiarity.The ... referential whole is grounded preciselyin familiarity, and this familiarity implies

that the referential relations are wellknown.''Prior to any specific engagement of Dasein with otherbeings, world is disclosed to Dasein. The very Being ofDasein refers to this disclosednes and it is implicitin the term da (there). "The 'there' of Being and thediaclosedness of the world are but one."'Our discussion of disclosedness brings us directlyInto the realm of truth. Heidegger has devoted much ofhis energy to the clarification of the reality oftruth. This is evident not only from Being and Time,but also from his other writing such as "On theEssence of Truth"" and The Early Greek ~hinking."The elucidation of truth in Being and Time, 'takesits departure from the traditional conception of truth,and attempts to lay bare the ontological foundations ofthat concepti~n:'~ In order to achieve this Heideggerbegins with the usual concept of truth. Truth inphilosophy is discussed from the perspective ofcorresp~ndence, coherence or pragmatic theories. Theoldest and most widespread doctrine of truth is that ofAristotle and it is known as the correspondence theoryof truth. According to Aristotlc.

to say of what is, that it is, is true; andof what is not, that it is not, is likewisetrue; whereas, to say of what is not that itis, is false."This theory postulates a certain standard relationshipbetween words on the one hand, and the world or realityon the other. The proponents of the coherence theorymaintain that truth does not lie in individualpropositions. Individual propositions are true onlywithin the system within which they are articulated andexplained. Thus the statement that parallel lines donot rr.eet is true only within the Euclidean system ofgeometry and not in non-Euclidean systems. Thepragnlatic theory of truth equates truth with utility orusefulness.Heidegger's explication starts with a probingquestion. What do we ordinarily understand by truth?For example, we speak of true gold when it is genuineand. when it is in accordance with what we mean by gold.We speak of true statements too. Thus a statement istrue when it is in accordanc~ with the matter aboutwhich it is made. This accordance was expressed in thetraditional definition as veritas est aecfuatio rei etintellectus. Thus truth as correspondence came toacquire a quasi absolute validity and a sense of self-

evidence. Heidegger is not satisfied with thecorrectness of the traditional understanding. Accordingto him what is correct need not be true. His aim is tolay bare the ontological foundations of correspondence.We recognize correspondence when two things havesimilarity in appearance. But how can there becorrespondence between two distinct realities such as astatement and a thing or matter? Heidegger maintainsthat there is a representative relation. It means thatthe statement says something about the thing and how itis or what it is like. It is not a psychologicalrepresentation but as "letting something take up aposition opposite to us, as an object."" Heideggermeans by this "that the thing, though it remains in itsplace and remains generally what it is, traverses anovertness towards oneself .'" In other words the thingmust enter into a realm of the open. It is here that weshould see the whole discussion regarding truth interms of Dasein as Being-in-the-world. The realm of theopen is that which characterizes Dasein. The open is amatrix of relationships which constitutes the sphere ofthe potentialities of Dasein. Our judgments are capableof expressing correspondence precisely because in thevast horizon of the open Dasein is capable of enteringinto a comportment with a to-be-judged. This realm of

the open is the permanent and indispensable conditionfor all human knowledge and all purposive activities.Dasein's pre-ontological understanding ofvarious ways of being opens a clearing inwhich particular entities can be encounteredas entities to be used or as the referents oftrue assertions, etc."Dasein as being-in-the-world is the primordialdisclosednesss' and it is primordial truth forHeidegger.Heidegger preferred to use the original Greek termaletheia for truth. This Greek term meant uncovering orunveiling of things. An uncovering presupposes thatthings were embedded in a mystery which shrouded them.It is against this background that all uncovering andall arriving at and establishing of truth takes place.Aletheia is the primary open space within which Beingunfolds itself. Truth as aletheia is not to berestricted to correctness. It refers to the manifestnessand openness of entities, and this manifestnessis the basis for correctness of assertions."The term aletheia is derived from the root formlethosS and the first person form is lanthano whichmeans 'I escape notice,' 'I am hidden,' 'unseen orforgotten by others.' Alethes, an adjectival form of

aletheia, is also described as that which does not sinkinto lethe, the source of ~blivion.'~ Another scholartranslates aletheia as 'unconcealed" and so aletheiacan be rendered as unconcealment, Even the Gennanequivalent for truth too is significant for Heidegger.He has acknowledged this in his work The Questionconcerning Technology and Other ~ssays." According tohim the verbal form of Wahrheit (truth) is wahren whichstands for 'safe keeping,' 'to watch over,' and 'topreserve. 'Thus in Wahrhei t (truth) the fundamentalconnotations of manifesting and watchful safeguardingare implied.Truth as aletheia is also freedom according toHeidegger. He states that freedom is the foundation oftruth. He desists from any naive understanding offreedom which sees it as the property of man. He wouldrather look for the very basis of freedom itself andthat which renders it possible. Heidegger understandsfreedom as "letting beings be." It implies that manconcerns himself with the things around him as they areand treat them, and among then himself, and hisfellowmen as "beings.' 'Letting beings be' is not justany activity of man, but is that by virtue of which hebecomes Dasein, an entity that is defined by itsrelationships to the open. The expression "letting

eings be" in no way reflects a spirit of passivity. Itmeans "to open up the ontological clearing in whichthings can disclose themselves and thus 'be'."OeThisnecessitates that there be no undue human interferencein the process of allowing things to show themselves.Moreover, it calls for interacting with things in arespectful manner. Thus "letting be ... means partici-pating in the open and its openness, within which everyentity enters and stands. " 09Truth as aletheia has enabled Heidegger to relateit to the fundamental problem of the question of Being.It also has enabled him to go beyond the epistemologyof the subject and the object. He acceptscorrespondence theory of truth for all practicalpurposes but rejects the manner in which this agreementwas seen as the correspondence of a subjective mentalcontent with an objective state of affairs. Hispresentation of truth is an event of immediacy. It isan event of revealing which is at the same time anevent of concealing. A leading metaphor for theexperience of truth for him is the flash oflightning.

2.4.3 Dimensions of Being-inWe have seen that Being-in clarifies the way~asein is in the world. Dasein is in the world not asa subject related to an object. Rather Dasein is alwaysoutside itself and is formed by shared practices. It isabsorbed in one activity or other. Thus Dasein isalways in the world by way of being in a situation,dealing with specific context of things and people, anddirected towards some specific end. A situation is theresult of a shared practice and it cannot be privatelike a mental state or experience. Situations by theirvery nature can be shared. Heidegger calls thesituation a clearing." The term clearing may refer tothe verbal use of the activity of clearing or thenominal use of the result of that activity. For examplethe activity of clearing a forest produces a clearingin the forest. Being-in a situation Dasein has steppedout beyond itself and it is in a world. 'As Being-in-the-world it is cleared in itself, not through anyother entity, but in such a way that it is itself thelear ring.'^^It means that the luminosity of Dasein isnot somethir:g added to it but that it is its innermostconstitution.That is why Heidegger declares that"Dasein is ~ t s discl~sedness.'~' This clearing is notthe work of a monadic, windowless transcendentalsubject but the activity of a being that presupposes

and produces a shared clearing.95 As a shared clearing~aSein finds itself situated. Heidegger clarifies herea three-fold structure of this situatedness. 'When the'there' has been completely disclosed, its disclosednessis constituted by understanding, state-of-mind andfalling. ""2.4.3.1 UnderstandingThe first characteristic element of the 'beingthere"is understanding. In Being and Time Heideggerclearly demonstrates that interpretative understandingis central to human e~istence.~' In other wordsunderstanding is not just one of the various possibleways of Being but the very mode of the Being of Daseinitself. "Dasein, as existent, is itself anintrinsically understanding entity."" Understandingfor him is our most basic ability to live in and copeskillfully with our world. For inktance, to understanda hammer "does not mean to be aware of the propertiesof hammer; rather it means knowing how to hammer. "' Hedescribes this as 'primary understanding.' This primaryunderstanding flows from the very situatedness ofDasein. Situatedness reflects that Dasein has got todeal with things. Such dealings with things presupposesthat they are already found significant.

The structure of understandingis seen aspressing forward into possibilities. Heidegger namesthis characteristic as projection. "Projection means toseize by anticipation the structure of a being still tobe enco~ntered."~~ The projecting that is referred tohere is not a simple reasoning from a list of all theparticular choices that one has to make in decidingover something.The existential concept ,of understanding asprojection of possibilities are determinates ofDasein's existence. "Because the Dasein is essentiallybeing-in-the-world, projection unveils in everyinstance a possibility of being-in-the-w~rld:'~~ Thusin the understanding of Dasein's existence, there is adisclosure of other Daseins and the Being ofintraworldly beings.Heidegger's explication of 'primary understanding'is not complete without the clarification of themeaning of interpretation. Heidegger has two Germanfor interpretation. The first term is Auslegung,which means "~aying-out," and is translated as"interpretation' with a lower case 'i: It includesthe everyday phenomena of ordinary skills which arelargely unthematic. Interpretierung translated as

"jnterpretationn with an upper case 'I* stands forthematized and discursive articulation. It refers toacademic interpreting of texts and to the theory ofinterpretation itself.Heidegger clarifies the relationship betweeninterpretation and understanding as follows. "Ininterpretation, understanding does not become somethingdifferent. ... it is rather the working-out ofpossibilities projected in ~nderstanding."~' In otherwords what is primarily understood is the world and itcomes to be "laid out'(aus1eigt) in concretesituations. This implies that interpretation as such,unlike Dasein or understanding, does not disclose."Interpretation always only takes care of bringing outwhat is disclosed as a cultivation of the possibilitiesinherent in an understanding. "Io3The primary form of all interpretation, accordingto Heidegger, is to see something in terms of its 'aswhat," or in other words to see it as something. Thereis no bare perceptual seeing in him. Seeing for him isalready interpreted as something. For instance, we donot hear sound in itself but as the noise of somethingspecific, may be as wind.

The context of meaningfulness or the background ofa shared understanding brings out the three-foldof interpretation. Heidegger calls this thestfore-structure" of understanding. An explicit interpretationof something as something we have abackground grasp of the totality of possible practicesinvolved. This given factor is what he calls as 'forehaving".There is a second level that is requiredbefore anything is made explicit. He calls this as"fore-sight' where we see in advance the appropriateway in which things can appear. The third level is thatof "fore-conception" where we grasp conceptually inadvance the appropriate way to interpret something.According to Heidegger, to interpret something is toexpose the as-structure which is grounded in a forestructure.The relationship between the two is similarto the relationship between understanding and interpretation.Just as interpretation is founded in (andnot added on) understanding so also the as-structure isfounded on the fore-~tructure.'~'Clarification of interpretation in terms of thefore-structure leads to crucial questions. First of allthere are a whole lot of qqestions related tohermeneutic circle.'" Moreover, from a methodologicalPoint of view insistence on the circular nature of

tend to imprison us in our outlook. Itblocks us from recognizing the otherness of the text.Besides, the fore-structure of understanding makes ustraditional and politically suspect since it becomesunable to challenge the cultural and political statusquo. These criticisms have taken a clear divisionbetween the reconstruction of Gadamer and thedeconstruction of Derrida.'06This is second in the list of a three-foldstructure of Being-in. Heidegger's German expression isBefindlichkeit and there is no unanimous agreement onthe translation of this term.lO' The whole problem isto arrive at an English term that conveys the sense of"being found in a situation where things and optionsalready matter. 'lo' Befindlichkeit, thus, refers toDasein's initial awareness of itself. Befindlichkeit isan ontological existential and it reveals Dasein'sthrowness. Throwness is a technical term in Being andTime and it refers to the facticity of ~asein."' Inother words it refers to the irreducible fact thatDasein already is amidst things and with others. Alongwith this its origin and destiny remain obscure.Moreover, the fact of existence of Dasein is different

from the factuality of entities. It means that Daseinby its very nature is not a completed entity but a taskto be achieved.The thrown existence of Dasein is the firstcharacteristic of Befindlichkeit. Secondly, thrownnessdiscloses the totality of Being-in-the-world as awhol?. Here we can see Dasein as moving towards theworld by actively relating it, with the entities.ThirdLy, it reveals the passivity of Dasein in so faras the world moves towards Dasein. These threecharacteristics thus reveal the basic throwness ofDasein. The nature of this finding is not a type ofknowing but an awareness of the affective order whichHeidegger distinguishes as mood(Stimmung) . He does notuse the term mood for private feelings but he uses itto name any of the ways Dasein can be affected. Moodcan refer to the sensibility of an age, the culture ofa company, for instance, or the mood of a currentsituation such as the boredom or eagerness in a classroom situation. Moods for him perform the basicfunction of disclosing. 'Mood has already disclosed. inevery case, Being-in-the-world as a whole, and make itpossible first of all to direct ourselves towardssomething.'"0 Dasein is able to encounter things in aspecific way, for instance, as interesting or

threatening, boring or frustrating precisely because~efindlichkeit is the condition of the possibility ofthings showing up as mattering to Dasein."' Thus moodsprovide the background due to which specific events canaffect us.The third constituent dimension of Being-in is'falling'(Verfallen). The disclosedness that happenshere reveals Dasein in its everyday mode of existence.In the context of Being-in, Heidegger is looking forthe 'who' of Dasein in its everydayness. Heidegger isquick to point out that the concept of 'falling' shouldnot be understood in the usual sense. Such uses have anegative connotation of 'falling from grace.'"''Falling' refers to a common and essential tendency inDasein. It is the tendency to flee from or avoid thedisclosure of one's ownBeing and the Being of theentities within-the-world. Heidegger is not interestedin searching for the motives of the falling tendencybut in its consequences. The mysterious tendency of'falling' blocks the disclosure of Being in two ways.The first case is that we fall into an absorption inentities within-the-world. This leads to themisinterpretation of ourselves and the world in terms

of the entities. The second way is that we end up in aparticular mode of Being-with in which we acceptuncritically the prevailing public interpretation ofourselves and the world.A concrete feature of the public interpretation isthe 'they'(Das Man). It refers to the anonymity ofDasein. The public understanding is conveyed in certaindiscourse that he calls as Idle talk. The situation ofidle talk does not connote laziness but a form ofcommunication in which one is not interested in thelighting up of what is talked about. We carry on ourinteractions not out of genuine concern but we followthe conventions. Idle talk lack concernful dealingsthat must flow from the fact of being Dasein. Thesecond route by which weflee disclosedness iscuriosity. This consists in preoccupation with entitiesin the world to the extent of neglecting ourfamiliarity with Being that grounds such concern.Curiosityconcerns itself with seeing, not in order tounderstand what is seen ... but just in orderto see. It seeks novelty only in order toleap from it anew to another novelty.'"Closely related to idle talk and curiosity is thephenomenon of ambiguity. ~t is a situation where 'it

ecomes impossible to decide what is disclosed in agenuine understanding, and what is not. ""' NO genuineknowledge is made impossible in ambiguity. Thesituation of ambiguity affects one's being-with-one-another. "The Other is keenly watched under the mask of*for-one-another.' but in fact, an 'against-one-another ' is at play. '115The interpretation of fallenness clarifiesHeidegger's notion of inauthenticity.Inauthenticity does not mean anything likeBeing-no-longer-in-the-world, but amountsrather to a quite distinctive kind of Beingin-the-world-- the kind which is completelyfascinated by the 'world' and by the Daseinwithof Others in the the^'."^2.5.1 Care as TemporalityThe various structural aspects of Dasein's ways ofBeing are brought to a unity in care. 'Dasein's Beingreveals itself as care. "'I7Here we should note thechange in terminology that has taken place. In thebeginning of the existential analysis of Dasein,Heidegger has pointed out that the Being of Dasein isexistence. But here he devotes a relatively largesection for the analysis of care as the Being ofDasein. This is not to

perspective or lack of consistency. It is rather thebringing out of the primordiality of existence as care.We must distinguish this basic existentialphenomenon of care from those which are identified withit such as will, wish, addiction and urge. Care hasnothing to do with tribulation, melancholy, or thecares of life. It is an ontological concept and as suchthese phenomena are founded on it. It is, 'The formallyexistential totality of Dasein's ontological structuralwhole. "laHeidegger began his analytic of Dasein as Being-in-the-world. We have seen his elucidation of thisphenomenon and its constitutive elamente. According toHeidegger, the average everydayness of Dasein can bedefined as.Being-in-the-world which is falling anddisclosed, thrown and projecting, and forwhich its own most potentiality-for-Being isan issue, both in its Being alongside the'world' and in its Being-with others. "'His aim is to arrive at an intelligible concept bywhich he can grasp Dasein's everydayness in itstotality. Heidegger's explication of care must be seenin this context. He sees care as the unifying totalityof Dasein's ontological structural whole. He describes

care as follows: "The Being of Dasein means ahead-ofitself-Being-already-in-(the-world)as Being alongside(entities encountered within-the-w~rld).'"~ Thiscombined and hyphenated expression aims to communicatethe structural wholeness of existentiality, facticityand fallenness. Dasein is found in a unique way inexistence. Existentiality refers to Being-ahead-ofitself.This dimension points to Dasein's disclosure ofitself as a project and a possibility. 'Asexistentiality Dasein experiences freedom andresponsibility to choose authentically its own mostpotentiality-for-Being.'"' The existentiality of Daseinis not an empty concept but is revealed as facticityand fallenness. The facticity of Dasein reveals itsthrownness. It is a naked thereness in which Daseinexperiences the fact that it is thrown into a worldwithout its choice. In other words there is a realmbeyond the control or choice of Dasein and it is shapedby the environmental and the communal world into whichit is cast. Hence, "Being-ahead-of-itself* means, ifwe grasp it more fully. 'ahead-of-itself-in-alreadybeing-in-aworld'.'"' Thus 'Exist- entiality isessentially determined by facticity:la' The facticityof Dasein manifests fallenness.

Fallenness points to the universal tendencyof man to lose himself in his presentpreoccupation and concerns, alienatinghimself from his unique and personal futurepossibilities."'In the description of care, the expression 'Being-alongside' refers to this aspect of fallenness. Thusthe two structural aspects of 'ahead-of-itself' and*~eing-already-in-a-world' include the third aspect of,~eing-alongside.' It is the way of existing of anyentity that exists.Care, for Heidegger, is thestructural unity of existentiality, facticity, andfallenness. All these factors together constitute theBeing of Dasein as care. Heidegger furtherdistinguishes care from concern and solicitude.Because Being-in-the-world is essentiallycare, Being-alongside the ready-to-hand couldbe taken in our previous analyses as concern,and Being with the Dasein-with of Others aswe encounter it within-the-world could betaken as solici rude. "'In short, Heidegger'n understanding of care is nota pragmatic concern. The arman equivalent of it isSorge, and it means care as in 'the cares of theworld: ~ubart Drefyus observes that"' in aconversation with Heidegger he pointed out that 'care'in English has connotations of love and caring.Heidegger responded to that in a positive manner. and

noted that with the term 'care' he wanted to name thevery general fact that 'Sein geht mich an,' whichtranslated would mean Being gets to me.2.5.2 The Temporal Dimension of CareThe basic insight of Heidegger isthat the notion oftime plays a significant role in clarifying the meaningof Being. In fact half of the published part of Beingand Time deals with the theme of Dasein andtemporality. What is important for us is to see theway Heidegger explains care as temporality. In ouranalysis of care we have seen that it is a structurethat unifies the various modes of existence of Dasein.Heidegger would further maintain that it is the notionof temporality that enables us to make sense of thethreefold structures of care.When we inquire about the meaning of care, weare asking what makes possible the totalityof the articulated structural whole of care.in the unity of its articulation as we haveunfolded it."'There are three distinctive elements inHeidegger'sdefinition of care, and they are Dasein as Being-already-in, ahead of itself, and Being-amidst. 'ThePrimordial unity of the structure of care lies in

temporality.""' The term 'temporality' is not referringto the fact that like all other things, we are confinedto time nor does it mean that we have a sense of time.~t means that we exist in the unity of three temporaldimensions. Our Being is constituted in the fact thatany moment of our existence is a way of being ahead ofourselves in the future, drawing on our past, whilebeing concerned with the pre~ent."~ "Temporality makespossible the unity of existence, facticity, andfalling, and in this way constitutes primordially thetotality of the structure ofThe sense offuture grounds the ahead-of-itself. The character ofpast as "having been' is realized in the 'Beingalready-in,'and the present becomes possible in"Being-alongside."" The three phenomenal character-~stics of future, the character of having been, and thepresent, manifests the ekstatikon"' or the 'ecstases*of temporality. The expression 'ecstases' derived fromGreek means 'standing outside,' and is closelyconnected with 'existence.'"' 'All it means is that weare already 'extended' outward in temporal dimensionsand so are never contained in a 'punctual' here andnow. " I)' Heidegger would maintain that temporality isnot an entity which emerges from itself but 'its

essence is a process of temporalizing in the unity ofthe ecstases. .135It is obvious that Heidegger is having a differentconception of time. According to him the ordinaryunderstanding of time consists in the fact that it is apure ::equence of 'nows; without beginning and withoutend. Tle various theories of time emphasize the presentover tbe future. And so time is conceived as a seriesof instants and this character is founded in thepresent. The ordinary understanding of time as a seriesof 'nows" is rooted in Aristotle's definition of timeas the measure of motion. For Aristotle, to say thatthings are 'in time' means that their movement isc~untable.~~' We think that the more precisely wemeasure motion the deeper our grasp of time. In factmeasuring the nows involved in motion is possible onlybecause we ourselves exist as a kind of movement. Thismovement is the movement of the temporal transcendencewhich always opens up the horizon of the future, past,and present. The movement of things are countablebecause it is surrounded by the+temporal movement ofthe soul which opens up the 'earlier' and 'later' inwhich counting of 'nowso becomes intelligible. lnChristopher Macan observes that the fundaIn~t41 notionUnderlying such an understanding of time is the

interpretation of time in terms of space.'" Heideggerconsiders existential time as primordial. He sees ourexistence itself as the temporal openness which letsbeings manifest. It is this temporality which makespossible all experiences whether they be of theeveryday, inauthentic or authentic mode.2.6.1 The Ecological Bearing of Heidegger's Philosophy of 'World'We have provided, in this chapter, a detailedresent at ion of the important aspects of thefundamental ontology of Heidegger as developed in Beingand Time. Our inquiry was guided by two central notionsthat are significant for developing an ecologicalperspective. First, an ecological perspective shouldmanifest a dimension of interrelationship among variousrealms of existence. Second, it should enable one tomove away from a human centered world view, so that aproper de-centering of the subject be achieved. It isfrom the standpoint of these two notions that weidentify the ecological bearing of Heidegger'sphilosophy of the world.Heidegger is a philosopher of the world. World forHeidegger is not the universe or the cosmos or the sumtotal of entities but a how structure that essentiallybelongs to hsein.'" hsein is an entity which has an

understanding of Being, and it is Dasein that providesa clearing so that entities can be understood in theirBeing. Tho specific ~ality of Dasein is existenceunderstood as Being-in-the-world. This unitary phenomenonof Being-in-the-world, seen from the perspectiveof ~eing-in clarifies the way Dasein is in the world.It is evident that Heidegger's philosophy of theworld is understood as an essential structure ofDasein. It is an a priori of Dasein and world is solong as Dasein exists. Characterizing Heidegger as thephilosopher of the world is not 'going to increase ourknowledge of the world nor does it enable us to beecologically more conscious of the world around. On theother hand, the ecological bearing of his conception ofthe world can be recognized in the very approach thathe has adopted. This approach is a departure from theself-enclosed consciousness of the objectifying subjectto the open axpanse of Dasein.The traditional manner of philosophizing is ametaphysical stance according to which every being isconceived either as a subject or an object. TheParadigm of self-enclosed consciousness of theobjectifying subject is found in the philosophy ofDescartes. The ego that gains certainty of existence in

the act of thinking is seen as a subject. Everythingthat is not a thinking subject becomes an object ofthought. Such a perspective leads to the consequence ofseeing all reality as divided into subjects andobjects. This kind of philosophizing is unacceptable toHeidegger. Reality, for him, is much more than aconglomeration of subjects and objects. If everythingis pressed into the categories of subject and objectthen the wondrous depth of reality is ignored, heholds.It is this orientation that makes him raise anewthe question of the meaning of Being. The way ofraising this question is not done through the subjectobjectdichotomous model but through the analytic ofDasein. Dasein has a three-fold priority over otherentities."' An ontic priority in the sense that onlyDasein exists; an ontological priority in the sensethat only Dasein has an understanding of Being; and afundamental priority in the sense that it understandsits own Being as well as the Being of other entities.The most basic state of Dasein is Being-in-the-worldand this basic awareness is foundational to otherexistentials which characterize the ways of Dasein'sBeing-in-the-world.

The elucidation of this complex phenomenon and itsstructural elements reveal that Dasein as to-be-in-theworldhas a special relation to the world. Theachievement of Heidegger in the analytic of Dasein hasconvincingly shown that all relatedness to the world isbased on a prior relatedness, namely, the a priori ofBeing-in-the-world. In this approach Heidegger has gonebeyond the agency of knowing and has seen that allknowing is a founded mode of Dasein as Being-in-theworld.There is no subject in this framework that stepsout of the inner sphere in order to reach to the objectout there. Neither is there an I which would at firsthave to establish a relationship to others but ratherit primarily exists in Being-with-others.The ecological significance of Heidegger'selucidation of the concept of the world lies in thisfact that it brings forward the relational dimensionwell."' All our relatedness is hased on the a priori ofBeing-in-the-world. As a founding mode it helps toovercome the dualistic thinking of the epistemologiesof skeptical orientation. A strictly scientificapproach no doubt increases the fund of information butit is a detached approach from the perspective ofpresent-at-hand(vorhandan). This approach, as Heideggerhas shown, is freed of human purposes and even of human

existence. Thus from the perspective of fundamentalontology, ecology has to be approached not as an onticissue, but as an ontological phenomenon. This woulddemand that we inquire into the Being of ecology thatcalls us to be open to the revelation of Being thattakes place in the realm of ecology. This would amountto a search for the ultimate intelligibility of ecologyas such. Intelligibility is not a property of things,but from the Heideggerian perspective, it is applicableto Dasein. Thus the ecological perspective has to beseen in relation to the human purposes and even ofhuman existence. In other words it is an ar~iculationof the meaningfulness of ecology as such.We find that the significance of Heidegger'sphilosophy of the world consists in going beyond adualistic framework and adopting a framework of basicrelatedness. This is implied in his explication of theBeing of equipment. He has convincingly show that ourprimordial relation to things around is not that ofPresent-at-hand but of readiness-to-hand. In otherwords we make sense of things as equipment before weare aware of them as objects of knowledge. Moreover,things are not given as isolated heaps but as environspointing to a network of relationships. A significantinsight in this connection is that it is breakdown that

ings to the fore this network of relationships as awhole."2 This is particularly applicable in the contextof contemporary ecological crisis. We are experiencingthe breakdown in this life-sustaining system and henceit is manifesting the dimensions of the network ofrelationships as a whole.If the world essentially belongs to Dasein, howfar can we see this approach as de-centering thesubject? In other words, is it not an anthropocentrismin disguise? In our exposition we have noted thatHeidegger was aware of this problem. According to himthe principal problem is to determine exactly thesubjectivity of the subject. Dasein is not a subject inthe normal sense of the term but it is existence itselfand characterized by an awareness of Being. This uniqueprerogative of Dasein does not mean that it lords overentities but guards and preserves them in theirtruth."' Thus Dasein has a great responsibility. It isto let beings be. Ultimately it calls for interactingwith entities in a respectful manner.We find that Heidegger's philosophy of the worldbrings into focus the background familiarity and thestructure of our involvement in our practical life. It

consists of a perspective of interrelationship which atthe same time achieves a de-centering of the subject.We can find in the approach of existentialontology a radical questioning from the perspective ofBeing. This necessitates that it resist any onedimensionalmanner of revealing the meaning ofentities. This becomes significant in the area ofscience and technology. Thus our culture's uncriticalallegiance to science and teckqology becomes questionablefrom the perspective of existential ontology. Whatare the ecological implications of Heidegger's analysisof technology? It is to this that we turn in the nextchapter.

CHAPTER THREEFROM TECHNOLOGY TO ECOLOGY***************

3.1.0 On Heidegger and TechnologyIn the previous chapter we made an investigationinto the fundamental ontology of Heidegger from theperspective of ecology. This investigation was guidedby two key concepts, viz. a framework of interrelationshipand a move to de-center the subject. Wemade a study of the various dimensions of Heidegger'selucidation of Being-in-the-world.. We saw clearly howhe articulated the interrelationship in existence asBeing-in-the-world. We noted further how hiselucidation goes beyond a subject-centered approach.This has enabled us to affirm that Heidegger has gonebeyond a crude sense of anthropocentrism.We now move on to Heidegger's critical examinationof science and technology. It is obvious that we do notundertake this from a purely disinterested andtechnical concern. It is done with a hope to identifythe ecological dimensions implicit in his explicationof the meaning of technology. Does his critique oftechnology provide possibilities for developingecological sensitiveness? Can we with the help of hiscritique promote the possibilities of de-centering thesubject? What is the ecological significance of themeditative thinking that Heidegger proposes in the

place of calculative thinking that is operative in thetechnological domain? What are the possibilitiesopened up by gelassenheit? Does it open up thepossibility of existence in which the ecologicalsensjbility will be enhanced? These are some of theguidi lg questions that will enable us to draw out theecological implications in Heidegger's examination oftechnology.Martin Heidegger is perhaps one of the fewphilosophers who has made a path-breaking critique ofthe whole question of technology. Historical recordsshow that he addressed himself to the question oftechnology from the year 1949 onwards.' We rely, forour study, on the effort made by William Lovitt whocollected various essays of Heidegger regarding thetheme of science and technology. The essays were puttogether from the different volumes of his originalworks with Heidegger's concurrence and were brought outunder the title of The Question Concerning Technologyand Other Essays.'Technology is the characteristic of our age. Itmay be defined as "the organization of knowledge forthe achievement of practical purposes:' It is a set ofskills, techniques, and activities for the shaping of

materials and the production of objects for practicalends.' The scientific advancements and technologicalgrowth have made man overcome distance, get thingsdone faster, and increase productivity. Thepotentiality of modern technology and the vastexpansion that it makes is common knowledge. It is truethat technology has made human life easier and bright.But there is a dark side to the bright picture. We areall well aware of the havoc played by the unbalanceduse of science and technology. It is reflected in thegrowing ecological crisis, the problem of nuclearwastes and a host of other problems negativelyaffecting life. Thus the phenomenon of technology hasbecome a mixed blessing indeed! One can identifythree interrelated meanings of technology. First of alltechnology referred to the techniques, devices. systemsand production processes that are associated withindustrialization in general. Secondly, technology canrefer to the rationalist world view usually associatedwith modernity. Modernity manifests a strongscientific, anthropocentric and secular world view.Thirdly, it referred to contemporary way of understandingor disclosing things that make both industrialproduction process and the modernist world viewpossible.' As far as Heidegger is concerned, the third

meaning of technology is extremely important. He is ofthe view that both meanings of technology, viz.industrialism and modernity are symptoms ofcontem-porary disclosure of things as raw material to be usedfor expanding the scope of technological power. Heclearly sees that man's thirst for domination andcalculative manipulations of entities are manifested inits extreme possibility in science and technology. Thecalculative thinking inherent in the technological ageglorifies the subject and thus metaphysics realizes itsultimate possibility of the subject's domination overreality. Heidegger was convinced that raising anew thequestion of Being can restore human being to thedignity of his essence. This demands a new type ofthinking which releases human being to be attuned tothe granting of Being. It is in this background thatHeidegger raises questions concerning technology. Hisperspective is to inquire into the essence6 oftechnology. He hoped that his explication will clarifythe horizon of technology in its rzlationship to humanexistence:We shall be questioning concerning technologyand in so doing we should like to prepare afree relationship to it. The relationshipwill be free if it opens our human existenceto the essence of technology. When we canrespond to this essence, we shall be able to

experience the technological within its ownbounds . 'In order to achieve this Heidegger proceeds to free thephenomenon of technology from its familiar interpret-ations.3.2.1 The Familiar Interpretation of TechnologyIt is quite usual to understand and explaintechnology in naturalistic and instrumentalist terms.Thls happens when technology is seen as a means to anend. It is explained further as a human activity too.The usual way of understanding the phenomenon oftechnology proceeds from the pre&ppositionthat it ismerely an invention of a subject and functions as amere neutral instrument. The instrumental andanthropological definitions of technology see humanconsciousness in an evolutionary context. In theprocess man learns to adapt to a variety of situations.The capacity for adaptation helps human beings to makeuse of symbols and tools. Modern technology, from sucha perspective, is simply a sophisticated version of thetools used by primitive man. The difference is that ofthe quality of scientific application and better skill.Heidegger did not deny the value of such assumptions.According to him, they are correct, but not Yet

sufficient to open our human existence to the essenceof technology. Obviously, here Heidegger would employthe distinction between correct and true. According tohim, the true, and by this he means his ow? version oftruth as unconcealment, aletheia. must be givenpriority over the merely correct. "Only the true bringsus into a free relationship with that which concerns usfrom out of its essence."' As usual, his approach isone of inversion whereby the familiar and the apparentare explained by the unfamiliar and here he wouldapproach the true by way of the correct.3.2.2 Analysis of CausalityInstrumentality and means and end belong to thedomain of the fourfold causality of Aristotle. Cause isunderstood as that which brings about an effect. Such adefinition presupposes the priority of the efficientcause over the other causes. It sets the standard forall causality. This observation of Heidegger impliesthat the priority accorded to efficient cause resultsin considering the effecting or producing the standardrelation to things. Moreover, what we understand bycause as bringing something about and effecting neednot be the original Greek conception of cause. Theyderived the word 'cause' from aition and it meant,

"that to which something else is indebted.'$ Causalityfrom this perspective is the way in which the fourcauses belong together and are responsible forsomething else. For example, the material cause of asilver chalice -- a sacrificial vessel used in thechristian worship -- is the silver that it is made outof. It is co-responsible for the chalice because itprovides the matter. The vessel is indebted to the formof chaliceness due to which it remains a chalice andnot anything else. The responsibility of the finalcause is realized when it is confined to the level ofconsecration and bestowal. The silversmith is thefourth participant in the responsibility for thefinished vessel. 'The silversmith considers carefullyand gathers together the three aforementioned ways ofbeing responsible and indebted."' Here Heidegger drawsout original reflections from the German and Greekequivalents of "to consider carefully. '11 Thus thecoming into appearance of the chalice is the play ofthe fourfold ways of being responsible. Clearly,Heidegger has moved beyond the interpretation ofcausality from the perspective of making and theconsequent importance attached to efficient cause.It is from the character of being responsible andindebted to that Heidegger moves to the primal meaning

of causality. What are these four ways responsible for?They are responsible for the presencing of somethinginto appearance.They set it free to that place and so startit on its way, namely, into its completearrival. The principal characteristic ofbeing responsible is this starting somethingon its way into arrival."The Greeks, according to Heidegger, experienced inaltia a sense of 'occasioning,' a way of what is notyet present as arriving into presencing. It is herethat Heidegger sees the connection between thisprocess and poiesis (bringing-forth). Heideager findsconfirmation to thie in Plato and he quoted fromThe Symposium. "Every occasion for whatever passes overand goes forward into presencing from that which is notpresencing, is poiesis, is bringing-forth [Her-forbringen].""Heidegger observed that when one thinksthe full scope of bringing-forth one finds theconnection not only with poiesis but also with physis.Physis for him is the event of self-emergence and it issomething like the bursting forth of a bud into aflower. It is also the disclosive event that makes theappearing of entities possible. Reflections onbringing-forth along these lines enabled Heidegger tosee the 'belonging together' of the fourfold causality.

causality as the fourfold way of occasioning bringsinto appearance that which is concealed.~ringing-forth brings hither out of concealmentforth into unconcealment. Bringing-forthcomes to pass only insofar as somethingconcealed comes into unconcealment ."This whole process is what Heidegger understood astruth or aletheia.~hus his inquiry regarding the essence oftechnology has brought him to the realm of revealing orunconcealrnent. The unity and difference of concealingand revealing is very important in Heidegger. Somewould consider it as the backbone of his thinking.'5His thinking is anchored in the very belongingtogether of Being and man. But this very belongingtogether is of such a nature that there is a duality ofrevealing and concealing. They are not two separateactivities. The presencing of Being is the dimension ofrevealing. "What is withdrawn or concealed is notanything but the very revealing itself.'I6 In otherwords, the revealed is present, while the revealing isabsent. *AS it reveals itself in beings, Beingwithdraws.'l7 The word unconcealment utters theinseparable unity of concealment and revealment andthat of Being and entities. 'Being never presences

without the entities, and entity never is withoutBeing " I0This has opened up the possibility to seetechnology as the realm of revealing. "Technologycomes to presenceLWest1 in the realm where revealingand unconcealment takes place, where aletheia, truth,happens."" Instrumentality that is considered to bethe fundamental characteristic of technology, and endsand means belong within this domain of revealing.However, it might give the impression that techne aspoiesis and as revealing is applicable only to theGreek era. The name technology stems from the Greekword technikon. And it means that which belongs totechne. It can mean two things. First, it is the namefor the activities and skills of the craftsman. Second,it refers to the arts of the mind and the fine arts.Besides, techne is linked with episteme for both areknowing in the widest sense. In this sense it providesan opening for the manifestation of that which is notbrought to appearance.3.3.1 The Essence of Modem TechnologyThe single-minded concern of Heidegger is toarrive at the revealing that dominates in moderntechnology.

The revealing that rules in moderntechnology is a challenging, IHerausfordernlwhich puts to nature the unreasonable demandthat it supply energy that can be extractedand stored as such.'PIn other words, the revealing that dominates in moderntechnology is a one-dimensional mode of viewing things.This one-dimensional view comes to be concretized inseeing things as raw material.That challenging happens in that the energyconcealed in nature is unlocked, what isunlocked is transformed, what is transformedis stored up, what is stored up is, in turn,distributed, and what is distributed isswitched about ever anew. Unlocking,transforming, storing, distributing, andswitching about are ways of revealing."The net result is that everything is ordered andregulated so that they may be ever ready to provideenergy at the beck and call of man. The wholephenomenon is summed up in the expression Bestand 22(standing-reserve). The term Bedtand, obviously, hasconnotations of stockpiling of things. But Heideggerhas in mind the very presencing of things as provokedor challenged to reveal in a particular manner

3.3.2 The Essence of Modem Technology as das GesrellModern technology is no mere human doing. There isa challenging revealing that gathers man to orderthings as Bestand. 'We now name that challenging claimwhich gathers man thither to order the self-revealingas standing-reserve: 'Gestell' [Enframing]. "" It isthe key expression for the nature of modern technology.1t means that way of revealing which governs theorientation of modern technology, and implies aparticular understanding of the Being of man and ofentities. It is obvious that it is nothingtechnological.Heidegger himself acknowledged that Gestell is avery unfamiliar word. In ordinary parlance, the wordGestell means some kind of apparatus, for example, abook-rack. It signifies a framework that holds thingsready for use. This explains the rendering of this as"enframing"" in English. Accordingly everything isframed, ordered and classified so that they could beused at convenience. The German word contains thePrefix ge which refers to a collectivity as in Gebirq(a mountain range). This is followed by the root verbStell which means Yo put or place.' The combined wordthus brings together all the modes of stellen where it

has the additional connotation of 'to put a demand on."Gestell thus means the linking together of what isposited by the technologically oriented subject. Wordsderived from and related to Gestell stand for'mobilization,' 'to report for military duty,' etc.sesides, the image of military mobilization provides arealm where everything is supposed to be set in order,waiting to be used at a moments notice.'= Gestell, inshort, means that all things are placed in the samemanner as raw material. It is something that stampshumanity to disclose everything in a one-dimensionalmanner. l6The essence of technology as enframing has enabledHeidegger to point out a corrective to our usualassumption that modern technology is an appliedphysical science. Modern technology from the point ofview of chronology is a later phenomenon. Modernphysical science began in the seventeenth century,whereas the machine power technology developed only inthe second half of the eighteenth century. According toHeidegger, from the point of view of the essenceholding sway within it, modern technology is historicallyearlier. The import of this inversion is thatthe essence of technology is inherently related to thehistory of Being. The essence of technology is the very

mode of Being's revealing in the modern age. Thus, inthe pervasive presence of modern technology, Heideggersees the holding sway of a 'dm~tining"" or "aendingforth" of Being. This destining or sanding forth ofBeing has come upon man and molded him and his world."3.3.3 Gestell and the DangerThe essence of technology lies in enframing.There is a great danger involved in the destiny ofBeing as enframing. In the technological age enframingholds sway and consequently manis continually approaching the brink of thepossibility of pursuing and pushing forwardnothing but what is revealed in ordering, andof deriving all his standards on thisbasis ."This blocks the other possibility of beingadmitted "to the essence of that which is unconcealedand to its unconcealment, in order that he mightexperience as his essence his needed belonging torevealing.'30 The supreme danger, in other words. comesto us in two ways. First of all, man himself is in theconstant possibility of becoming a part of theStanding-reserve. This happens because man is theorderer of the standing-reserve. We have seen that inthe exclusive concern of seeing everything as standing-

eserve, things are not even seen as objects. In themidst of objectlessness man himself will have to betaken as standing-reserve. Secondly, the technologicalman, threatened by this possibility, reacts byasserting himself as the lord of the earth. Thus heencounters everywhere none but himself. Consequently,he fails to become a listener and fails in every way tosee himself as one who ek-sists."Heidegger is notintending that technology itself is the danger. What isdangerous, according to him, is the essence oftechnology that reveals everything as standing-reserveand its consequent effects. "The rule of enframingthreatens man with the possibility that it could bedenied to him to enter into a more originalrevealing....'"power.The extreme danger is not without its savingWhat we experience in the frame as theconstellation of ~eing and man through themodern world of technology is a prelude towhat is called the event of appropriation."Heidegger stated elsewhere"that enframing is thephotographic negative in terms of the event ofappropriation. It is evident that a negative of aphotograph contains the possibility of positive prints.

It is this thought pattern that enables Heidegger toquote ~blderlin:'~"But where danger is, growsThe saving power also."This does not mean that saving power appearsincidentally or that it is secondary to the danger orthat it takes place without preparation. "The danger isthe saving power, in as much as it brings the savingpower out of its -- the danger's -- concealed essencethat is ever susceptible of turning."]' The expression"turning" points to a "turning inward" and it has sucha power that in its intensity it awakens the spark of afuture memory. It is a turning at the heart of theTechnik. l7Heidegger sees that the word *savee has extraordinarymeanings. To save is not a matter of seizinghold of a thing threatened by ruin. "To save' is tobring something home back into its essence, "It meansto loose, to emancipate, to free, to spare and husband,to harbor protectingly, to take under one's care. tokeep safe."18 He pointed out that if we take thepoet's words seriously, then the essence of technologymust bear in itself the growth of the saving power. Thestep he suggested is to "look with yet clearer eyes

into the danger." This would entail that we "considerin what sense of 'essence' it is that Enframing isactually the essence of techn~logy?"'~ Here Heideggercalls for a deeper reflection on the term "essence."'OThe essence of technology is not an essence in thesense of a genus. "Enframing, as a destining ofrevealing, is indeed the essence of technology, butnever in the sense of genus and e~senita."~ ~ssenceis that which endures and holds sway and that whichcomes to presence. "Wesen understood as a verb is thesame as wahren [to last or endure], not only in termsof meaning but also in terms of the phonetic formationof the word."" It is here that Heidegger saw theessential connection between the danger and the saving.They are not only a phonetic relation but also "the wayin which technology essences lets itself be seen onlyfrom out of that permanent enduring in which Enframingcomes to pass as a destining of revealing."'essence ofThetechnology as enframing is itself agranting, for "every destining of revealing comes topass from out of a granting and as such a granting.""The saving power is recognized in the granting, for itenables one to enter into the highest dignity of one'sessence. This dignity lies in keeping watch over theunconcealment -- and with it, from the first, the

concealmnent -- of all coming to presence on thisearth. "'' Thus enframing threatens man the freedom ofhis essence, butit is precisely in this extreme danger thatthe innermost indestructible bekongingness ofman within granting may come to light,provided that we, for our part, begin to payheed to the coming to presence oftechnology.Thus in the coming to presence of technology thepossible arising of the saving power is included but wedo not suspect it at all. As the Gestell reaches itszenith in modern technology, it pushes towards its owndisplacement. "In the homogeneities of the modernepoch, the metaphysical drive to presence comes fullcircle and thus has the potential to invert itself:"It is Heidegger's strong belief that this whole processwould happen only if we think. The most importantquestion is this: "How must we think?'"3.4.1 The Pathway beyond TechnologyHeidegger's analysis of the danger and hissubsequent reflection on the inherent saving powerpoints a way out. But this does not mean that there isa ready-made solution to the danger of technology. Hefirmly believed that the way beyodd lies in restoring

the authentic meaning of technology..According to him,the authentic meaning of technology should be found intechne. Techne is a kind of making which disclosesthings appropriately. The pathway beyond technology issomething very dear to Heidegger. We can identify twowinding ways in this movement. The first way could behis reflections on techne as art which would go beyondthe enframing and disclose things appropriately. Thesecond movement is a moving away from das gestell togelassenhei t .3.4.2 Techne as ArtThe word techne, which is the source oftechnology, is often translated as 'fine art' and'handiwork.' Heidegger would maintain that the primarymeaning of this Greek term should not be seen inskilled handiwork. The primary meaning of techne isart." Techne is understood a3 the capacity fordisclosing something, for bringing , it forth, forletting it to be seen. It meant the event of bringingsomething into the open and the know-how required foraccomplishing it. This is where Heidegger sees theconnection between techne and art." He was notinterested in the technicalities of art. But hisinterest was in seeing the disclosive power in art. The

artist, according to him, founds the world in which theactivity or producing, letting things be, can takeplace.51 Away out of the technological fix is tobecome capable of authentic producing:Authentic producing, then, ' understood interms of the Greek insight, involvesdisclosing something appropriately, lettingit come forth into its own, bringing it intothe arena of accessibility, letting it lieforth as something established stabley foritself. To "pro-duce' something means to leadit forth (pro-ducere), to release it so thatit can manifest itself and linger in presencein its own way.5'As against this type of authentic producing, whathas happened in the technological domain ia thedomination of "productionist metaphysics.' The productionistmetaphysics is the legacy of the history of theWest. In fact, the history of the West is the story ofhow the "productionsist metaphysics" of the ancientGreeks gradually degenerated into modern technology.The Greek founders of metaphysics defined the being ofentities in a proto-technological way. Heidegger readPlato as the initiator of this metaphysics. Platoconceived the being of entities in images drawn fromhuman manufacturing. His concept of ideal Form wasdrawn from the role played by the blueprint or model inthe work of a craftsman. The craftsman's blueprint

provides the structure for the thing he makes.Similarly, the eternal Form provides the structure forthings which come to be in the temporal-empiricalworld. Productionist metaphysics became afoundationalist metaphysics for the assumption is thatfor something to be, it must rest upon some ultimatefoundation.In his critique of technology, Heidegger has shownthat the productionist metaphysics has encouraged waysof producing which became increasingly blind to themanner of work, to the material used in the works andthe nature of the works produced. Heidegger's examinationof causality and the de-emphasizing of theefficient cause has to be seen in this background.3.4.3 From das Gesrell to GelassenheitHeidegger sees the possibility of overcomingtechnicity through the thinking of Being. He would liketo characterize his path of thinking by an old Germanword called Gelassenheit. The word Gelassenheit comesfrom the root of the verb lassen. And, it means to letgo, to relinquish, to abandon and in the Heideggerianliterature it is translated as 'relea~ement.'~~According to Heidegger, Gelassenheit refers to a typeof thinking that is freed from the constructions of the

thinking subject and tries to gain access to a regionthat is freed from such obstructions.We have seen earlier that Heidegger did not leavethe analysis of the danger inherent in thetechnological domination as it is. He understood that agenuine response to the danger should come in themanner of thinking. Hence the importance of thequestion "How must we think?"'His reflections inGelassenheit, translated into English as Discourse On~hinking," is an attempt to respond to this question.In the Memorial Address he raised the questiondirectly. 'What attitude should we take towardtechnology?'His answer was in the following manner:We can use technical devices.. . and also letthem alone as something which does not affectour inner and real core... . But will notsaying both yes and no this way to technicaldevices make our relation to technologyambivalent and insecure? On the contrary! Ourrelation to technology will become wonderfullysimple and relaxed. We let technicaldevices enter our daily life and at the sametime leave them outside, that is, let themalone, as things, which are nothing absolutebut remain dependent on something higher. Iwould call this comportment toward technologywhich expresses 'yes' and at the same time"no,' by an old word, releasement towardthings. '6

Our concern in the analysis of Gelassenheit is tosee how this rich and old concept provides a responseto the enframing power of technology and consequently,to bring out the ecological sensibility inherent init. We shall adopt the following procedure. First, weshall present in a summary manner Heidegger's ownattempt to clarify the notion of thinking. Second, weshall inquire into his critique of Western metaphysicsas ontotheology. According to him, the representativethinking and calculative thinking are manifestations ofthe ontotheological character of metaphysics.3.5.1 Thinking in HeideggerHeidegger devoted much of his energy to bring outthe essential aspects of thinking. In fact thinking washis sole concern. This does not in any way mean that hedeviated from the single-minded concern of Seinsfage.Rather, Heidegger was convinced that the question ofBeing demands that one thinks through towards essentialthinking. We have already made a mention aboutDiscourse on Thinking where he tried to bring out thenature of essential thinking. One can further findHeidegger's reflections on thinking in the lecturesdelivered at the University of Freiburg in the year1951-52. It was later published in English as What is

called ~hinking?" Further in his work on~n Introduction to Metaphysicss' Heidegger inquiredinto the relation of thinking -- from the perspectiveof tradition, such as the early Greek thinking -- toBeing. Further we should note his penetrating inquiryin his essay "On the Principle ofround"" where heexamined the dominance of calculative thinking.Heidegger followed a negative way in bringing outthe essential aspects of what he called thinking. Thisnegative way consisted in pointing out some of theaspects that are opposed to what he called thinking.~hus thinking is not understood as having an opinion ora notion. It is not a representation. He examined thevarious ways of linguistic usage related to thinking."All the various ways in which we use thinking point tothe fact that thinking brings something before us. Inshort, for us, it is a representation. Further thinkingis not an instance of logical reasoning leading to aconclusion from the premises, though manywouldconsider that as the paradigm of thinking. Thinkingfinally is not conceptual or systematic in the sense ofthe Hegelian idealistic tradition where the concept isconsidered thinking par e~cellence.~~ Heidegger wouldfurther note that thinking has an inherent weaknessthat it cannot produce results as people normally

expect. First of all it does not bring knowledge as thesciences do. It does not produce practical wisdom. Oneshould not approach thinking to solve cosmic riddles.Finally thinking is not something that will endow usdirectly with the power to act.62 Such a perspectiveenables Heidegger to maintain that, "Thinking beginsonly when we have come to know that reason, glorifiedfor centuries, is the most stiff-necked adversary ofthought. "'' The force and power of Heideggerianreflections on thinking will be felt if we first of allfollow his critique of traditional Western thinking.3.5.2 Metaphysics as OntotheologyThe nature of thinking that dominated traditionalmetaphysics has been rightly named by Heidegger asonto-theology. This combined expression brings out theinherent nature of Western metaphysics which Heideggersees as a combination of ontology, logic and theology.The standpoint for Heidegger to view the whole of themetaphysical tradition is that of the forgetfulness ofBeing. The forgetfulness is manifested in thetransformation of aletheia, physis and logos into logicdominated concepts, and he sees the change in thefollowing manner.

Heidegger finds in the thinking of Plato and~ristotle a "beginning of the end of the greatbeginning,'" where physis and logos are interpreteddifferently and thus lose the initial meaning. Theearly Greeks experienced Being as physis. The wordphysis denoted the emerging power. It is Being itselfand refers to the realm of things that emerge andabide. But Plato interpreted Being as Idea and thisrendering had a dominant influence on Western thinking.The word Idea refers to vision. "Idea ... is adetermination of the stable insofar and only insofar asit encounters vision.'65 The eidos (Idea) is thatwhich constitutes the essent. Being-seen becomes thesole and decisive criterion of Being. This leads to thefollowing consequence, viz. the Idea comes toconstitute the whatness of an essent, and whatnessconstitutes the most real element in an essent. Thusbeing as Idea is the true being and measure of reality.Appearance lacks true reality from the perspective ofIdea, and it becomes a copy of the Idea. Appearancethus comes to be degraded. This process has importantconsequences for truth. Truth is no more theunconcealment of the essence of the emerging power,but it becomes the representation and correctness ofvision.

Heidegger recognizes another transformation in thehistory of metaphysics. If the first one was Plato'sinterpretation of physis as Idea, then the second onecentered around Aristotle'~ under~tanding of logos asstatsment. According to the early Greeks, and ~peciallyfor Heraclitus, logos meant the gathering or bringingtogether into unity. It is that by reason of whichentities are gathered together and held fast.$' Logosis the Being of entities in the sense that it is agathered togetherness and contains in itself acollectedness.Logos is derived from legein which primarily meansto gather or to collect. Legein also means word orspeech and thus stands for language. In the developmentof Western metaphysics and specially in Aristotle,there emerged a particular understanding of language.Instead of seeing language as saying and gathering,"Aristotle interpreted logos as statement. A statementcan be asserted, repeated and its truth value can beascertained. According to Heidegger, logos whichoriginally referred to the unconcealment of entity, andhence aletheia, becomes a statement and the criterionof truth is correctness."

Heidegger finds that the interpretation of logos,as 'to say something about something,' is arepresentation in the sense that Being becomes thatwhich is represented. In a statement an essent may berepresented in various ways:Because, as modes of being-said , they arederived from logos -- and because to state iskategorein - the determination of the beingof the essent are called kategoriaio,categories. . . . the goal of all ontology isa doctrine of categories."According to Heidegger, this process is the logicalextension of BaingAnother milestone is the theological extension oflogos. It is found in the Christian interpretation ofJesus Christ as the Logos. In the first chapter of hisGospel, St.John portrays Jesus as the eternal Logos whotook the human form so that he fould be the mediatorbetween man and God. The New Testament notion of Logoswas originally developed by Philo of Alexandria whosedoctrine of creation attributes to the Logos thefunction of mediati~n.'~ Logos, in the Greektranslation of the Old Testament, refers to the 'word'with the definite meaning of command and commandment.Thus logos refers to the messenger who gives commandsand commandments. Logos is Christ himself as the

mediator and redeemer. It is obvious that logos in theNew Testament is not at all what Heraclitus meant bylogos as the gathering gatheredness. Rather it refersto one essent, namely Jesus Christ. Heidegger finds thetheological extension of logos in this process. Thethinking that dominates metaphysics seen from thethree-fold extension of Being is ontotheology forHeidegger. Thus metaphysics as ontotheology isinherently representative thinking and it takes thespecifically calculative mode in science andtechnology.Metaphysics moves in the sphere of beings asbeings. The orientation of metaphysics is to considerthe beingness of beings. Metaphysics is ontologyinsofar as it considers beings in theiruniversal and fundamental trait of beingness.abstractedHowever, Heidegger views the whole thing differently inhis Identity and Difference. He points out thatmetaphysics is not only ontology but it is theology aswell.But metaphysics represents the beingness ofbeings [die Seiendheit des Seiendenl in atwofold manner: in the first place, thetotality of beings as such with an eye totheir most universal traits, but at the sametime also the totality of beings as such in

the sense of the highest anddivine being ."thereforeThe metaphysical inquiry into entities as grounded inthe highest entity leads to the metaphysical notion of~od. What is important to note is that both ontologyand theology are logies since they provide the reasonfor beings in statements. Ontology and theology arenot to be seen as two divisions in metaphysics. Theyare to be seen rather as a single unity, and the onenecessarily implies the other.It should be clearly noted that Heidegger'scriticism of metaphysics as ontotheology is not to bemistaken as atheism. He has clearly noted that he wouldlike to go beyond the categories of theism and atheism.He states:Someone who has experienced theology in hisown roots, both the theology of the Christianfaith and that of philosophy, would todayrather remain silent about God when he isspeaking in the realm of thinking. For theontotheological character of metaphysics hasbecome questionable for thinking, not becauseof any kind of atheism, but from theexperience of a thinking which has discernedin ontotheology the still unthought unity ofthe essential nature of metaphysics."There is ample possibility for developing an authenticthinking of the Divine from the perspective of the

~eing question.'3 But our concern here is to point outthat metaphysics as ontotheology is an instance of thetype of thinking from which Heidegger would like todistance himself. He would refer to this type ofthinking as representational thinking in essence. It isthe representational and intellectual concepts thatdominate the ontotheological nature of thinking.3.5.2.1 Representational ThinkingMetaphysics as ontotheology is representational inits true nature. It was evident in the oblivion ofBeing that took place in Plato and Aristotle. WhenPlato interpreted Being as Idea, truth turned out to bethe correctness of vision and representation. Similarlywhen Aristotle perceived logos as statement and adoctrine of categories, Being became that which isrepresented in a statement. The crucial ontologicalquestion of the Being of entities came to be dominatedby ratio. This domination reaches its zenith in logicwhich 'is regarded as a court of justice, establishedfor all eternity. "" Heidegger wants to point out thatin the metaphysical tradition thinking becomes nothingbut the representation of ideas. Logic as the ultimatearbiter has crossed its own boundaries and trespassedinto the domain of Being. It is ev:dent for him that a

logic dominated metaphysics is incapable of bringingabout the question of the Beinq of entities. Therepresentational nature of thinking became more andmore manifest in the subjectivist orientation ofmetaphysics of the modern period. In. his essay on 'TheAge of the World ~icture;'~Heidegger considers atlength how the world becomes a picture to therepresenting subject.The fundamental event of the modern age isthe conquest of the world as picture. Theword 'picture'[Bildl now means the structuredimage [Gebildl that is the creature of man'sproducing which represents and sets before.76Thus to represent means to bring before oneselfsomething as standing over against. This is what theetymology of the word object connotes. According toHeidegger, representation is an objectification and anaffirmation of the fact that the representing subjectis the sole criterion Representation is not acomprehension of that which presences. It 'is makingstand-over-against,an objectifying that goes fowardand masters."' Quoting Nietzsche, Heidegger wouldmaintain that the metaphysical man has been 'blinking'and thereby forming or representing ideas without goinginto the essential ground."

Heidegger further brings out the dominance ofrepresentational thought in his reflection on"The Principle ofround'." Leibniz' principle ofsufficient reason became so natural with the human mindthat we are always on the lookout foq the 'reason' foreverything. ~eidegger finds that the very content ofthe principle and its emphasis on ratio manifests thedefinitive establishment of representational thinking.In a later treatise Leibniz referred to the principleof contradiction and the principle of returning reasonas the primary principle." The principle of returningreason(Rationem reddere) renders the truth of somethingbyrendering its reason. Truth, thus, is trueproposition or true judgment. A judgment manifests theconnection between the predicate and the subject. It isreason that supports the connection between them.Reason is returned to man whose judgment determinesobjects as objects:Only by means of the ground of therepresentational connection that is renderedto the ego and expressly presented to it,does what is represented thus come to stand[kommt ... zum stehenj in such a way that it iscertified as an object [Gegenstdndj ,that is,as an object [Objektj, for the representingsubject .I1

Heidegger finds etymological similarity in ratioand the meaning of the German word rechnen which meansto calculate. Calculation is another form ofrepresentation for him. We represent something overagainst us in calculation and thus bring it t~ stand.3.5.2.2 Calculative ThinkingRepresentational thinking takes a specific mode ofcalculative thinking in modern science and technology.According to Heidegger science by its very naturecannot be concerned with the thinking of Being. It isthis inability of science to think the question ofBeing that is hidden in his now ill-famed expression,"Science does not think:" He would further maintainthat, "science does not think in the way thinkersthink:" This apparently condescending and unfavorableexpression points to the fact that science does notmove in the dimension of thinking. It is dependent uponthis dimension without knowing it. Commenting on thisexpression in a conversations' that took place in thelate sixties, Heidegger maintained that 'it is not areproach but is simply an identification of the innerstructure of science. ''' Does it imply that authenticthinking need not pay any attention to the sciences?Heidegger would maintain that the statement 'science

does not think* is 'not a license under which thinkingis free to set itself up out of the blue, so to speak,simply by thinking something up.'" According toHeidegger, science means any discipline or branch ofknowledge. Normally, any natural science is science forus. But for Hcidegger, a discipline such as history,with its representing of historical events as causalsequences, is equally a science.The calculative character of science is inherentin the very scientific method. Heidegger sees that thevery notion of research is the distinguishing featureof the modern scientific method. There are threeessential ingredients to modern scientific research."They are, the rigour of procedure that necessitatesmathematical precision, experimentation that requirescalculative measurement and increased specializationthat results in institutionalization. The technologicalattitude manifests the scientific thinking in a moreaggressive manner.We have examined the ontotheological nature ofmetaphysics and its influence on the thinking of ourtimes manifested in science and technology. We shallmove on to Heidegger's perspective on authenticthinking.

3.5.4 Authentic ThinkingWe have already seen the various ways of comonlyaccepted meanings of thinking which Heidegger wouldconsider as a degeneration of thinking. It is adegeneration because all of these ways considerthinking essentially related to our faculty. In essenceit is rational and a glorification of reason. Now it istime that we bring out the salient features ofHeidegger's authentic thinking. Authentic thinking is athinking of Being which enables us to think the truthof Being. Heidegger develops this notion from ahistorical perspective in his An Introduction toMetaphysics.According to Heidegger, thinking is authentic whenit stands with Being. His reflection thus is a call toreturn to the origins. It is a call to think the natureof thinking that is part and parcel of Being. The usualway to consider thinking as a reality operative in thefield of logic relates it directly to its linguisticsource, namely, logos. The early Greeks did notunderstand logos as word or thought as it is usuallyunderstood.The original meaning of logos is gathering. It isthe primal gathering principle that gathers entities as

they are 'hurled back and forth from one opposition toanother.'"In this sense logos is Being itself asphysis, understood as the emerging power. 'It does notlet what it holds in its power to dissolve into anempty freedom from opposition, but by uniting theopposites maintains the full sharpness of thetension."'Logos thus is the steady gathering of theessent in its Being. Heidegger understood this processas aletheia or unconcealment, the way the essents comeinto their Being.To be a man means to take gathering upononeself, to undertake a gathering apprehensionof the being of the essent, thesapient incorporation of appearing in thework, and so to administer (vernalten) unconcealment,to preserve it against cloaking andconcealment.Authentic thinking, for Heidegger, culminates inGelassenheit. Heidegger acknowledges that this is an'old term' ." Its meaning is essentially related to theGerman mystical tradition, especially that of Meister~ckhart.'' He had a lot of respect for this great.thinker of the twelfth century. There are sevenreferences to Meister Eckhart in the writings ofHeidegger." We can very well see the deeperaffinity in the thinking of Being of Heidegger and themystical thinking of Meister ~ckhart." Meister

Eckhart's speculative mysticism is centered on therelation between God and the soul. Gelassenheitbecomes sigriificant in this context. The soul preparesfor the coming of God by releasement which has atwofold structure. The first structure is that ofdetachment which has a negative connotation. The goalhere is to reach a state where one will be empty of allcreatures. The second structure has a positiveconnotation and the goal here will be to reach a statewhere the soul will be filled with God. Releasementfor Eckhart then is a 'letting' the world go, and a'letting' God come in. The soul in the disposition ofreleasement lives without a why as God himself is. Weshall be focusing on the ecological implications ofthis concept as we proceed.Heidegger uses various names to refer to thethinking of Being. He uses such names as 'meditativethinking,' 'essential thinking,' 'recollective thinking'courageous thinking' and 'primordial thinking. '" Inthe context of his work, What is Called Thinking?Heidegger understands the nature of authentic thinkingas a call. He mentions four possible modes ofunderstanding this title. First of all it could be anexamination of the meaning of the word thinking.Secondly, what do we still understand today by

thinking7 Thirdly, what is it that directs us Intothinking? Fourthly, what is it that calls us tothink?96 Heldegger observes that of all the four modes,the fourth mode takes priorlty over all others formsMoreover, all these four modes are polntlng to a slnglemeaning, namely, what IS ~t that glves dlrectlon forthinking' Thls enables hlm to point out that authenticthinklng lnvolves a call from Belng that evokes thoughtIn man and a response from hlm The 'call, In what 1sthat which calls on us to thlnk, 1s not an occaslonaldlrectlon that comes to us now a?d then to be engagedIn some thlnklng In other words, thlnklng 1s not anoccaslonal actlvity In human beings It 1s the essenceof man In the sense that man is a thlnker only by thevirtue of the call to thlnk " Heldegger clarlfres thatthe verb "to call" opens to us a rlch varlety ofmeanlngs such as to Instruct, to demand, and co directHe points out that In Greek and In Sanskrlt theernphasls of meanlng 1s not so much 'to command' as 'tolet reach, 'to invite, ' with an added nuance ofhelpfulnessHence In the word 'to call' we shouldhear meanings that point 'to commend 'give Into safe-keeping,' to keep safely, etc 99to entrust, 'toThat whlch calls us to think In this waypresumably can do so only Insofar as thecallrng itself, on its own, needs thought

!&atwhat calls us to think, and thus commands.that 18, brlngs our essentlal nature Into thekeeping of thought, needs thlnklng becausewhat calls us wants itself to be thoughtabout according to ~ts nature what calls onus to thlnk demands for itself that lt betended, cared for, husbanded In ~ts ownessentlal nature by thought What calls on usto thlnk, glves us food for thought lo@calls us to think 1s that which gives us food forchought, whlch In turn is the most thought provokingthing The aspect of grvlng makes Heldegger to relate:t with the It givesles glbt)'@' whlch in turn clarlflesche reallty of "call 'Heldegger s attempt has been to elaborate theglvlng aspect whereas in metaphysical tradltzon theelement of glft has been emphasized Being has beenconsidered as a glft but not from the perspective of;lvlngHeldegger wants to emphasize the glvlng aspect3y the expression It glves (es glbt)In the beglnnlng of Western thlnklng, Belng 1sthought, but not the 1t glves as such The latterwithdraws In favour of the glft which lt glves[esg~bt] From then on, that glrt is thoughtandconceptualized exclusively as Belng wlth regard to

~ccording to commentators,'0' the fundamental limitationof metaphysical thinking is evident here. Theyconsidered Being as the gift, to the neglect ofconsidering the giving of the gift, or the letting ofthe presenting which remains withdrawn. So in What iscallad Thinking?, that which calls on us to think isthe withdrawn aspect of Being.In essential thinkingthere is a belongingtogether of Being and man. If thinking is a call fromthe side of Being, it becomes complete in a receptivelistening from the side of man. This response becomesgrateful thinking. Thus Heidegger is able to malntainthat genuine thinking is thanking. Here again Heideggeremploys his favourite etymological analysis. The root-term that links words such as thinking (Denken),thought (Gedanke), memory (Geddchtnis) and thanks(Danke) is the middle high German word which carriesthe meaning of grateful devotional recollectivethought.101 It is also related to the old En-lish noun"thanc." Hence he would maintain that thinking isthanking. Man is athanking essence.thinking essence as well as aThinking as thanking takes place in theaffirmation of Being .... Man's privilegedrelationship to Being is more tangibly

exercised in his thanking thinking thatshepherds, houses and listens to Being.'''3.5.5 Releasernent as Authentic ThinkingIn the previous section we have attempted to seethe meaning of the term releasement and its connectionto the German mystical tradition. Now we shall identifythe essential aspects of releasement as enunciated inDiscourse on Thinking. The cencral concern of the"Conversations' in Discourse on Thinking is toemphasize the idea that releasement is the essence ofthinking. At the same time it is noted that by thestandards of ordinary representative thought releasementis essentially thoughtlessness. We can notice herea negative procedure.Heidegger clarifies his notions in opposition tosome other notions. Thus releasement as the essence ofthinking is distinguished from three kinds of thinking.The most ordinary kind of thinking is subject-objecttype of thinking. The subject-object mode of thinkingpresupposes a transcendental thinking which sets thehorizon for it. This can be understood as the contextor the universe of discourse within which a term getsits meaning. In the language of psychology it will becalled a field or ground or gestalt in which a figure

ecomes meaningful. Heidegger goes beyond thetranscendental kind of thinking to a third type ofthinking whereby he is able to think the region or thehorizon in neither causal nor transcendental terms butin terms of "letting-be.'105In Discourse on ThinkingHeidegger uses twospecific terms such as horizon and region. Horizon isthe visual field in which objects appear. As far asHeidegger is concerned such a conception of horizonacts in the domain of representative thinking. He wantsto think that which lets the horizon be what it is.lo6Heidegger would like to describe the horizon assomething that is open. However, an openness that letsthe horizon be, i.e. primordial openness is called theregion by him. He would use here the old German word~e~net'~' which can be translated asregions. ''that whichIt is not just a region, nor can it be seenas the abstracted content of all regions. It is theregion or the region of all regions... That-which-regions is an abiding expansewhich, gathering all, opens itself, so thatin it openness is halted and held, lettingeverything merge in its own ~esting.'~'This region is an openness that gathers everything intoopenness characterized by expanse and abiding.

The two terms, expanae and abiding, enableHeidegger to bring out the meaning of Gegnet in spatiotemporalexpre~sion.'~' That which regions letseverything appear in its abiding expanse. "...so thatthings which appear in that-which regions no longerhave the character of objects. 'lLO They no longer standagainst our representing. That which regions is thesource for men and things, and it is from whereeverything blooms out. 'That which regions surrounds usand reveals itself to us as the horizon. ' 'I1 In otherwords, horizon is the manifested aspect of the Gegnetturned towards us.We need to specify two further aspects of theGegnet. The Gegnet is Vergegnis (regioning) when themanifestation is with regard to man and it is Bedingnisibethinging) in relation to things. By the ,se of thisterminology, Heidegger wants to emphasize that man isenabled to let himself be 'to that which regions' andthings are let be as things. He makes it very clearthat the relation between 'that-which-regions' andreleasement is neither a causal nor transcendentalhorizonalrelation. "'~hus these unfamiliar expressionsare used precisely to go beyond the usual metaphysicalcategories.

Releasement from the perspective of Being or 'thatwhich regions' is a letting-be of man and things. Whatis releasement from the perspective of man? HereHeidegger would reflect in a positive and a negativemanner. In negative terms what does it mean to saythat man releases himself to 'that which regions. 'Here he would point out that releasement is 'nonwilling.'It means that one renounces willingwillingly."' In other words, letting ourselves intoreleasement is not an activity of ours and it remainstotally outside the domain of will. "So far as we canwean ourselves from wl-ling, we contribute to theawakening of releasement:"' It appears to be anattitude of total passivity, but Heidegger considersreleasement as a higher form of activity. It is"beyond the distinction between activity and passivity.because releasement does not belong to the domain ofwill. .:I5In positive terms releasement is a waiting wherewe leave open what we are waiting for. Such awaiting(warcen) has no object. In that sense it isdistinguished from awaiting (emarcen), the grammaticalform of which demands an object. Heidegger wouldmaintain that we release ourselves into the openness."Openness itself would be that for which we could do

nothing but wait.""' He would say that this form ofreleasement is a releasement towards things and anopenness to mystery."' In fact this would be theapproach that he would take in a world dominated bytechnology where releasement to 'things would be theright disposition.Quite often we are caught up in situations wherewe would have to say 'yes' to the inevitable use oftechnical devices and at the same time 'no' totechnology by denying it the right to dominate us. Thisambivalent behaviour is expressed in t e phrase'releasement to things'. At the same time we are in therealm of mystery. The mysteriousness is evident forthere is a realm of hidenness in the very manifestationof things. "That which shows itself and at the sametime withdraws is the essential trait of what we callthe mystery. ""' Openness is the proper disposition thatwe should cultivate at the realm of mystery."Releasement towards things and openness to the mysterybelong together, 'Ig and it is this disposition thatenables us to dwell in a released manner. What does itmean to dwell in a released manner? It does not in anyway imply a passive existence. Rather it implies, aswe have indicated above, a waiting which manifests adisposition of letting beings-be. Heidegger would

maintain that if we are released towards things in thismanner, our relationship to things become, "wonderfullysimple and relaxed.""' Releasement brings about adisposition that enables us to view things differentlyand increases the mystery dimension in our lives.3.6.1 The Ecological Import of Authentic ThinkingWe arrived at the question of thinking as wefollowed Heidegger's path in his critique oftechnology. According to Heidegger the present-daytechnology is not a mere impartial phenomenon. Neitheris it a practical application of the ever growingscientific knowledge. In the revealing-concealingframework of his thinking, Heidegger views technologyas a from of revealing. The revealing that d~.ninates inmodern technology is a one-dimensional mode of viewingentities. This comes to be evident in perceivingeverything as raw material. The essence of technologywhich he names as enframing is a claim which makes manto order everything in this manner. The rule ofenframing has the utmost danger because it denies thepossibility of entering into a more original revealing.But in the danger of enframing a saving power ishidden, in the sense that genuine thinking opens us tothe realm where the presencing of technology takesplace.

The significant achievement of Heidegger'scritique of technology is that the thinking of Beingenabled him to see the technological present as aconsequence of the metaphysical past. The metaphysicalpast for Heidegger is a degeneration of the early Greeknotion of physis, logos and aletheia.Heidegger's critique of science and technology isecologically significant in the sense that it makes usaware of the dominance of the subject-object model ofthinking. He sees the triumph of subjectivism in thedominance of technology. In a technologicd frameeverything is ordered and regulated. Efficientcausality attains priority over other forms of causes.The orientation of production becomes the standardrelation to entities. Man, as the one who orders andregulates everything, becomes the lord of the earth.The technological man fails to become a listener andfails to see himself as one who ek-sists.Authentic thinking, on the other hand, is not anexercise in logic. It is a thinking that understandsthe essential belonging together of logos. Logos asthe primal gathering principle is that which gathersentities into revealment. Man's role is to preserve theunconcealment and to cultivate a receptive attitudetowards the appearing essent. We can recognize in

Heidegger's reflections on authentic thinking a strongemphasis to de-center the subject. It is evident in hisvery approach that questions the domination of logic inthinking.Gelassenheit as a positive mode of thinking opens uppossibilities of ecological sensitiveness. His reflectionson releasernent is an attempt to go beyond thedomination of the will. We find an entirely differentpicture of the human here. The human being we find isno longer the lord and master but one who receptivelylistens to and waits for the call of Being. Theframework of interrelationship that Heidegger developedin the early part of Being and Time specially throughhis analysis of existence as Being-in-the-worldrealizes an added dimension here. It is thernetaphysico-technological attitude, dominated bycalculative and representational thinking of thesubject-object mode that views reality in dualisticcategories. Such a perspective forgets the conditionnecessary for the possibility of encountering things atall. Common sense supposes that the horizon opens upjust because we open our eyes. While it is genuinethinking that knows that looking presupposes anhorizon.

Releasement as 'letting-beings-be' is verysignificant from the perspective of ecology. It is nota let-go but a let-be that does not suggestcarelessness but the highest form of care. Ordinaryexistence knows very well that it can let things be.When one says that something is let-be, it iczlies thata grip is loosened. Even the physical expressionssuggest that a thing is loosened from the situation ofpossession. It is freed into its own being. In otherwords, it is viewed from no ultimate grounds, nor fromits usefulness. Releasement thus enables one not onlyto let a thing be but also to let all things be. Inthis sense it is the highest form of detachment. Thisis particularly significant in a world dominated by anextreme form of consumerism. Things are forced toyield the maximum results and every form of desire isseen as a need to be satisfied. The perspective ofletting-beings-be, in such a situation, is a call toswim against the current.We have seen that Heidegger's path of thinking hasmuch ecological significance. His analysis of technologyhas led us to the path of thinking. In concludinghis question concerning technology, the question thathe raised is this: *How must we think?' At thisjuncture we should raise this question. Is his path of

thinking possible in a scientifico-technologicallydominated world as ours?This question gains importance precisely becausethe one-dimensional thinking is so dominant that anyother type of thinking is not seen to be worth thetrouble. Heidegger is of the opinion that in such acontext authentic thinking can only be prepared andthat it remains ultimately a task. Great care needs tobe taken so that this type of thinking is notinterpreted with and integrated into the existing frameof reference. Heidegger's effort is to point out thelimit of the existing frame of reference. And thus hehas been able to point a wayI2' rather than enunciatingthe actual contents of it.

CHAPTER FOURFROM HOMELESSNESS TOROOTEDNESSTOWARDS AN ECOLOGICAL DWELLING

4.1.0 Heidegger on Dwelling1In the previous chapter we examined Heideger'sthinking on technology. We find that his reflectionsprovide an orientation to move from the dominatingpower of das gestell towards the freeing power ofGelassenheit. If the technological understanding ofBeing forces humanity to disclose everything in a onedimensionalmanner, Gelassenheit is a positlve mode ofthinking that releases man towards things and opens upthe mystery dimension of life. We dwelt at some lengthon the possibilities of ecological sensitivity that onecan gather from releasement as letting-beings-be, Wefind that in his investigation, Heidegger realizes aframework of interrelationship and. he achieves the decenteringof the subject.The present chapter, as the title indicates,concentrates on Heidegger's reflections on dwelling andits ecological significance. He believed that thepeculiar excess of the domination of technicity in theform of management and calculation should lead to agenuine need for dwelling. It should be noted that hedoesn't bring in this dimension of dwelling as an addedfactor but it flows from the very thinking that heengaged in. Thus thinking in turn becomes dwelling for

him. The way of dwelling that Heidegger envisages isdefinitely opposed to the tendency of modern man, 'thatexploits the earth, controls the sky, encapsules 'God'in well-defined concepts, and refuses to accept hisradical finitude."' On the other hand Heidegger wouldenvisage that man be a dweller in the Fourfold thatwould ultimately regain the ontological weight of humanexistence.We shall begin by examining his explication ofdwelling and its relation to building and thinking. Mandwells is in the Fourfold of the earth, the sky, themortals, and the divinities. Dwelling, for Heidegger.is dwelling among things and so an explication of themeaning of things is in order. Heidegger believes thatthis dwelling manifests the character of poetry. Hencewe shall deal with his reflection on poetry andlanguage and their relation to dwelling.Heidegger understood dwelling as a preservation ofthe Fourfold. There is no doubt regarding theecological significance of dwelling, all the more inthe context of the contemporary ecological crisis.Heidegger's reflections on dwelling is a saying aboutthe human dwelling -- a genuine homecoming. Etymologically,Oikos is the root for the term ecology and it

efers to 'a house' or 'a dwelling.' Logos, which isinherently connected to Oikos, means 'saying,' which inturn strongly signifies the true sense of the termecology as 'dwelling-saying.'We rely on the following texts in this section.The major part of our discussion will be centered onthe three lectures of Heidegger included in his book,Poetry, Language, Thought.' he^ are, "BuildingDwelling Thinking," "The Thing." and "Poetically ManDwells ...." We shall also rely on Discourse onThinking and "Letter on Humanism."Dwelling is one of the most common experiences ofhuman beings. We dwell in our homes. The word resonatesIntimacy and the feeling of at-homeness, andconsequently familial relationships. It is not just amatter of findlng some shelter. We are primarilydwellers.Heidegger thinks of dwelling in relation tobuilding. They both are seen as one whole and thatcould be the reason for him to write the three wordswithout the separation of the necessary commas.' Theconnection that dwelling has to building is in no wayaimed at bringing out architectural ideas or torecommend rules for building. He prescinds from such

technical concerns and wants to *trace building backinto that domain to which everything that is belongs."'~hough the activity of building has dwelling as itsgoal, it is quite evident that every activity ofbuilding is not for dwelling. That is, everyresidential building that is well-planned does notnecessarily guarantee the occurrence of dwelling.Heidegger wants to point out that it is true that therelation between building and dwelling is somethingakin to means and ends. However, Heidegger does not seethem as two separate activities, which in turn wouldhide the essential relationship. It is through hisfavourite etymological analysis that he establishes theessential connection between building and dwelling.4.1.1 Insights from EtymologyHeidegger maintains that the clue forinderstanding the essence of dwelling and building isto be found in language. Language tells us the essenceof a thing, "provided that we respect language's ownnature. "' He finds that there is a link between bauenwhich means 'to build' and buan which means 'todwell." Buan is so old a word that its meaning hasbeen lost to us. Heidegger finds that a "covert trace'of it has been preserved in the German word for

neighbour, viz. ~achbar. Neighbour is experienced asthe Nachgebauer, the near-dweller. He notes further,*The verbs buri, buren, beuren, beuron, all signifydwelling, the abode, the place of dwelling."' Bauenoriginally means to dwell and in the original sense itssignificance reaches up to the very ordinary uses of 'Iam' and 'You are.' It means that in the ordinary use ofich bin (I am)and du bist (you are) the word binbelongs to bauen. Thus in the most original sense Ichbin means I dwell. "The way in which you are and I am,the manner in which we humans are on the earth, isBuan, dwelling."' Heidegger also notes that the wordbauen means to cherish, to protect, to preserve, and tocare for. It is in the cultivation of the soil thatsuch caring and protecting is manifested. Such caringis a type of building that preserves and notnecessarily making anything new. Heidegger summarizesthis section in the following manner:But if we listen to what language says in theword bauen we hear three things:1.Building is really dwelling2.hnrelling 1s the manner in which mortals areon the earth3 .Building as dwelling unfolds into thebuilding that cultivates growing things andtake building that erects buildings.''

Agaln, Heidegger makes use of etymologicalanalysis when he wants to lnquire into the nature ofdwelllngThe word dwelling 1s derived from the oldSaxon won, and from the Gothic wunlan, and these rootsmean to remaln and to stay In a place The remaininglmplied in wnlan means 'to be at peace, 'brought to peace' and 'to remain In peace ''to beThls 1sessentially connected wlth peace and freedom in thesense that something is preserved from harm and dangerThus there 1s an element of sparlng and it is positlveln meanlng To dwell, therefore, 1s to be set at peace,and to preserve the free space that safeguards eachthlng In lts natureThe fundamental character of dwelllng is thlssparing and preserving. It pervades dwelllngin ~ts whole range. That range revealsItself to us as soon as we reflect that humanbelng conslsts in dwelling and, ~ndeed,dwelling In the sense of the stay of mortalson the earth "4 2 1 Dwelling and the FourfoldThe manner In which buildlng belongs to dwellingnecessitates that we clarify the meanlng of theFourfold (Gevlert).la The Fourfold is the primal onenessof the four realms of the earth, the sky, thedlvinlties and mortals. These realms, though belonging

together, can be considered as the four aspects ofBeing.The earth is the aspect that supports the growthof plants, providing for their blossoming, andrendering them fruitful. It is the earth that supportsthe rock and water, and supports all forms of life.Heidegger always insists, "When we say earth, we arealready thinking of the other three along with it. ""The sky is the realm of the sun, the moon, and theshining stars. The sun is the realm of the seasons andtheir changes.The light and dusk of the day, the gloom andglow of the night, the clemency andinclemency of the weather, the driftingclouds and the blue depths of the ether,"all happen in the sky. The divinities are themessengers of the Divine. They appear and withdraw intoconcealment out of the holy sway of the Divine. Themortals are the human beings. Heidegger uses the termmortals to emphasize the importance of death. In thiscontext he would maintain that only mortals are capableof death as death. It implies that we should not merelysee death as the end of life, or as a mere Nothing.Death is a harbinger in the sense that it embodies thepossibility of presencing Being. Heidegger would not

use the term mortals for animals for they onlyperish. l 5We now call mortals mortals -- not becausetheir earthly life comes to an end, butbecause they are capable of death as death.Mortals are who they are, as mortals, presentin the shelter of Being. They are thepresencing relation to Being as Being."The Fourfold thus is the simple oneness of thefour realms. They are not to be seen as four separatebeings but as that dimension of the world where theplay of the Fourfold is seen in the concealing andunconcealing dimension of Being itself.Heidegger understands dwelling in the context ofthe Fourfold. %elling is the way of the mortals in theFourfold. This way manifests the character of sparingand preserving. "Mortals dwell in the way they preservethe Fourfold in its essential being, its presenting.""As far as the earth is concerned, mortals dwell insuch a manner that they save the earth. Saving, forHeidegger, is not to snatch something away from theface of danger but it means to free something into itsown presencing. He is quick to point out that saving inno way implies exploitation or mastering the earth inorder to subjugate it. further the mortals dwell in

such a manner that they receive the sky as sky." Suchdwelling too implies a non-exploitative attitude as faras the sky is concerned. It demands that the sun andthe moon and the stars be left to their own courses ofjourney and the basic rhythms be respected. It alsonecessitates that the night be not turned into a day-nor day into a harassed unrest."The dwelling of the mortals manifests an attitudethat is open to the divinities. They await thedivinities as divinities. In moments of presence andabsence, it is the attitude of awaiting that getsprecedence. As far as the mortals are concerned, theirdwelling manifests that they initiate their own nature.Their nature is that they are capable of death asdeath. According to Heidegger, dwelling occurs when theFourfold is preserved in the above manner. Thus, "insaving the earth, in receiving the sky, in awaiting thedivinities, in initiating the mortals, dwelling occursas the ourf fold. "I9The Fourfold is the interplay of the earth, thesky, the mortals and the divinities. They are never bythemselves but are only in the One-fold. Heideggerwould call it the round dance of the four, as the playof the world.

The Four-fold represents the happening of amutual owning and acknowledging of each byeach and of each into the' unity of theGeviert, such that each is at the same timeexpropriated into the freedom of its ownnature. This oiining-expropriating fourfoldnessin its unity is called by Heideggerthe mirror-game.20Heidegger understands this play of the Fourfold as theconcealing and unconcealing dimension of Being itself.He uses a novel way of indicating the Being of theFourfold. He writes Being with the crossed marks (asThe symbol of crossed lines can, to be sure,according to what has been said, not be amerely negative symbol of crossing out.Rather it points into the four areas of thequadrangle and of their gathering at thepoint of inter~ection.~'4.2.3 Building and DwellingHow is building related to dwelling? Building isnot related to dwelling as any form of mereconstruction but as that form of making which guardsthe Fourfold. Guarding the Fourfold is, in other words,to save the earth, to receive the sky, to await thedivinities and to escort mortals. This in essence isthe presencing of dwelling. "In this way, then, dogenuine building give form to dwelling in its

presenting and house this presence."22 Thus there is avery close relation between dwelling and building.Heidegger maintains that, "only if we are capable ofdwelling, only then can we build."23 Heideggerillustrates the type of dwelling and building throughthe example of a farmhouse in the Black Forest area. Itis the dwelling of the peasants that enabled them tobuild. He observes that in their dwelling the power ofthe earth and the heaven, the divinities and themortals entered into a simple oneness with things.It did not forget the altar corner behind thecommunity table; it made room in its chamberfor hallowed places of child bed and the"tree of the dead" -- for that is what theycall a coffin there: the Totenbaum -- and inthis way it designed for the different gener-ations under one roof the character of theirjourney through time. A craft which, itselfsprung from dwelling, still uses its toolsand frames as things, built the farmh~use.~'The reference to the Black Forest farm and the detailedillustration of the way of dwelling doesn't in any wayimply that we should go back to such a peasant form ofexistence. Heidegger's intention is to portray the wayof dwelling that enables people to build. In otherwords he is able to show that dwelling is the basiccharacter and building belongs to dwelling and receivesits meaning from dwelling. Heidegger states that such a

detailed description would have achieved the purpose ifonly we are able to raise building and dwelling to alevel where they become worthy of questioning andenable us to thinking.The path of thinking that Heidegger has followedso far indicates that thinking itself belongs todwelling. He would observe that, "building and thinkingare, each in its own way, inescapable for dwelling. "'5However, building and thinking should not be seen inseparation. Rather, the two should listen to oneanother, and only then can they belong to dwelling.Heidegger is aware that for thinking and building tobelong to dwelling long experience and constantpractice is needed.4.2.4 The Dwelling Among ThingsWe have explicated so far Heidegger's reflectionson dwelling and it lead us to an investigation of theFourfold. Dwelling for Heidegger is always staying withthings. How does he understand the essence of a thing?Heidegger has some unique reflections to offer in thisregard. Moreover, his reflections on things clarifyfurther the realm of the Fourfold.

What is a thing?" This is the central questionthat Heidegger tries to unravel in his reflection onthings. At the outset he identifies the purview of thequestion and differentiates it from other .ambiguoustalk about things. He finds that there are threedifferent meanings to the question, 'What is a thing?"First, it means that something is a thing in the senseof being present-at-hand. Thus the concrete materialthings around us such as a rock, a piece of wood, etc.are things. Second, a thing could refer to our plans,decisions, attitudes, actions, and other historical"things." Third, a thing could mean all the abovethings and anything whatsoever that is a something andnot a nothing. He limits himself to the first of thesemeanings.Heidegger finds that the first narrow meaning ofthing is closer to the normal linguistic usage.Moreover, the other meanings are included in thisnarrow use of the term.27 Thus Heidegger makes it clearthat the question "What is a Thing?" means the concreteand observable things around us. Does it appear toosimplistic? Heidegger is aware of this and so heobserves that the purpose of the question is not todiscover, for example, what a granite is. The intent ofthe question rather is to discern what a granite is as

a thing. It is obvious that the purview of the questiondoes not fall under the realm of the sciences. Thesepreliminary observations manifest the orientation ofHeidegger as far as his reflections on things areconcerned. Starting in this fashion, finally, heinquires into the thingness of a thing. However, thethingness of a thing is inextricably linked to theFourfold and hence an examination of the relationshipof the thing and the Fourfold is called for.4.2.5 Thing: A Gathering of the FourfoldA thing for Heidegger is not a bare object but itis somewhere the assembling of the world takes place.It is where the interplay of the Fourfold is witnessed.It is in this process that he sees the thingness of athing. How 1s that a thing is the assembler of theFourfold? Heidegger offers here, for example, adetailed description of a jug as a thing. The essence05 a jug consists in the outpour of the flow of wateror wine. Even if it is not used for this purpose, itsessence consists in the factthe outpouring of water or wine.that it can be used forThe spring stays on in the water of the gift.In the spring the rock dwells, and in therock dwells the dark slumber of the earth,which receives the rain and dew of the sky.

In the water of the spring dwells themarriage of sky and earth. It stays in thewine given by the fruit of the vine, thefruit in which the earth's nourishment andthe sky's sun are betrothed to one another.The gift of the pouring out is a drink formortals ... The outpouring is the libationpoured out for the immortal gods.. . . In thegift of the outpouring earth and sky,divinities and mortals dwell together all atonce.28Thus a thing for Heidegger is thqt which assembles theearth, the sky, the divinities and the mortals. Theassembling that happens in a thing is a belongingtogether. The Fourfold of the earth, the sky, themortals, and the divinities, belong together in such amanner that unconcealment takes place. The jugpresences itself as a thing." When a thing is left tothe way it is in itself it brings the structure of theworld into light. This structure is the interplay ofthe Fourfold. Thus according to Heidegger, "the jug'sessential nature, its presencing, so experienced andthought of in these terms is what we call thing."0At this juncture Heidegger makes use of thelinguistic insights from related languages to bring outthe similarity and difference with regard to theessential meaning of things. The very word thing isan Old High German and it means a gathering,

"and specifically a gathering to deliberate on a matterunder discussion, a contested matter."" A similar ideais contained in another Old German word dinc. Thesewords denote anything that has bearing on men andconsequently is a matter of discourse. The Romanlanguage conveyed the same notion in the word res. Thisword is associated with res publica which means not thestate but that which concerns everybody and thereforeis deliberated in public. The meaning of res as acontested matter, a case at law, brings in the wordcausa. This word in no way signifies 'cause' as weunderstand it today. It means, rather the case and thatwhich is the case in the sense that something comes topass and becomes due.The Old German word thing or dinc, with itsmeaning of a gathering specifically for thepurpose of dealing with a case or matter, issuited as no other word to translate properlythe Roman word res, that which is pertinent,which has a bearing. From that word of theRoman language, which there corresponds tothe word res -- from the word causa in thesense of case, affair, matter of pertinence-- there develop in turn the Romance la cosaand the French la chose: we say, "thething. "I2Heidegger is of the view that the English word "thing"has preserved the full semantic power of the Roman

word res. Expressions such as, "he knows his things,"or "he knows how to handle things," suggest the aboveconnotations of the word res.What is decisive for Heidegger is not the givensemantic history but the possibility of thought thatthese semantic details offer. The. word res of theRomans denotes reality as that which has a bearingupon,and a concern. Instead of thinking through thenature of what they experienced, they conceived thereality of res through the Greek category of on. TheGreek category of on and its Latin form of ens meansthat which is present, in the sense of presented beforeus. The reality of res as originally experienced as abearing upon or concern is relegated to everythingpresent in any way whatever, even mental representati~n.~'A similar thing, according to Heidegger,happened with the term thing or dinc. What did heachieve, one may be inclined to ask, by this laboriouslinguistic and etymological examination? Heideggerfinds that the various linguistic uses of the word doesnot help to discover and give adequate thought to theessential source of jug as a thing. However, there isone exception to this and this is the Old High Germanthing as "gathering.'

The jug is a thing neither in the sense ofthe Roman res, nor in the sense of themedieval ens, let alone in the modern senseof object. The jug is a thing in so far as itthings. ''In other words something is a thing in so far as itgathers the Fourfold. Heidegger is very fond of theexpression that a thing things. This expression refersto the gathering that unites the Fourf~ld.'~The gathering and assembling that takes place in athing is the drawing near of the world. Heideggerexpresses this in the following manner. "Each thingstays the Fourfold into a happening of the simple onehoodof the world."I6 The gathering, in other words, isa worlding of the four structural elements of theworld. The world as the Fourfold dimension, of theearth, the sky, the mortals and the divinities, is thevery dynamism itself which comes forward fromconcealment to revelation." Thus, according toHeidegger, Being presences in the thinging of a thing.4.2.6 Traditional View of ThingsWe have seen the rather strange Heideggerianconception of a thing. In what sense is it differentfrom the traditional manner of viewing things?Heidegger himself raises this issue elsewhere, though

he deals with it very briefly in the essay on things.38From the traditional point of view one finds differentanswers to the question, what constitutes the essenceof things? These answers can be reduced to thefollowing three positions: A thing is the compositionof substance and accidents; it is a unity of a manifoldof sensible properties; and, finally the thing as theunity of matter and form.According to the first view, a thing is thataround which the properties have been assembled. Thussubstance is that which is in it itself and theaccidents are the properties that are in another. Whatwe call substance was named as yupokeimenon by theGreeks. The characteristics were called as sumbebekota.According to Heidegger, the translation of these intoLatin was not an innocent process. The basic Greekexperience of Being as presence is carried on here.This process is essentially related to what Heideggercalls the oblivion of Being.I9 However, thisdetermination of the thingness of a thing seems tocorrespond to our natural view of things. There is asubject-predicate structure in our propositions, andthis is the way we speak about things. Here he raisesthe crucial question:

Is the structure of a simple propositionalstatement (the combination of subject andpredicate) the mirror image of the structureof the thing (of the union of substance withaccidents)? Or could it be that even thestructure of the thing as thus envisaged isa projection of the framework of thesentence?"Heidegger is not interested in entering into thiscontroversy as to whether the sentence structure or thething structure comes first. According to him thisquestion should be decided "from a common and moreoriginal source. "" In other words it should be decidedfrom the question of Being. ThiS enables him tomaintain that the substance-accident structure of athing is not natural and that it does not reflect thetrue structure of a thing. If at all it appears to benatural it is because it has been in use for a longtime .The second conception regarding the thingness of athing deals with the thing as the unity of the manifoldof what is given in the senses. The characteristictrait of this conception is that a number of perceivedsense impressions are united and a thing will beunderstood as this unity. It is quite obvious thatHeidegger will not uphold this view of a thing.According to him perception is not an acquaintance with

sensations. Understanding is a founded mode of Beingand it enables him to maintain that there is an 'asstructure' in our ~erceptions.'~ Consequently thethings themselves will be much more close to us thanmere sensations ."The third conception regarding the thingness of athing deals with the conception of thing in terms ofmatter and form. It is this matter and form combinationthat gives constancy in a thing. Thus in thisconception, a thing is a formed matter. The conceptionof form and matter has a long history straight fromAristotle down to the medieval Scholastics. But as faras Heidegger is concerned the princi~les of matter andform are insufficient to disclose the thingness of athing. He finds that these principles can be applied toany being whatsoever, whereas Heidegger deals with astrict understanding of things. Moreover, theprinciples of matter and form do not bring out theontological structure of things. "The matter and formstructure has its proper place in the description ofthe manner in which equipment comes-to-pass andabides. -"These three theories or their various combinationsdominate the traditional view of things. According to

~eidegger these theories do not reveal the thingness ofa thing. He does not question the correctness of thesetheories but he Questions their truth in the sense thattheir real origin is not brought forward. This hebelieves should relate to the concealment-revealmentstructure of the question of Being.4.3.1 Poetic DwellingWe have seen earlier the various dimensions ofdwelling. An important aspect of dwelling thatHeidegger envisages is brought out in his reflectionson poetry. Heidegger believes that dwelling should beof a poetical nature. In fact the same idea iscommunicated by the title of one of his short essays,vlz. "...Poetically man d~ells..:'~ Here we shalldwell on Heidegger's reflections on poetry andlanguage.4.3.2 The Nature of PoetryHeidegger's reflections on poetizing stretchesover a long period of time starting from 1935 to 1953.He had exceptional attachment to the poetry ofH6lderlin" whom he considered the poet of the poets.Heidegger deals with the power and role of poetizing inhis essay "Htilderlin and the Essence of Poetry."'

Normally we understand poets as the creative onesendowed with a great sense of imagination. They are theones who recollect their thoughts in tranquillity andgive utterance to their inspirations in words. A senseof the cult of "genius' is attached to them.Heidegger on the other hand goes beyond the normalunderstanding of the nature of poets and poetry. Poetryis the establishment of Being by means of the word.poetizing is a manner of opening up of Being so thatentities may appear in a given manner. Heideggerdescribes poetizing as a process in which Being as theHoly addresses itself to the poet. The poet responds tothis address by articulating it in words.Poetry is the disclosure of concealment. It is acoming to pass of truth. In this sense it is similar toa work of art. According to Heidegger, a work of art isa means of establishing truth in a new andunprecedented way. In the process a world is formed andmeaning emerges.Poetizing is measure-taking. It does not in anyway imply spatial and metrical measures. It is anopening of the dwelling of man in such a way that he isable to dwell between the heavens and the earth. Inother words the dwelling of man is opened up to the

dimensions of the Fourfold. This way of dwellingbestows the measure for the breadth of the humanessence in general .IsIn Heidegger's reflections on the nature of poetrythere are different metaphorical characterizations ofBeing. We are familiar with the conception of Being interms of the metaphor of light. This metaphor isfurther enriched by his use of the expression, "theGlad-some." It suggests a sense of serenity and light-heartedness. The "Holy' is another importantexpression. It is neither God nor the gods. Being asHoly is beyond God, the gods and men and guaranteesthe integrity of their Being. It is the opening up ofthat domain in which God, the gods and men may come topresence. '*Heidegger refers to primordial poetizing.According to him, the coming to presence of languageltself is the disclosure of Being. In other words, theessence of language is the coming of Being into words.If this is the case, then man's original concern withwords enjoys a privileged affinity with Being. Thus anaccess to Being is possible by a careful attendance oforiginal meaning of basic words. Such an original

concern with words is the primordial poetizing forHeidegger .Heidegger sees a close relation between poetry anddwelling, though in ordinary terms they are apparentlyincompatible. According to him it is poetry thatenables us to dwell. What he means is that theessential nature of poetry enables us to a distinctivekind of building and it is this building that lets usdwell.51 It does not mean that the poetic character isan ornament to dwelling in the sense that it brings ina respectable appeal to our dwelling. he poeticdwelling in essence demands that we think the nature ofhuman existence by way of the nature of dwelling andthat we think of the nature of poetry as enabling us todwell.According to Heidegger genuine dwellingnecessitates that the poets first measure thedimension. It means to open us to the realm of the inbetween,viz. the between of heaven and the earth. Thisbrings us to his reflections on the Fourfold. Once thepoets have poetized the Fourfold it becomes possiblefor the mortal to inhabit it. It is a learning "to heedit in its essence,' in the absence of which theFourfold would remain closed to him.

4.4.1 The Nature of LanguageHeidegger's reflections on the nature of poeticdwelling is inherently related to his unique doctrineof language. He is known for his strongly anti-subjectivistic views on language which inverts ourusual relation tolanguage. Heidegger would seelanguage speaking in us, rather than human beingsspeaking language.Heidegger's reflections on language must be seenas going against the current perceptions of language.The normal way of viewing language is to see it as thevocal utterance of inner thoughts. The vocal utteranceis grasped as a phenomenon of the body. What getsarticulated in vocal utterance is the content oflanguage and it is this that gives sense and meaning.Heidegger would name this characteristic way of viewinglanguage as language of expression." It is not thatthis normal way of viewing language is not correct."They hold sway, as if unshakable, over the whole fieldof the varied scientific perspectives on language.""But they are not true in the sense that they do notenable us to undergo "an experience with lang~age.'~'Language is not a mere tool that manpossesses in addition to many others; on thecontrary, it is only language that affords

man the very possibility of standing in theopenness of Being. Only where there islanguage is there a world, i.e. the perpetuallychanging environment of decision andwork, of action and responsibility, but alsoof arbitrariness and noise, of decay andconfusion. Only where world holds sway isthere history .... Language is not a toolwhich is at man's disposal but rather thatevent which disposes of the supremepossibility of man's being.554.4.2 Language SpeaksLanguage offers the possibility of opening man'sBeing. In this sense Heidegger would say that it islanguage that speaks. The inversion that is takingplace is obvious. Normally we would understand that itis man who speaks a language. But here he wouldemphatically state that it is language that speaks. Thespeaking that he refers to is not a chatter but it is anaming. This naming is not a placing of various objectsand events with words of a language.56 It is not aquestion of handing out titles or applying terms.Naming is a function of calling things into words.It implies bringing things closer into nearness. It isnot a matter of making things present among thingsalready present. Nearness and remoteness are acorrelation which Heidegger uses quite often. And, theyare applicable to Being itself. Being is "far' because

it is not an entity. In other words it is the same assaying that Being conceals itself behind the entitiesto which it gives presence. At the same time Being isnear to man because he has a comprehension of it and itis the source of all nearness.5'When Heidegger states that language speaks, hewould see the function of speaking as an elucidation ofBeing itself. It is because speaking is naming, andnaming implies bringing things to nearness. He woulddevelop this idea in the following manner. Naming iscalling things into arrival. Things are invited so thatthey may bear upon men as things." The things that arenamed gather themselves as the sky and the earth, themortals and the divinities. Here we need to bear inmind his reflections on the Fourfold and the thinkingon things.4.4.3 The Essence of Language as SayingHeidegger reflected further on the nature oflanguage as saying. He uses the term 'saying' todevelop the notion of manifestation. "To say' isrelated to the old Norse "saga' which means to show, tomake appear, and to set free. Thus, saying seen fromthe perspective of these meanings enables Heidegger tosee it as the world-lighting and concealing event.

,\This lighting and hiding proffer of the world is theessential being of saying."' Heidegger, thus, wouldmaintain that the essential being of language is sayingas showing. The saying that he refers to is notidentical with speaking. It may happen that a man mayspeak endlessly but at the same time he need not sayanything. Another may remain silent and yet could say agreat deal.Heidegger tries to get closer to the essence oflanguage by the following guiding principle. He statesthis as "the essence of language: the language ofessence."60 Essence in the first part of the statementis understood as quiddity. Language is the subject andthe search is to understand the quiddity of thesubject. The second part of the statement is not a merechange of terms. It is not the metaphysical quidditythat is sought after. The second part of the statementmust be understood as Being itself in the sense that itabides and lingers on, not as mere duration but as thatwhich touches us and moves us." "Language belongs tothis continuous abiding and is inherent in that whichmoves everything as that which is most characteristicof it.' The way to think of this dimension as thatwhich moves every thing is to relate it to the realm ofthe Fourfold.

Language, Saying of the world's Fourfold isno longer only such that we speaking humanbeings are related to it in the sense of anexus existing between man and language.Language is, as world-moving Saying, therelation of all relations. It relates,maintains, proffers, and enriches the faceto-faceencounter of the world's regions,holds and keeps them, in that it holdsitself-Saying-reserve.'63Thus for Heidegger language is nothing separate fromand found outside the Fourfold but it is the veryrelatedness of the Fourfold itself. It is not atranscendent power which would amount to a metaphysicalrepresentation. It is the original gathering and thenearness to man that governs the Fourfold.4.4.4 Language as the House of BeingThe essential nature of language is furtherbrought out by the assertion that language is the houseof Being. Heidegger has referred to this way ofexpressing the essence of language in many places." Aclear statement of this is found in his "Letter onHumanism' :Language is the house of Being. In its homeman dwells. The thinkers and the poets arethe guardians of this home. Their guardianshipaccomplishes the manifestation of Beinginsofar as they bring the manifestation to

language and maintain it in language throughtheir speech. 65House is a place that reflects intimaterelationship and close familiarity. It is that whichgives security and well-being. It is that makes one"feel at home." Language as speaking and sayingmanifests the realm of Being that is brought to word.Once it arrives in words, then ". . .language is thelanguage of Being in the same way that the clouds arethe clouds of the sky."66 It is language that providesa protection for the presenting of Being insofar as itscoming to light is entrusted to the appropriate saying.Thus as a protection language is the house of Being. Itis in this house that things find themselves. "Languageis the house of Being because language, as Saying, isthe mode of Appropriation, "67The intimate relationship between language and thequestion of Being is in no way a matter of grammar andetymology. In his An Introduction to Metaphysics,Heidegger develops the special relationship betweenBeing and language in an altogether different manner."It is possible to make a threefold differentiation inour use of language to refer to things. A word such aspen, for instance, may be considered first, in respectto the audible and visible form of the word. Second, it

may be considered with regard to the meaning of what werepresent in connection with it. Third, it may beconsidered in respect to its purpose, i.e. it is towrite something on a piece of paper. Thus we candifferentiate a thing from the perspective of wordform, word meaning and word thing. Heidegger'scontention is that this form of a threefolddifferentiation is not possible as far as the wordBeing is considered. We can have only word meaning withregard to Being. He would put forward this idea in astriking manner in the following way. The Being of abuilding is not just another thing of the same kind asthe roof or the cellar. Does this mean that Beingconsists only of the word meaning? Heidegger wouldmaintain that, "the meaning of the word does not, as ameaning, constitute the essence of But weaim at Being itself by going through the word meaning.It follows from this that "Being itself is dependent onthe word in a totally different and more fundamentalsense than any essent:" It is this fundamentalrelation that enables Heidegger to use this imaginativeexpression that language is the house of Being.Heidegger made some observations regarding the useof this expression in his "A Dialogue on Language.'"He stated that,

... with that expression, I do not mean theBeing of beings represented metaphysically,but the presence of Being, more precisely thepresence of the two-fold, Being and beingsbut this two-fold understood in respect ofits importance for thinking them.12Though he admitted that the phrase "house of Being'gives a hint to the nature of language, yet he admittedthat it was a clumsy expression." He never bothered togive an explanation for calling this a clumsyexpression.4.5.1 Man: The Shepherd of BeingThe preceding analysis brings about an entirelydifferent picture of man. He enjoys a privilegedposition which demands of him to play a special role.He plays his privileged role by dwelling in theFourfold. This necessitates that he becomes a mortaland as a mortal he dwells insofar as he saves theearth, receives the sky as the sky, and await thedivinities. The poetic dwelling opened up in thismanner presences the intimate relationship betweenBeing and language. The true picture of man thusconsists in being related to and owned by Being.Heidegger uses a beautiful imagery to convey thispicture of man. According to him man is the shepherd of~eing ."

Shepherd is not the owner of the sheep-fold. He isentrusted with the care, protection and the safe-keeping of the sheep. In the like manner,Man is not the lord of beings. Man is theshepherd of Being. Man loses nothing in this"less"; rather, he gains in that he attainsthe truth of Being. He gains the essentialpoverty of the shepherd, whose dignityconsists in being called by Being itself intothe preservation of Being's trGth. 75It is against the image of'the lord that Heideggeremploys the image of the shepherd. This image of theshepherd clearly brings out the true nature of man asthe privileged partner of Being. Man as the shepherd ofBeing is opposed to the technological man who ischaracterized by homelessness and rootlessness.Technological man lacks a neighbourhood. He appears tobe not at home anywhere. He acts as a stranger to Beingthat is the really nearest and a friend of entitiesthat are apparently nearest.'6It is obvious that Heidegger uses the image of manas the shepherd of Being in opposition to a long-standing definition of man as animal rationale. Thisdefinition conceives man as a living being endowed withreason. This age-old definition of man is based on thenotions of genus and differentia. Thus in this

definition genus consists in anirnality and rationalityis the specific difference. According to Heidegger thiswell-founded definition lacks the original experienceof man as man. The definition of man as animalrationale presupposes an understanding of Being that isdeveloped by looking at an extant being, by not viewingman as man." Concepts such as genus and specificdifference are thought as essence in the sense of whatness.The essence of a thing or its whatness isdistinguished from that-ness or being-real. Theseconcepts reflect the metaphysical concepts of beingand they are extended to all beings. According toHeidegger, this metaphysical determination covers overman's ownmost being as an existence that comprehendsBeing.4.6.1 The Ecological Bearing of DwellingThe ecological perspective that we have adopted isguided by two key notions. They are a search for aframework of interrelationship and a de-centering ofthe subject. Heidegger's reflections on dwelling isecologically significant from the perspective of thesetwo key notions. Of course the terminologicalsimilarity between ecology and dwelling is implicit.Dwelling is a saying about the hwnan dwelling. Oikos

which is the source for the term ecology too refers tohouse or dwelling. Saying brings us close to logos. Sothe dwelling-saying is ecology in the true sense of theterm.Heidegger understands dwelling as a preservationof the Fourfold. It is the primal oneness of the fourrealms of the earth, the sky, the divinities and themortals. Mortals dwell insofar as they save the earth.Saving is not understood as rescuing something fromdanger but a type of freeing something into its ownroot unfolding. Preserving the earth thus goes againstall tendencies of exploitation and domination. Mortalsdwell insofar as they receive the sky as sky and waiton the divinities. Thus the dwelling is a dwelling withthings, spari'ng, preserving and protecting the Fourfoldof the earth, the sky, the divinities and the mortals.The framework of interrelationship which Heideggerestablished in his fundamental ontology receives anadded emphasis in his reflections on the Fourfold. TheFourfold is not seen as separate entities but are onlyin the One-fold. He would call it the round dance ofthe four or as the play of the world. It is a mutualowning and acknowledging of each by each other. Thusthe essential oneness of Being is manifested in the

polyvalence of the four dimensions. This dimension ofinterrelationship that is manifested in the Fourfold isecologically a very significant notion.All through the reflection on dwelling theunderlying picture of man is a de-centered subject.This is reflected best in the imagery of the shepherd.This image of man manifests the essential poverty ofthe shepherd who does not own but is entrusted with thecare and protection of the sheep. Similarly man guardsthe truth of Being. Such a de-centering takes away thehubris of modern man who shows the domination oftechnicity and reduces everything one-dimensionally asraw materials. Thus we see a shift of perspectiveoccuring here. It enables us to be open to the mysterydimension in life. Things are no more seen as isolatedentities but as the gathering of the Fourfold. Languageis not viewed from an instrumental perspective but asthe house of Being.Thus the possibilities of ecological sensitivitythat are opened up from Heidegger's reflection ondwelling are enormous. It provides a solid critique ofour existing unpoetic, exploitative sheltering andopens us to genuine dwelling.

CHAPTER FIVEHElDEGGER AND ECOLOGYTOWARDS AN HERMENEUTJC PROCESS

5.1.0 Journeying through HeideggerWe have made a journey through Heideggar from theperspective of ecology. It offers, as the sub-titleindicates, an ecological perspective to theHeideggerian thinking. In other words, it amounts toreading Heidegger from the perspective of ecology. Theexpression "ecological perspective'stands for twoguiding principles that are significant for ecology. Wearticulated them as the abiding concerns ofcontemporary ecological discussion, a survey of whichwe undertook in the beginning of this study. They are:(1) An ecological perspective should manifest adimension of interrelationship among the various realmsof existence. In fact this idea flows directly from theconcept of ecology itself which is understood as adiscipline that deals with the interrelationshipbetween living things and their natural environment.This dimension of interrelationship goes beyond thelevel of mere dependency and implies a deeper sense ofunity that emphasizes our ~0~eCtednesS rather thanseparation from all forms of life. It is opposed tomechanistic and objectivistic frameworks which do notpromote ecological thinking.

(2) Another level of concern that is reflected invarious ecological discussions is that an anthropocentricperspective is disastrous to the environment inthe long run. Anthropocentrism conveys the idea thathuman being is the 'crown of creation.' It magnifiesour sense of self-importance in the larger scheme ofthings. A genuine emphasis on interrelationshippresupposes that we go beyond a human-centered worldview.We examined Heidegger's philosophy as a whole, andthe path of thinking that he followed, from these twoperspectives that are significant for ecology.Heidegger's philosophy is primarily a way, an expressionvery dear to him. This way consists in raising anewthe question of the meaning of Being. He remained withsingle-minded devotion till the end of his life in hissearch for the meaning of Being. Being, for Heidegger,is not an entity but that which enables all entitiesto be present. It is the self-manifesting presencing orrevealing of entities. This self-manifesting presencingis the domain of openness that takes place within aclearing and it is called Dasein. Dasein is the there,where entities can be. The process of self-manifestingof entities is a temporal phenomenon. In contrast tothis, metaphysics meditates on beings as beings. It

forgets the ontological difference and concentrates onthe beingness of beings. Heidegger's effort to overcomemetaphysics is to go beyond the subject orientedthinking that is reflected in the metaphysicaltradition. He develops the question of Being in such away that in the unfolding of the Being-process man isseen as one who listens to the beckoning of Being.Though Heidegger approaches the Being-question insingle-minded devotion, it is astonishing to see thediversity of issues that his thinking leads to. Itinvolves the various ways in which men and women engagethemselves in beings as a whole. We interpreted thispath of thinking from the perspective of ecology.We concentrated at lengt?? on three areas ofthe Heideggerian path of thinking for our study. Theyare: (a) Heidegger's explication of the meaning offundamental ontology the core of which is theelucidation of Dasein as Being-in-the-world. (b) Hiscritique of science and technology and (c) thereflections on dwelling.We shall highlight the important aspects that wediscovered in our journey through Heidegger from theperspective of ecology.

5.2.1 Through the World to EcologyHeidegger, in his fundamental ontology, establisheshimself as the philosopher of the world. World,according to Heidegger is not the sum total of thingsaround us. Rather it is a how-structure thatessentially belongs to Dasein. The world is thatwherein we encounter entities and it is what gives themtheir connectedness. He understands the world as anessential structure of Dasein.'Heidegger understands Dasein as an entity which ischaracterized by an awareness of Being. It is the basicawareness of Being that enables Dasein to become aclearing so that entities can be understood in theirBeing. Heidegger maintains that the awareness of Beingis not an explicit, conceptual, awareness. It is vague,obscure, dark, nebulous and average understanding ofBeing. And his aim is to make this vague and averageunderstanding explicit and thematic. Thus it is thecapacity to understand Being that distinguishes Daseinfrom all other entities. He articulates this capabilityin terms of a three-fold priority of Dasein. Dasein hasan ontic priority in the sense that Dasein aloneexists. It has an ontological priority which refers tothe basic understanding of the Being of Dasein. It has

a fundamental priority in the sense that it understandsits own Being as well as the Being of other en ti tie^.^The three-fold priority of Dasein points to theessential characteristic of Dasein, namely, existence.This is what enables Heidegger to assert: "The essenceof Dasein is its existence.."' Dasein is the onlyexisting entity whereas all other entities are.Existence, as the etymology suggests, is a 'standingout from.' Dasein characterized by existence stands outfrom all other entities in the sense that it is open toitself and to the world. Dasein thus is not a finishedproduct, but a dynamic reality to be achieved.Heidegger would not explicate the ways of Being of sucha reality of Dasein in rigid categories but inexistentials. Existentials(as opposed to existentiells)are those structures which pertain to Dasein'scomprehension of the Being-structure of entities.'Dasein is Being-in-the-world, and this basicawareness is foundational to other existentials whichcharacterize the ways of Dasein's Being. AlthoughBeing-in-the-world is a unitary phenomenon, it can beviewed from the perspective of clarifying theontological structure of the world and from the

perspective of Being-in that clarifies the way Daseinis in the world.Heidegger arrives at the notion of the world as anontological phenomenon through the description of oureveryday relation to entities within the world. Heholds that our primary sense of things are not asobjects of perception. He accords priority to the waywe make use of objects as equipment that fit naturallyinto our ordinary practical activity. This is broughtout by the familiar examples of the hammer or the doorknob. Things are not given to us as jumbled heaps butas environment which contains within itself anintelligible context and a network of relationships. Hewould use the expression readiness-to-hand (zuhanden)to describe the way objects are for us in the midst ofpractical activity. The world here is a network ofrelationships which is manifested in the way the toolsare assigned and the purposes of Dasein who uses them.This practical world is more fundamental than thetraditional sense of the world as a collection ofthings in objective space. Opposed to the world of thepractical subject is the world bf the theoreticalsubject. Heidegger names this as the present-at-hand(vorhanden) view of things. According to him thevorhanden perspective is the source for most of the

traditional problems ofskeptical orientation. Thebest way to overcome them, he suggests, is to avoid thepicture of reality that gives rise to them.'Heidegger uses the expression, "the worldhood" ofthe world to describe the ontological nature of theworld.The "worldhood' of the world stands for thewhole of the referential and significance totalities.Things are encountered against a background offamiliarity, competence and concern. Thus worldaccording to Heidegger is a wherein, a within which, weencounter entities and it is what gives them theirconnectedness. According to him the world is somethingthat comes 'beforehand,' and not 'afterward." It isnot something subsequent to that we calculate as thesum total of all entities. Heidegger opposes anyprivate, "my world." He holds that it belongs to thevery idea of a world that it be shared.Being-in-the-world is the basic disclosedness. Itstands for the character of having been laid open.Prior to any specific engagement of Dasein with otherentities, the world is disclosed. Dasein thus refers tothis primary disclosedness and it is implicit in theterm da (there). It is here that Heidegger's under-standing of truth as aletheia (unconcealment) becomes

significant. Aletheia is the very unfolding of Beingitself. It refers to the manifestness and openness ofentities. Truth then would not be located in statementsand propositions. The role of Dasein is to preserve thetruth of Being. He sums up this in the expression,"letting-beings be." It is to interact with entities ina respectful manner and to open up the ontologicalclearing so that entities can be.'The unitary phenomenon of Being-in-the-world, whenviewed from the perspective of Being-in clarifies theway Dasein is in the world. Dasein is in the world notas a subject related to an object.' Rather it is alwaysoutside itself and is formed by shared practices.Heidegger calls this the situatedness of Dasein. Hesees a three-fold structure in situatedness. They areunderstanding, state-of-mind and falling. Dasein isintrinsically an underetanding entity. It is theability to live in and cope with our world success-fully, which he names as the primary ~nderstanding.~ IfDasein is primarily an understanding entity, it is alsoa'thrown' entity. He conveys this idea by thetechnical term Befindlichkeit. It refers to theirreducible fact that Dasein already is amidst thingsand with others. At the same time its origin anddestiny remain obscure. The disclosedness that occurs

in the everyday mode of existence is fallenness. Itrefers to the universal tendency to flee from or avoidthe disclosure of one's own Being and Being of theentities within-the-world.The various structural aspects of Dasein's ways ofBeing are brought to a unity in care. As an ontologicalconcept care stands for the existential totality ofDasein's ontological structure. It is the structuralunity of existentiality, facticity and fallenness.Heidegger distinguishes care from concern andsolicitude. Concern is manifested in the attitude thatDasein has to entities as ready-to-hand and solicitudefor others as the Dasein-with of others.The primordial unity of the structure of care isunderstood as temporality.' Heidegger's concept oftemporality does not refer to our awareness of time. Itrefers to the fact that any moment of our existence isa unity of existence, facticity and fallenness.Heidegger's philosophy of the world enables us tounderstand the important aspects of his fundamentalontology. We maintain that the ecological bearing ofhis conception of the world can be recognized in theapproach that Heidegger has taken. This approach is adeparture from the self-enclosed consciousness of the

objectifying subject to the open expanse of Dasein. Thetraditional manner of philosophizing is a metaphysicalstance according to which every being is conceivedeither as a subject or an object. The paradigm of selfenclosedconsciousness of the objectifying subject isfound in the philosophy of Descartes. The ego thatgains certainty of existence in the act of thinking isseen as a subject. Everything that is not a thinkingsubject becomes an object of thought. Such aperspective leads to the consequence of seeing allreality as divided into subjects and objects. This kindof philosophizing is unacceptable to Heidegger.Reality, for him, is much more than a conglomeration ofsubjects and objects. If everything is pressed into thecategories of subject and object then the wondrousdepth of reality is ignored, he holds. It is thisorientation that makes him raise anew the question ofthe meaning of Being. The way of raising this questionis not done through the subject-object dichotomousmodel but through the analytic of Dasein.The achievement of Heidegger in the analytic ofDasein has convincingly shown that all relatedness tothe world is based on a prior relatedness, namely, thea priori of Being-in-the-world. In this approachHeidegger has gone beyond theagency of knowing and

has seen that all knowing is a founded mode of Daseinas Being-in-the-world. There is no subject in thisframework that steps out of the inner sphere in orderto reach to the object out there. Neither is there an Iwhich would at first have to establish a relationshipto others but rather it primarily exists as Beingwith-others.Heidegger's elucidation of the concept of theworld brings forward the relational dimension well. Allour relatedness is based on the a priori of Being-inthe-world.1°This is implied in his explication of theBeing of equipment. He has convincingly shown that ourprimordial relation to things around is not that ofpresent-at-hand but of readiness-to-hand. In otherwords we make sense of things as equipments before weare aware of them as objects of knowledge. Moreover,things are not given as isolated heaps but as environspointing to a network of relationships. A significantinsight in this connection is that it is breakdown thatbrings to the fore this network of relationships as awhole. This is particularly applicable in the contextof contemporary ecological crisis. We are experiencingthe breakdown in this life-sustaining system and henceit is manifesting the dimensions of the network ofrelationships as a whole.

If world essentially belongs to Dasein, how farcan we see this approach as de-centering the subject?In other words, is it not an anthropocentrism indisguise? In our exposition we have noted thatHeidegger was aware of this problem. According to himthe principal problem is to determine exactly thesubjectivity of the subject. Dasein is not a subject inthe normal sense of the term but it is existence and ischaracterized by an awareness of Being. This uniqueprerogative of Dasein does not mean that it lords overentities but guards and preserves them in their truth.Thus Dasein has a great responsibility. It is to letbeings be. Ultimately it calls for interacting withentities in a respectful manner.We find that Heidegger's philosophy of the worldbrings into focus the background familiarity and thestructure of our involvement in our practical life. Itconsists of a perspective of interrelationship which atthe same time achieves a de-centering of the subject.5.2.2 At the Domain of the Critique of TechnologyHeidegger is perhaps one of the few philosopherswho has made a penetrating critique of the question oftechnology. The uniqueness of his critique lies in thefact that it is exclusively governed by his concern for

the question of Being. He sees the strong reflection ofthe Western metaphysical tradition at the domain oftechnology and the consequent forgetfulness of Being.Heidegger does not approach technology as anindustrial phenomenon or as the scientific temper ofmodernity. His aim is to see the disclosure of Beingthat takes place in contemporary technology. He seesclearly that man's thirst for domination andcalculative manipulation of entities are manifested inits extreme possibility in science and technology. Thecalculative thinking inherent in technological ageglorifies the subject and thus metaphysics realizes itsultimate possibility of the subjects domination overreality. Heidegger was convinced that raising anew thequestion of Being can restore human being to thedignity of his essence. This demands a new type ofthinking which releases humans to be attuned to thegranting of Being. This is the background that enablesHeidegger to inquire into the essence to technology.Keeping true to his approach of explaining theunfamiliar by the familiar, Heidegger takes his pointof departure from the familiar interpretation oftechnology.

The usual way of understanding technologyoperates at the domain of causality." Why should causebe understood as something that brings about an effect?Why should the efficient cause be considered superiorto other forms of causality? In other words, why shouldproducing be the standard relation to things? Heideggerfinds that the original Greek conception of cause isaition and it meant "that to which something else isindebted." Causality from this perspective is the wayin which the four causes belong together and areresponsible for something else. Heidegger makes use ofthe example of chalice -- a sacrificial vessel used inthe Christian worship -- and points out that the cominginto appearance of the chalice is the play of theFourfold ways of being responsible. This enables him tomove to the primal meaning of causality as thepresencing of something into appearance. This inessence is poiesis (bringing-forth). Heidegger is ofthe opinion that poiesis and physis are inherently thesame, for physis is the event of self-emergence. It isthe disclosive event that makes the appearing ofentities possible. This process he understands asaletheia (truth).According to Heidegger, technoiogy primarily is aform of revealing. The revealing that dominates modern

technology is a one-dimensional way of viewing things.This one-dimansional view is concretized in seeingthings as raw material. Everything comes to be orderedand regulated so that they may be ever ready to provideenergy at the beck and call of man. This idea is summedup in the expression Bestand (standing-reserve).I2Heidegger identifies the essence of technology asenframing (Gestell). It means the way of revealing thatgoverns the orientation of modern technology thatimplies a particular understanding of the Being of manand of entities. It means that all things are placed inthe same manner as raw material. It is something thatstamps humanity to disclose everything in a one-dimensional manner.Heidegger sees the essence of technology asinherently related to the history of Being. The essenceof technology is the very mode of Beings' revealing inthe modern age. From the point of view of the essence.modern technology is historically earlier than modernscience. This enables him to question the usualassumption that modern technology is applied physicalscience.Enframing is utmost danger for under its swayman pursues nothing but what is revealed in ordering

and derives all his standards on its basis. This blocksthe possibility of being admitted to the realm ofunconcealment. Man himself becomes a part of thestanding-reserve. The technological man asserts himselfas the lord of the earth. Such a man fails to become alistener and fails in every way to see himself as onewho ek-sists. This extreme danger is not without itssaving power, for Heidegger quotes Holderlin to statethat where there is danger saving power also grows.Enframing is the destiny of Being in the technologicalera. In the destiny of Being there is an essentialbelongingness of man and Being but the dominance oftechnology blinds us to this. When we pay heed to thecoming to presence of technology we recognize thepossible arising of the saving power. ~eidegger'sstrong belief is that this whole process would happenonly if we think. And this brings him to the movementaway from the danger of Gestell to the positive powerof thinking as el ass en he it (releasement).13Heidegger devoted much of his energy to bring outthe essential aspects of his thinking. He makes animportant distinction between authentic and inauthenticthinking. Inauthentic thinking is that type of thinkingwhich is dominated by logic and considers thesystematic conceptual analysis as the paradigm of

thinking. According to Heidegger this is a degenerationof the original meaning of thinking and continues to bethe legacy of metaphysics which is inherentlyontotheologic.The nature of thinking that dominates thetraditional metaphysics has been rightly named byHeidegger as ontotheology." This combined expressionbrings out the inherent nature of Western metaphysicswhich Heidegger sees as a combination of ontology,logic and theology. He finds that in the thinking ofPlato and Aristotle, a transformation of the earlyGreek experience of physis and logos gets articulatedas conceptual realities. Plato interpreted Being asIdea and edios refers to the aspect of being-seen.Consequently being-seen becomes the decisive criterionof Being. Being as Idea constitutes the whatness of anessent. Appearance becomes real to the degree ofparticipation in the Idea. Truth, in this framework, isconceived as representation and correctness of vision.Heidegger finds in Aristotle's interpretation of logosas statement, a logical extension of Being. Instead,logos is the primal gathering principle. Logos isderived from legein which primarily means gathering andsecondarily refers to speech or word. Logos whichoriginally meant the unconcealent of an entity comes to

e seen as a doctrine of categories. The whole questionof truth loses the perspective of aletheia andcorrectness gets the priority. Heidegger finds atheological extension of Being in the Christianinterpretation of Jesus Christ as Logos. Logos isunderstood here as the mediating word: The thinkingthat dominates in metaphysics seen from the three-foldextension of Being is ontotheology for Heidegger. It isinherently representational in character and takes thecalculative form in the domain of science andtechnology.Heidegger would consider authentic thinking as athinking of Being that enables us to think the truth ofBeing. The normal ways of seeing thinking considers itas essentially related to our faculties as humanbeings. In essence it is a glorification of rationalityand looses the perspective of Being. Authentic thinkingis a response to the call to think. What calls us tothink is that which gives us food for thought. Theaspect of giving makes Heidegger to relate it to the'It gives' (es gibe). Heidegger wants to emphasize thegiving aspect of Being which remains withdrawn incontrast to the aspect of gift. If thinking is a callfrom the side of Being, it becomes complete in areceptive listening from the side of man. This response

ecomes grateful thinking. Thus, for Heidegger,authentic thinking is thanking. Heidegger wouldmaintain that in authentic thinking as thanking, man'sprivileged relationship to Being is experienced. It isthis experience that enables man to shepherd, house andlisten to Being."Heidegger's use of Gelassenhiet (releasement)reflects the above mentioned dispositions. Releasement,as Heidegger uses it, is different from the ordinaryways of understanding thinking. It is characterized bya releasement towards things and an openness tomystery. Releasement, from the perspective of man, isto let-beings-be. The disposition of letting-being-bein no way connotes passivity. Heidegger would maintainthat it is beyond the distinction between activity andpassivity for releasement does not belong to the domainof will. It is a wililess thinking that enables us todwell in a released manner.The significant achievement of Heidegger'scritique of technology is that the thinking of Beingenables him to see the technological present as aconsequence of the metaphysical past. He hasestablished beyond doubt that the metaphysical past isa degeneration of the early Greek understanding of

Being. His critique of science and technology issignificant for ecology in the sense that it makes usaware of the pernicious dominance of the subject-objectmodel of thinking. The orientation of productionbecomes the standard relation to entities. Thetechnological man fails to become a listener and missesthe opportunity to see himself as one who ek-sists.Authentic thinking, on the other hand, is a thinkingthat realizes the essential belongingness of man andlogos. Logos is that which gathers entities intorevealment. Man's role is to preserve the unconcealmentand to cultivate a receptive attitude toward theappearing essent. In his reflections we can recognize astrong emphasis to de-center the subject. Gelassenheit,as a positive disposition, is very significant from theperspective of ecology. It is not a let-go but a let-bethat does not suggest carelessness but the highest formof care. Releasement enables one not only to let athing be but also to let all things be. It is thehighest form of detachment in this sense. It isparticularly significant in a world dominated byunbridled consumerism.

5.2.3 Dwelling: An Ontological PerspectiveDwelling is a basic human experience. It is not amatter of finding shelter. According to Heidegger, manfundamentally is a dweller and he dwells in theneighbourhood of Being. Heidegger thinks dwelling inrelation to building and he understands the essence ofbuilding and dwelling through an elaborate etymologicalanalysis of basic words such as bauen (build) and buan(dwell).I6 Building and dwelling are seen as one wholeand that could be the reason for him to write thetitle, "Building Dwelling ThinkingX without thenecessary punctuation marks.According to Heidegger every activity of buildingis not a dwelling. To dwell, for Heidegger, means to beset at peace, and to preserve the free space thatsafeguards each thing in its nature. He sees dwellingas dwelling in theourf fold." The Fourfold is theinterplay of the earth, the sky, the mortals and thedivinities. They are never by themselves but are onlyin the one-fold. Heidegger would call it the rounddance of the four, as the play of the world. TheFourfold should not to be seen as four separate beingsbut as that dimension of the world where the play of

the Fourfold is seen in the concealing and unconcealingdimension of Being itself. It is in this connectionthat Heidegger understands the essential relation ofbuilding and dwelling as that form of constructionwhich guards the Fourfold. Guarding the Fourfold meansto save the earth, to receive the sky, to await thedivinities and to escort the mortals. Heideggerunderstands this as the presencing of dwelling.Dwelling is a dwelling in the Fourfold and it is adwelling with things. One may understand by a thing aconcrete material thing, or a mental disposition, or inthe sense of a something as opposed to nothing.Heidegger limits himself to the common meaning of thingas a concrete material thing. His purpose is not todiscover the material aspect of a thing. Heideggerdoes not understand the nature of a thing as a bareobject but it is something where the assembling of theworld takes place. He recognizes the interplay of theFourfold in things and this is expressed in hisexpression " thinging of a thing. 'la The gathering andthe assembling that takes place in a thing is abelonging together. The gathering is a worlding of thefour structural elements of the world. The world, asthe Fourfold dimension of the earth, the sky, themortals and the divinities, is the very dynamism of

Being itself which comes forward from concealment tounconcealment.Heidegger believes that dwelling should beessentially poetic in character.'' He had exceptionalregard for the poetry of HBlderlin whom he consideredthe poet of poets. He sees poetry as the establishmentof Being by means of the word. Poetizing is a manner ofopening up of Being so that entities may appear in agiven manner. Poetizing in this sense is the disclosureof unconcealment and so a coming to pass of truth.Heidegger sees a close relation between poetizing anddwelling. The essential character of poetry enables usto a distinctive kind of building and it is thisbuilding that lets us dwell. The poetic dwellingdemands that we think the essence of human existence byway of dwelling and that we think the character ofpoetry as enabling us to dwell.Heidegger's reflections on poetic dwelling bringsua to his unique perspectiva on language. He seeslanguage speaking in us rather than we speak language.He sees that all the varied scientific perspectives oflanguage view language as an expression of thought. ButHeidegger sees the function of speaking as anelucidation of Being itself.

Heidegger's perspective on language can besummarized in his famous expression, "language is thehouse of Being."' This expression informs us thatlanguage and Being belong together in an intimate way.It is possible, Heidegger states, to make a three-folddistinction such as word form, word meaning and wordthing, in our use of language to refer to things. Hiscontention is that as far as the word Being isconcerned, Being has only the word meaning, and notword thing and word form. We aim at Being by goingthrough words and Being itself is dependent on languagein a fundamental sense.The above reflections have important bearing onthe picture of man. According to him, man is theshepherd of Being. A shepherd is not the owner of thesheep-fold. He is entrusted with the care, protectionand the safe-keeping of the sheep. Man as the shepherdof Being is contrasted with the image of thetechnological man who is characterized by homelessnessand rootlessness. Such a man appears to be not at homeanywhere. He acts as a stranger to Being that is thereally nearest and a friend to entities that areapparently near. "

Heidegger's reflection on dwelling is significantfrom the perspective of ecology. It is much more thanthe terminological similarity between ecology anddwelling, for dwelling-saying can be seen as eco-logy.Heidegger understands dwelling as the preservation ofthe Fourfold of the earth, the sky', the divinities andthe mortals. The framework of interrelationship whichhe established in his fundamental ontology is realizedin his reflections on the Fourfold. The Fourfold is notseen as separate entities but are only in the belongingtogether of the four realms. The imagery of theshepherd communicates the idea of a de-centeredsubject. Such a de-centering takes away the hubris ofmodern man who shows the domination of technicity andreduces everything one-dimensionally as raw materials.Heidegger's reflections open up the mystery dimensionin things. Things are no more seen as isolated entitiesbut as the gathering of the Fourfold. Thus Heidegger'sreflections opens up ecological sensitiveness. Itprovides a solid critique of our existing unpoetic,exploitative sheltering and opens us to genuinedwelling.

5.3.1 Journeying BeyondA journey through Heidegger opens the possibilityfor attempting a journey beyond Heidegger. The attemptto go beyond does not mean to throw away the ladder asWittgenstein suggested, but a creative interactionbetween the ecological perspective and'the Heideggerianthinking. It would imply a hermeneutical process ofgoing though Heidegger to Ecology, not to end thejourney there, but to return to Heidegger throughecology. Keeping this in mind we can raise asignificant question at this juncture. In what way doesHeidegger's path of thinking enhance ecologicalthinking? Consequently, how does a thinking from theperspective of ecology enhance the thinking ofHeidegger?We maintain that the significant achievement ofthe Heideggerian thinking as a whole has been tobroaden the dimension of interrelationships. In anegative manner this resulted in overcoming thesubject-object dichotomous thinking of the metaphysicaltradition. In a positive manner this was highlighted inhis elucidation of the fundamental ontology, the coreof which is the explication of Dasein as Being-in-theworld.A thinking from the perspective of Heidegger

would demand that ecology which deals with the study ofinterrelationship among living things and their naturalenvironment should not be approached as an ontic issuebut as an ontological phenomenon. The ontologicalperspective, as Heidegger understands, would desistfrom approaching ecology from a detached point of viewof the present-at-hand. It would imply that theperspective of the ontological existential of theworldhood of the world be presupposed in our day-to-daydealing with nature.Such an ontological perspective calls for anopenness to the revelation of Being that takes place atthe realm of ecology. This amounts to a search for themeaningfulness of ecology as such and an attempt torelate it to human existence as a whole.The dimension of contemporary crisis of ecologypoints to a revelation of our present-day contingency.The roots of this, according to Heidegger, goes to themetaphysical tradition and its manifestation in thetechnological domination. One of the significantinsight that Heidegger's thinking brings forward isthat any amount of larger and better technicalsolutions cannot ultimately solve the problems ofecology. It needs a thorough re-thinking of our

fundamental attitudes concerning our place in thelarger scheme of things.At this juncture Heidegger's reflections ondwelling becomes significant for ecology. The questionof Being does not envisage that man merely be arational animal but be a dweller in the neighbourhoodof Being. Authentic dwelling is a dwelling within theFourfold. It opens up the mystery dimension in ourlives. According to Heidegger our place in the largerscheme of things is to dwell in such a way as to savethe earth, to receive the sky, to await the divinities,and to initiate the mortals." In other words, it is todwell in a released manner that lets beings be.The perspective of ecology, on the other hand, ina creative interaction with the Heideggerian thinkingenables us to contextualise Heidegger's thinking aswell. Contextualization in any form contains withinitself possibilities of danger as well as opportunity.Danger is present in the form of challenge andopportunity in the form of possibility for broadeningof perspectives.The perspective of ecology that we have adoptedwas guided by the framework of interrelationships andan orientation to de-center the subject. They are, in

the ultimate analysis, ways of dwelling. Ecology,primarily as a way of dwelling, manifests itself in thevarious ways of inhabiting the earth. The basicstrength of Heidegger has been to provide a critique ofour contemporary unpoetic and exploitative type ofliving from the unfolding of the hiscary of Being. Theunfolding of the history of Being took the form of areturn to the origins, and that too the specificallyearly Greek form. Such a return to the origins enablesHeidegger to be critical of the distortions, so muchso, that it becomes unable for him to reconcile to thepositive dimensions of modernity. The best fruits ofmodernity are realized in democratic movements andsocial commitments of this era.A return to the origins that took the specificGreek form viewed the possibilities of dwelling too ina particular manner. Heidegger"~ poetic reflections ondwelling appears to be oblivious to the hiddendimensions of dwelling. It is noticeable in the primacyhe accorded to the ontological dimension of dwelling."The real plight of dwelling does not lie merely in alack of houses.'" The cosmopolitan nature ofcontemporary cities and the valuable cultural pluralismthat they offer would be instances of rootlesness fromthe perspective of Heidegger.

The ecological perspective would offer achallenge to the single-mindedness of the Beingquestion. It would challenge this thinking to be opento other ways of dwelling. Thus the Heideggerianthinking needs to be reconciled to a perspective ofpluralism. It does not mean that we cannot account forsuch a perspective of pluralism in his thinking. Therevealing-concealing framework of his thinking of Beingmanifests a basic openness. In this connection it isworth recalling a statement of Heidegger: "Being andTime is a way and not a shelter.. . . A way, not 'the'way which never exists in philos~phy."~' However,Heidegger's rootedness to a tradition manifests atendency of narrowness that lacks openness to othertraditions.Ecology, as a way of dwelling, should manifest acommitment to ecologically sensitive values. Some ofthe important values that reflect ecologicalsensitivity are a care and concern for the preservationof the fragile eco-system, a deep respect for all formsof life, a concern for the needs of the futuregeneration, an unexploitative way of life based onsustainable development, a deep concern for justice,and a form of life that checks the dominance ofconsumerism.

How far can the Being-question provide sufficientmotivation to cultivate ecologically sensitive values?This may not appear to be an appropriate question inthe context of Heidegger'a thinking, for neidaggerhimself has raised serious doubts regarding valueorientation." But his objections to values must beseen in the context of his wider critique, viz. athinking of values from an objective framework does notlet beings be. The question of Being is fundamentally asearch for meaning, and in the Heideggerian frameworkmeaningfulness belongs to Dasein. Questions of valuetoo are essentially an articulation of meaningfulness.The ecological values of our times are a specificationof a meaningful existence in today's circumstances.There could be various factors that influence aperson's commitment to values. Genuine thinking, deepreflection, and insight are all important factors fordeepening one's motivation. But along with this, aperson's cultural background, the religious orientation,and the level of moral consciousness areimportant considerations. The perspective of the Beingquestion, and the single-minded devotion of Heidegger,may not be inherently open to these dimensions. Whatpeople do about their ecology is a specific manifestationof what they think about themselves. We find

that the Being-question, as a way of articulatingmeaningfulness,and as an attempt to rethink ourposition in the larger schene of things can provide anorientation to one's commitment to ecological values.However, this needs to be supplimented with theinsights from various disciplines and. dimension ofindividual and social life.Heidegger once stated:It is in any case a dubious thing to rely onwhat an author himself has brought to theforefront. The important thing is rather togive attention to those things he leftshrouded in silence."This study is attempted in this spirit of bringing tothe fore the "unsaid' in the thinking of Heidegger.

Chapter IWotea and reference81. Susane K.Langer, Philosophy in a New Key (New York:Mentor Books 1951).2. Klaus Kostermaier, "The new Master-paradigm:EcologyNin Harold Coward, ed. Hindu Christian StudiesBulletin 6(1993),7.3. Milton C.Nahm ed. Selections from Early Greek Philosophy.4th edition, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.Prentice-Hall, 1964),p. 42. As cited in Eugene C.Hargrove, Foundations of Environmental Ethics,(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-~all,l989),p. 16.4. Richard Tarnas, The Passion of the Western Mind (NewYork: Ballantine Books.1993). p. 68.5. Eugene Hargrove. Foundations of Enviornmental Ethicsop. cit., p. 24.6. Ibid., p. 27.7. Plato, Phaedrus, 227a-230e as cited in Eugene C.Hargrove, Foundations of Environmental Ethics,op.cit., p. 27.8. Richard, Tarnas, The Passion of the Western Mind,op. cit.. p. 279.9. Seminar, No. 395 (July 1992), p. 45.10. Donald, Edward Davis, Ecophilosophy: A Field Guideto the Literature(San Pedro, California: R&E Miles,1990).11. Rachel Carson. Silent Spring(New York: FawcettCrest Books, 1962).12. Wawick Fox, Towards a Transpersonal Ecology:Developing New Foundations for Environmentalism(London: Shambhals, 19901, p. 4

13. Cited in Wawick lox, Towards a TranspersonalEcology, op. ci t . , p. 5.14. Ibid.15. Science, March 10,Vo1.155, No.3767(1966)16. Ibid., p. 120417. Ibid., p. 1205.18. The Book of Genesis (Chapters 1&2)19. Science, p. 1206.20. Elspeth Whitney, "Lyn White, Ecotheology andHistory" Environmental Ethics 15 (1993). pp. 151-69.21. Ibid.. p. 157.22. Allan Richardson, A Dictionary of ChristianTheology (London: SCM Press, 19691, p. 289.23. Martin Palmer, "The Encounter of Religion andConservation" in Engel Ronald J & Engel Joan G.,eds . Ethics of Environment and Development (Tucson& London: The University of Arizona Press, 1993).Also See O.P. hrrivedi, ed. World Religions and TheEnvironment(New Delhi: Gitanjali Publishing, 1989).24. Cited in National Jesuit News, April(1995) p. 14.25. K.Luke, "Nature and Man in the Biblical Persp-ctive," Jeevadhara 21(December 1991). p. 444.26. The ~ook of Genesis, 1/2627. Donald Worster, Natures Economy: A History ofEcological Ideas, 2nd Edition (Cambridge:1985)27a.Henryk Skolimowsky. Eco-Philosophy: Designing NewTactics for Living (Boston: Marion Boyars, 1381).pp. 53ff & "For the Record: On the Origin of Eco-Philosophy,' The Trumpeter 7(Winter 1990). p. 45.28. Warwick Fox, Towards a Transpersonal Ecology,op.cit., p. 31.

29. Michael Zimennan, Contesting Earth's Future:Radical Ecology in the Postmodern Age(Berke1ey:University of California Press, 1994), p.2430. Soundings 60(1977), p. 136.31. Ibid.32. Wawick Fox. Towards a ~rans~e=sonal Ecology, op.cit.. p. 33.33. Cited in Environmental Ethics, 15(1993) p. 119.34. J.Ronald Engel and Joan Gibb Engel, Ethics ofEnvironment and Development, op. ci t . , p . 78.35. Cited in Ronald Engel, op.cit., p. 80.36. Ibid.37. Bill Devall & George Sessions, Deep Ecology: Livingas if Nature Mattered (Layton: Perigrine SmithBooks, 1984). p. 243.38. Ervin Laszlo, The Systems View of the World,(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1972), p. 119.39. Cited in William Richardson, Heidegger: ThroughPhenomenology to Thought, 3rd edition (The Hague:Martinus Nijhhoff, 19761, p. 6.40. Ibid.41. Michael Zimmerman. "A Hedieggerian Ethos forRadical Environmentalism' New Scholasticism,(1993), p. 25.42. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Heidegger's Ways, (Albany: SUNYPress, 19941,~. 121.43. George J. Seidel. *Heidegger: Philosopher forEcologists?' Man and World, 4(1971), pp. 93-99.44. Ibid., p. 97.45. Joseph Grange, "On the Way Towards Foundational~cology' Soundings, 60(1977), pp. 135-49.

47. Michael Zinnnennan, 'Towards a Heideggerian Ethosfor Radical Environmentalism" Environmental Ethics,5 (1983), PP. 99-131.4 8 Michael Zimmcnnan, 'Implications of Heidegger'sThought for Deep Ecology'44(1986), pp. 19-43.The Modern Schoolman,49. Michael Zinnnennan, 'Towards a Heideggerian Ethosfor Radical Environmentalism* Environmental Ethics,5(1983), p. 118.50. Michael Zimmerman, "Rethinking the Heidegger-DeepEcology Relationship" Environmental Ethics,15(19931, pp. 194-223.51. A.T. Nuyen, "A Heideggerian Existential Ethics forHuman Environment' The Journal of Value Inquiry,25(1991), pp. 359-66.52. Ibid., p. 336.53. Bill Devall & George Sessions, Deep Ecology,pp. 98-99.54. Ladelle McWhorter, ed., Heidegger and the Earth,(Thomas Jefferson University Press, 1992).55. Ibid., p. x .1. Martin Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism,' BasicWritinqs, ed., David F. Krell,(London: Routledge &Kegan Paul, 1977) pp. 228-229.(hereafter BasicWritings)2. Ibid., p. 228.3. Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology,translated by Albert Hofstadter,(Bloomington:

Indiana University Press, 1982) p.174. (HereafterThe Basic Problems of Phenomenology)4. Ibid.5. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, translated by JohnMacguarrie & Edward Robinson, (London: SCM PressLtd. 19621, p. 249. (hereafter Being and Time)6. Charles Guignon, ed., Cambridge Companion toHeidegger, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1992). p. 47. Michael Zimmerman, "Towards a Heideggerian Ethosfor Radical Environmentalism" Environmental Ethics,5(1983), p. 103.8. Please see the detailed footnote, no.1 on page 27 inBeing and Time.9. Vincent Vycinas, Earth and Gods, (The Hague:Martinus Nijhoff), 1961, p. 24.10. Being and Time, p. 27 (It may be noted that thefirst time the term Dasein is found in Being andTime is towards the middle of page 26.)11. William Richardson, Heidegger: Through Phenomenologyto Thought, 3rd edition (The Hague: MartinusNijhoff, 1974) p. 34 and specially the footnoteno.17, and Michael Gelven, A Commentary onHeidegger's Being and Time, (New York: Harper & Row1970), p. 23, footnote no.3.12. This is an expression used by John D. Caputo,"Heidegger'a Original Ethics;The New Scholasticism45(1971) p. 13013. Being and Time, p. 42.14. John D. Caputo, Heidegger's Original Ethics,' TheNew Scholasticism 45(1971) p. 130.15. Hubert Drufys in his study shows how two versionsof the interpretations of Heidegger regarding this

is found. For details, please see his Being-in-the-World: A commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time,Division l(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994), pp. 12ff.(Hereafter, Hubert Drufys, A Commentary)16. *The Way Back into the Ground of Metaphysics' inWalter Kaufman ed., Existentialism from Dostoevskyto Sartre, (New York: New American Books, 1975). p.270.17. Being and Time, p. 32.18. Ibid.19. William Richardson, Heidegger: Through Phenomenologyto Thought, op. cit., p. 41.20. Being and Time, pp. 27 & 316.21. Madox, R.L., "Henneneutic Circle: Vicious orVictorious?" Philosophy Today (1983), pp. 66-76.22. "Philosophy will never seek to deny its 'presuppositions',but neither may it simply admit them. Itconceives them, and it unfolds with more and morepenetration both the presuppositions themselvesand that for which they are presuppositions."(Being and Time, p.358)23. Being and Time, p. 363.24. Being and Time, p. 31, footnote no.3. Also pleasesee Hubert Drufys, A Commentary p.20.25. Being and Time, p. 67.26. Werner Brock's Introduction in Heidegger, Existenceand Being, translated and introduced by WernerBrock,(London: Vision Press, 1956),p. 162-63.27. Heidegger, 'The WayBack into the Ground ofMetaphysics' in Walter Kaufmann ed. Existentialismfrom Dostoevsky to Sartre, op.cit., p. 271.28. Ibid.

29. Being and Time, p. 33.30. Richardson, Heidegger: Through Phenomenology toThought, op. cit., p. 50.31. Ibid, p. 68.32. Michael Zimerman, The Eclipse of the Self: TheDevelopment of Heidegger's Concept of Authenticity,(Athens: Ohio University Press, 1986(revisededition) ,p. XXVI.33. Heidegger. "The Letter On Humanism,' in BasicWritings, op.cit., p. 229.34. Please see the footnote no. 46 in JohnsonPuthenpurackal, Heidegger: Through AuthenticTotality to Total Authenticity, (Leuven: LeuvenUniversity Press, 1987), p. li.35. Being and Time, p. 38.36. John Richardson, Existential Epistemology, (Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 16.37. Charles Guignon, ed. Cambridge Companion toHeidegger, op. cit., p. 132ff.3 8 . Being and Time, p. 95.39. Ibid. p. 97 ff40. Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology,op. cit., p. 163.41. Being and Time, p. 98.42. Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology,p. 163.43. Being and Time, pp. 247-50.44. Ibid., P. 13245. Note the graphic presentation of the various typesof 'in-order-to' in Johnson J. Puthenpurackal,

Heidegger: Through Authentic Totality to TotalAuthenticity, op. cit., p. 16.46. Being and Time, p. 100 ff.47. John Richardson, Existential Epistemology, op. ci tp. 21.48. Ibid., p. 22.49. Charles Guignon, Cambridge Companion to Heidegger,op. cit., p. 132.50. Johnaon J. Puthenpurackal, Heidegger: ThroughAuthentic Totality to Total Authenticity, op. cit..p. 24.51. Being and Time, p. 119.52. The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 166.53. W.J. Richardson, Heidegger: Through Phenomenologyto Thought, op. cit., p. 56.54. Being and Time, p. 93 "This discussion of the word'world,' and our frequent use of it have made itapparent that it is used in several ways. Byunravelling these we can get an indication of thedifferent kinds of phenomena that are signified,and of the ways in which they are interconnected."55. Being and Time, p. 93.56. Khun, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,p.175 cited in Hubert Dreyfus, A Commentary, p. 9057. Being and Time, p. 105.58. Ibid., p. 114.59. Hubert Drefyus, A commentary, p. 10160. Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology,p. 168-70.61. Ibid., p. 168.62. Ibid..

63. Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology,p. 170.64. Being and Time, p. 78.65. Ibid., p. 79.66. Ibid., p. 78.67. Ibid., p. 79.68. Ibid., p. 80. See specially the note no.1.69. Hubert Dreyfus, A Commentary, p. 43. A detailedpresentation of the spatial and existential senseof various prepositions are given.70. Being and Time, p. 84. The translators of Being andTime, acknowledge that 'concern' is not always anexact equivalent of Gennan Besorgen. "'Besorgen'stands rather for the kind of 'concern' in which we'concern ourselves' with activities which weperform or things which we procure." See thefootnote no.1 in Being and Time, p. 83.7 1. Being and Time, p. 84.72. Ibid., p. 176. 'We must now -age to exhibit moreprecisely the interconnection between theuncoveredness of a being and the disclosedness ofits being and to show how the disclosedness(unveildness) of being founds, that is to say,gives the ground, the foundation, for the possibilityof !he uncoveredness of the being."See, Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenologyp. 72.73. Hubert Dreyfus, A Commentary, p. 103.74. Cited in Hubert Dreyfus, p. 103.75. W.J. Richardson, Heidegger: Through Phenomenologyto Thought, op.cit., p. 58.

76. Heidegger, "On the Essence of Truth" in BasicWritings, op. cit., pp. 117-41.77. Heidegger, Early Greek Thinking, translated byDavid F. Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi, (New York:Harper & Row, 1975). pp. 102-23.78. Being and Time, p. 257.79. Aristotle, Metaphysics T 7, 1011 23-28. Cited inJohnson Puthenpurackal, Heidegger: ThroughAuthentic Totlaity to Total Authenticity, op.cit.,p. 84, note no. 98.80. Basic Writings, p. 123.81. Ibid.82. Being and Time, p. 271.83. See above page 85, Being-in as disclosedness.84. John D. Caputo, "~letheia and the History of Being"Review of Metaphysics (March 1988), p. 520.85. Heidegger, Early Greek Thinking, op. cit., p. 103.The philogical information should be read alongwith this sentence. "An appeal to the meaning ofaletheia accomplishes nothing, and will neverproduce anything useful.' (However, we find thisinformation significant)86. For the myth of Lethe, please see the descriptionin Sabine G. Oswalt, Concise hcyclopedia of Greekand Roman Mythology (Glasgow: Collins. 1969). p.171(Heidegger does not refer to the myth of Lethe inany of his writings. But it is evident that thismyth is operative in his reflections.)87. Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology andOther Essays, translated with an introduction byWilliam Lovitt (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1977).p. 165.

88. Zirmncrman, .Re-thinking Heidegger-Deep EcologyRelationship,' Environmental Ethics, lS(1993)p. 20389. Basic Writings, p. 127.90. R.J. Dostal, "Heidegger's Poetics," Review ofMetaphysics (1994). p. 554. (Gadamer has reportedthat above the door of Heidegger's cabin in theBlack Forest the fragment of Heraclitus was placed:Alles stuert der Blitz(Lightening s,teers all things91. Hubert Dreyfus, A Commentary, p. 16392. Being and Time. p. 17193. W.J. Richardson, Heidegger: Through Phenomenologyto Thought, op. cit., p. 59.94. Being and Time, p. 171.95. Hubert Drefyus, A Commentary, p. 16696. Being and Time, p. 400.97. Ibid., p. 18298. The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 277.100. Being and Time, p. 185. The German term used hereis Entwurf which has the basic meaning of'throwing something off,' though in English thisconnontation has died out, it is very much alivein Heidegger ' s Gennan. Please see, Being and Time,p. 185, note no. 1.101. The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, p. 278102. Being and Time p. 188-89.103. Heidegger, History of the Concept of Time,(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985),p. 260. Cited in Hubert Dreyfus, A Commentary, P.196.

104. Johnson Puthenpurackal, Heidegger: Through AuthenticTotality to Total Authenticity, Gp. cit.,p. 30, note 147105. For detailed presentation on Hermeneutical circle,see Brice Wachterhauser, Hermenutics and ModernPhilosophy (Albany: SUNY Press, 1986), andCharles B. Guignon, Cambridge Companion toHeidegger, op. cit., pp. 170-94.106. Charles Guignon, Cambridge Companion to Heidegger.op. cit, p. 193.107. Scholars are of the opinion that this is not anordinary German word, but a coined expression. Itis related to the everyday greeting, "Wiebefinden Sie sich?' which means 'How are you?' orin the literal sense 'what state or situation doyou find yourself in?' The translators of Beingand Time rendered it as "state-of- mind" whichcan be problematic due to its mentalisticconnotations. W.J. Richardson translated it as'disposition" and according to Hubert Dreyfus ithas a behavioristic connotation. (Please aeeHubert Dreyfus, A Commentary, p. 168.) And so hetranslates it as "affectedness." John Haugelandprefers a literal translation of "so-foundedness"(See John Haugeland, "Dasein's Disclosedness,"Southern Jounal of Philosophy ZI(Supp1ement1989), p. 63 and specially footnote no. 37 in thesame article). Due to these variations, as faras possible, we use the origninal German wordin the text.108. Hubert Dreyfus, A commentary, p. 168, and ~eingand Time, pp. 176-77109. 'The concept of facticity implies that an entity'within-the-world' has Being-in-the-world in sucha way that it can understand itself, as bound up

in its 'destiny' with the Being of those entitieswhich it encounters within its own world." Beingand Time, p. 82.110. Ibid. p. 176.111. Hubert Dreyfus, A Commentary, p. 175.112. Being and Time, p. 220113. Ibid, p. 216.114. Ibid, p. 217115. Johnson Puthenpurackal, Heidegger: ThroughAuthentic Totality to Total Authenticity, op.cit.,p. 33.116. Being and Time, p. 220117. Ibid., p. 227.118. Ibid., p. 237.119. Ibid., p. 225.120. Ibid., p. 237.121. Johnson Puthenpurackal, Heidegger: ThroughAuthentic Totality to Total Authenticity, op. cit.p. 36.122. Being and Time, p. 236.123. Ibid.124. Maggill Frank, ed., Masterpieces of WorldPhilosophy, (London: George Allan & Unwin, 1963),p. 891, cited in Johnson Puthenpurackal, op.cit.p. 36.125. Being and Time. p. 237.126. Hubert Drefyus, A Commentary, p. 239.127. Being and Time, p. 371.128. Ibid., p. 375.

129. Charles Guignon, The Cambridge Companion toHeidegger, op. cit., p. 64.130. Being and Time, p. 376.131. Ibid.132. Ibid., p. 377.133. Ibid., Please see the footnote no.2134. Charles Guignon, Cambridge Companion to Heidegger,op. cit., p. 64.135. Being and Time, p. 377136. Heidegger. The Basic Problems of Phenomenology,pp. 275 ff.137. Michael Zimmerman, The Eclipse of the Self, op.cit., p. 104.138. Christopher Macann, Four PhenomenologicalPhilosophers (London: Routledge, 1993). p. 103.139. Please see above, p. 65.140. Please see above, pp. 60-1.141. Please see above, pp. 67-8.142. Please see above, p. 79.143. Please see above, p. 90.Chapter I111. The historical details are provided by williamLovitt in his Preface to The Question ConcerningTechnology and Other Essays.2. Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technologyand Other Essays, translated by William Lovitt,(London: Harper Torchbooks, 1977),(hereafter KT).3. Emmanuel Mesthene, Technological Change: Its Impacton an and Society, (New York: New American Library,

1970), p. 25, cited in Ian G. Barbour, Technology,Environment, and Human Values, (New York: Prager,19801, p. 35.4. Carl Mitcham and Robert Mackey, ed. Phillosophy andTechnology, (New York: Free Press, 1972), p. 36.5. Michael Zimmerman, Heidegger's Confrontation withModernity, (Bloomington: Indiana UniversityPress,1990), p. xiii6. Essence for Heidegger does not simply mean whatsomething is, but "the way in which somethingpursues its course, the way in which it remainsthrough time as what it is.' Please see QCT, p. 2note no.17. QCT, p. 3-48. Ibid.. P. 69. Ibid.10. Ibid., p. 8.11. The German word hrlegen means to considercarefully. The Greek form will be legein, logos.Legein is further rooted in apophainesthai whichmeans to bring forward into appearance. See, QCT,p. 8.12. QCT, p. 9.13. Ibid., p. 10 and the footnote 110.9.14. Ibid., p. 11. See the note no. 10 where a clusterof meanings regarding the German word dab htbergen(revealing/unconcealment) is clarified.15. Johnson Puthenpurackal, Heidegger Through AuthenticTotality to Total Authenticity, op.cit., p. 206.16. Ibid., p. 20717. Heidegger, Early Greek Thinking,(New York: Harper &ROW, 19751, p. 26.

18. Johnson Puthenpurackal, Hefdegger: ThroughAuthentic Totality to Total Authenticity, op. ci t.,p.207. In this work the author has prementeddifferent symbols and images that Heidegger hasused to speak of the dual aspect of the truth ofBeing. For details please see p.209 of the samework.19. K T, p. 13.20. Ibid., p. 14.21. Ibid., p. 1622. Ibid., p. 17, and please see the footnote no.16where the translator clarifies the co~otations ofthis German expression especially in relation toGegenstand (object) .23. Ibid., p. 1924. Albert Hofstadter in his translation of Poetry,Language and Thought rendered it as enframing.William Richardson in his contribution to ThomasSheehan ed. Heidegger the Man and the Thinker,op, cit.. translated it as Po-sure. T. Kisielpreferred Corn-posite.25. David Kolb, The Critique of Pure Modernity: Hegel,Heidegger and After, (Chicago: The University ofChicago Press, 19861, pp. 144-45. MichaelZimmerman, Heidegger '8 Confrontation withModernity, op. cit., p. 216. W. Lovitt, "AGesprlch with Heidegger on Technology,' Man andworld 6 (1973). p. 50. Gestell is also the name fora skeleton. Doesn't it contain the suggestion thatthe rule of Gestell may turn everything into avalley of bones? Obviously the reference is toThe Book of Ezakiel in The Old Testament.Ch.37/1-10.

26. There is a similarity in what Heidegger caledGestell and Ernest Jilnger's expression of theGestalt of the worker. Heidegger presented acontribution to the publication in honour ofErnst JUnger, entitled 'Concerning the Line."Please see The Question of Being, translated byWiliam Kluback and Jean T.Wilde,(London: Vision,1956). pp.33-109. Michael Zimmennan, Heidegger'sConfrontation with Modernity, op. cit.. p. 216.27. Destiny of Being is a peculiar Heideggerianexpression. Geschick(destining or mittence)is aparticular type of sending(schickan), that holdsitself back; it is a complex of concealing andrevealing: a withdrawing presencing. Please seeHeidegger, On Time and Being, translated by JoanStambaugh (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), p. 9.28. QCT, p. 24.29. Ibid., p. 26.30. Ibid.31. Ibid., p. 27.32. Ibid.. p. 28.33. Hedegger, Identity and Difference, tanslated byJoan Stambaugh, (New York: Harper Torchbooks,1969). pp. 36-7. 'The event of appropriation' orwhat Heidegger would call it in German as Ereignisis an important Heideggerian notion. In manyrespects it is synonymous with Being. It stands forthe dynamic interplay of concealment andappearance, absence and presnce. It stands forbasic dynamis, the power which does not manifestitself but lets something else be manifest. AlfredHofstadters etymological analysis of the wordrefers to the verb eigen (to make one's own) andhence it refers to the mutual appropriating of theelements of the world; the word also refers to

sight and hence "to place something before theeyes'. Please see Zinunennann, Eclipse of the Self,op. cit., pp. 124, 231-39.34. Cited in Johnson Puthenpurackal, "Technology toEcology: Provocation to Evocation" Paper presentedat the symposium organized by the Departmet ofphilosophy, Goa University, and the Indian Councilof Philosophical Reserarch, 1988.35. QCT, p. 28.36. Heidegger, "The Turning' in K T, p. 42.37. Rebecca Comay, "Framing Redemption: Aura, Origin,Technology in Benjamin and Heidegger; in ArleenB.Dallery & Charles E. Scott ed., Ethics andDanger, (Albany: State University of New York Press,1992). p. 155.38. Ibid.39. QCT, p. 2940. Please see above, note no. 641. QCT, p. 3042. Ibid. Here Heidegger sees the connection betweenthe realities of essence, truth, and saving powerin the verb wahren. Please see the note n0.9 inHeidegger, "The Turning' in KT, p. 42 and alsoin "Scinence and Reflection' in QCT, pp. 164-65.43. Ibid., p. 31. Here Heidegger makes a reference toGoethe who used wA'hren [to endure] and gewahren [togrant] in one unarticulated accord.44. Ibid., p. 32.45. Ibid.46. Ibid.47. Arleen B. Dallery & Charles E. Scott, ed. Ethicsand Danger, op. cit., p. 155.

48. Heidegger, *The Turning' in WT, p. 40.49. KT, p. 34.50. Basic Writings, pp. 149-87. Here in the essay on*The Origin of the Work of Art' Heidegger deal.with the revelatory nature of art as truth.51. Michael Zimmerman, Heidegger 's Confrontation withModernity, op. cit., p. 231.52. Ibid., p. 230.53. It is appropriate to render Gelassenheit asreleasement for, this meaning is related to otherEuropean languages as well. It has the nuances ofsetting free, liberating and abandoning. Accordingto one commentator the English terms of 'composure'and 'calmness' do not convey the original sense ofthe term. Please see Johnson Puthenpurackal,Hidegger: Through Authentic Totality to TotalAuthenticity, op. cit., p. 163, note 3.54. See above, the note no. 48.55. Martin Heidegger. Discourse on Thinking, atranslation of Gelassenheit, by John M. Andersonand E.Hans Freund (New York: Harper Torchbooks,1966). This text contains two seminal essays byHeidegger. The first one is a memorial address inhis hometown Messkirch. The second essay is adiscourse taken from a conversation writtendown in 1944-45 between a scientist, a scholar,and a teacher.56. Discourse on Thinking, p. 54.57. Martin Heidegger, What is Called Thinking,translated by 0. Glean Gray, (New York: Harper hRow, 19681.58. Martin Heidegger. An Introduction to Metaphysics,translated by Relph Manheim, (New Haven: YaleUniversity Press, 19591, pp. 115-96.

59. Martin Heidegger, 'The Principle of Ground" Manand World 9(1974), pp. 207-22.60. Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, op. citp. 118.61. Heidegger, What is Called Thinking? ,op. cit.. p. x62. Ibid., p. 159.63. QCT, p. 112.64. Heidegger. An Introduction to ~etaphysics, op.ci t. ,p. 179.65. Ibid., 182.66. Heidegger, Early Greek Thinking, op. cit.. p. 6067. For the meaning of language as saying please seechapter IV, p. 180ff.68. Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, op. ci t . ,p. 186.69. Ibid., p. 187.70. Ibid., p. 134-35.71. Ibid., p. 275.72. Heidegger, Identity and Difference, op. cit.,pp. 54-5.73. For instance in his "Letter on Humanism. Heideggermaintained that, "Only from the truth of Being canthe essence of the holy [das Heilige] be thought.Only from the essence of the holy is the essence ofdivinity [Gottheit] to be thought. Only in thelight of the essence of divintity can it be thoughtor said what the word 'God' is to signify:Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism' in Basic Writings,p. 230. In his work The Question ConcerningTechnology and Others Essays, op, cit., p. 49, heobserved as follows: "Whether God lives or remainsdead is not decided by the religiosity of men and

even less by the theological aspirations ofphilosophy and natural science. Whether or notGod is God comes disclosingly to pass from out ofand within the constellation of Being."74. Heidegger, An Introudction to Metaphysics, op. ci t.,p. 25.75. QCT, pp. 115-54.76. Ibid., p. 13477. Ibid., p. 15078. Heidegger makes uses of Nietzsche's Thus SpakeZarathustra for developing an imaginative critiqueof representational thinking. See What is CalledThinking? P. 64 f f .79. Martin Heidegger. "The Principle of Ground',translated by Keith Hoeler in Man and World,7 (1994), pp. 207-44.80. Ibid., p. 209.81. Ibid.. p. 21182. Heidegger. What is called Thinking?. op. cit..p. 8.83. Ibid., p. 131.84. Richard Wisser, ed., Martin Heidegger inConversation, translated by B. Srinivasa Murthy(New Delhi: Arnold-Heinemann, 1977). p. 42.85. Ibid.86. Heidegger, What is Called Thinking?, op. cit.,p. 134.87. Heidegger, "The Age of the World Picture" in KT.pp. 120-2488. Heidegger , An Introduction to Metaphysics, op. ci t . ,p. 128.

89. Ibid., p. 134.90. Ibid., p. 174.91. Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking, op. cit., p. 54.92. Meister Eckhart was born at Hochheim in 1260. Hewas a great mystic and belonged to the Dominicanreligious order. He held important positions in theOrder and his =itings are found in the form ofsermons, many of which were beyond the times. Hewas branded as a heretic which was quite common inthose days and was condemned by Pope John XXII. Hedied on his way to Avignon to meet the Pope around1327/28.93. Reiner Schiirmann, "Heidegger and Meister Eckhart onReleasement" Research in Phenomenology, 3(1975),pp. 96-100.94. The best studies on this topic are that of ReinerSchiirmann mentioned above and John D. Caputo, TheMystical Element in Heideger's Thought, (Athens:Ohio university Press, 1978) .95. These terms are found mainly in Discourse onThinking and What is called Thinking? Please seethe detailed reference in Johnson J. PuthenpurackalHeidegger: Through Authentic Totality to TotalAuthenticity, op. cit., pp. 131-32, note no. 72.96. Heidegger, What is Called Thinking?, op.cit.,p. 113.97. Ibid., p. 115.98. Ibid., p. 117.99. Ibid., p. 118.100. Ibid., p. 121.101. Es gibt Sein (It gives Being) is an importantnotion in Heidegger. He elaborates this concept in

his "Letter on Humanism." Please see, BasicWritings, pp. 214-16.102. Specially see Johnson J. Puthenpurackal,Heidegger: Through Authentic Totality to TotalAuthenticity, og. cit., pp. 133-44 & 177-80.103. Heidegger, What is Called Thinking?, op. cit.,p. 134.104. Johnson Puthenpurackal, Heidegger: ThroughAuthentic Totality to Total Authenticity, opcit., p. 157.105. Peter Kreeft, "Zen in Heidegger's Gelassenheit,"International Philosophical Quarterly, ll(1971).p. 526.106. Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking, op. cit., p. 73.107. Ibid., p. 66, note no.1.108. Ibid109. Please see the not no. 16 in JohnsonPuthenpurackal, Heidegger: Through AuthenticTotality to Total Authenticity, op. cit., p. 166.Here the author elaborates the spatio-temporalmeaning implied in the German word. The Englishequivalents of which will be against (spatial) andaround (temporal).110. Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking , p. 67.111. Ibid., p. 73.112. Ibid., p. 76.113. Ibid., p. 59.114. Ibid., p. 60.115. Ibid., p. 60.117. Ibid., p. 55118. Ibid.

119. Ibid.120. Ibid., p. 54.121. The path (Wege) is so important to him that whilehe was preparing the Gesmtausgabe (collectedworks) he seems to have insisted that the editorfollows the Wege, nicht Werke (the way, not theworks )chapter fV1. Homelessness and rootlessness are the plight of thetechnological man. It is significant in thiscontext to recall Heidegger's commentary onHBlderlin's poem "Homecoming: Please see,Heidegger. Existence and Being, op. cit., pp. 256-58. Homelessness is a term Heidegger uses in TheQuestion of Being, op. cit., p. 37. One canrecognize Heidegger's emphagis on rootedness in"Why do I stay in the Provinces?" Please see,Thomas Sheehan, Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker,op. cit., pp. 27-8. It may be noted that oftendwelling is used along with the preposition 'in,'that is, dwelling in. However, Heidegger uses itfrom an ontological perspective without anypreposition.2, Johnson Puthenpurackal, Heidegger: ThroughAuthentic Totality to Total Authenticity, op. cit.,p. 158.3, Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, translated byAlbert Hofstadter, (New York: Harper & Row, 1971).(hereafter as Poetry, Language, Thought) Theseessays were written around 1951-52 and theycompliment What is Called Thinking?4. 1t is singnificant that he writes these threeconcepts without the break of punctuations. By this

he wants to convey that these realities are aunified phenomenon.5. Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 145.6, Ibid., p. 146.7. Heidegger has creatively adopted Jacob Grim'sexegesis to the question at hand. For furtherdetails please see, Walter J.Strohrer, "Heideggerand Jacob Grim: On Dwelling and the Genesis ofLanguage,' Modern Schoolman, 42(November 1984)43-51.8, Ibid., p. 1479, Ibid10, Ibid., p. 14811, Ibid., p. 14912. The term 'Geviert' is a combination of vier whichmeans number four and the prefix ge signifiescollection. So it means a 'collection of four.' Itis rendered in English as the Fourfold though someCommentators translate it as 'the foursome' and'the quadrate.'13. Ibid.14, Ibid.15, In Being and Time Heidegger made a reference todeath and perishing. Please see, p. 291.16. Ibid., p. 179.17, Ibid., p. 150.18. Heidegger never gives a detailed explanation ofexpressions suchs as *to receive the sky as sky' or'to save the earth as earth' etc. However, from thecontext it can be understood that it is tocultivate a non-exploitative attitude to theFourfold that he has in mind.

19. Ibid. p. 151.20. J.L. Mehta, The Philosophy of Martin Heidegger,(New York: Harper Torchbooks, 19711, p. 220.21. Heidegger, The Question of Being, op. cit., p. 83.22. Ibid., p. 159.23. Ibid., p. 161.24. Ibid., p. 160.25. Ibid.26. This question is the title of one of his seminars.It was published as What is a Thing?, translated byW.B.Barton, Jr. and Vera Deutsch, (Chicago: HenryRegnery Company, 1967).27, Heidegger, What is a Thing?, pp. 6-7.28. Poetry, Language, and ~hought, pp. 172-7329. Ibid.30. Ibid.. p. 174.31. Ibid.32, Ibid., p. 175.33. "Roman thought takes over the Greek words withouta corresponding, equally authentic experience ofwhat they say, without the Greak word." Heidegger,"On the Origin of Art Works" in Poetry, Language,Thought, p. 23 .34. Ibid., p. 177.35. Ibid., p. 181.36. Ibid.37. Vinncent Vycinas, Earth and Gods, op. cit., p. 225.38. Heidegger, "On the Origin of Works of Arts" inPoetry, Language, and Thought, pp. 26-32.

39. Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 23. Joseph,Kockelmanns, Heidegger on Art and Art works, (TheHague: Marrinus Nijhoff, 1985), p. 114.40. Poetry. Language, Thought, p. 24.41. Ibid.42. This notion is developed in Chapter two. Please seeabove, p. 95.43. Ibid. p. 26.44. cited in Kockelmans, Heidegger on Art works,op. cit., p. 121.45. Poetry, Language, and Thought, pp. 213-2946. Friedrich Holderlin (1770-1843) was known as asolitary poet with an idealistic bent of mind. Hewas known for his odes and elegies. W.Diltheypublished a study on him in 1867. Holderlin was acontemporary of Schelling. His important poems areAnkenken, Die Wanderung, Der Rhein. From 1807 to along period of 36 years he was in a sanitorium ofTubingen. He was thirty two years when his creativepowers began to fail him. Holderlins's poetryexercised a strong power of attraction overHeidegger in his effort to explicate the fate ofmodernity. For urther details on Hblderlin's lifeand works, please see Philsophy Today 37 (1994) thewhole issue and Werner Brock,s account of the FourEssays in Heidegger. Existence and Being, op. ci t.,p. 217.47. Heidegger, Existence and Being, pp. 293-315.48. Poetry, Language , and Thought, p. 221.49. William Richardosn, Heidegger: ThroughPhenomenology to Thought, op. cit., p. 44450. Joseph Kockelmans, Heidegger on Art and Art works,op. cit., p. 194.

51. Poetry, Language, and Thought, p.215.52. Ibid., p. 192.53. Ibid., p. 193.54. This is the concern of his essays in On the Way toLanguage. Please see Heidegger, On the Way toLanguage, op. cit., pp. 57ff.55. Walter Biemel. "Poetry and Language in Heidegeer,in Christopher Macann ed., Heidegger: CriticalAssessments, (London: Routledge, 1992), ~01.111,p. 233.56. Poetry, Language , Thought, p. 198.57. William Richardson, Hediegger: ThroughPhenomenology to Thought, op. cit., p. 452.58. Please note that here Heidegger develops theseideas in the context of a commentary on Tarkel'spoetry, namely, A Winter Evening. Please see.Poetry, Language, Thought, pp. 194-99.59. Heidegger, On the Way to Language, op. cit., p. 93.60. Ibid., p. 91.61. Walter Biemel, "Poetry and language in Heidegger"in Christopher Macann, ed., Martin Heidegger:Critical Assessments, op. cit., Vol.111, p. 240.62. Ibid.63. Heidegger, On the Way to Language, op. cit., p. 107.64. One can find the use of this expression in "Letteron Humanism," "A ~ilaogue on Language," and "TheNature of Language..65. Basic Writings, p. 193.66. Ibid., p. 243.67. Heidegger, On the Way to Language, op.cit., p. 135.

68. Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, op.cit..pp. 87-92.69. Ibid., p. 88.70. Ibid71. Heidegger, On the Way to Language, op. cit., p. 26.72. Ibid., p. 26-27.73. Ibid., p. 5.74. Basic Writings, p. 210 & 221.75. Ibid., p. 221.76. Johnson Puthenpurackal, Heidegger: ThroughAuthentic Totlaity to Totatl Authenticity, op.cit., p. 201.77. Friedrich-William von Herrmann. "The flower of themouth': Hblderlin's hint for Heidegger's thinkingof the essence of language." in ChristorpherMacann, ed., Heidegger: Critical Assessments,op. cit., Vol.111. p. 278.Chapter V1. Vide, p. 54.2. Vide, p.60-4.3. Being and Time, p. 67.4. Vide, p. 63.5. Vide, pp. 67-71.6. Vide, p. 76.7. Vide, p. 86-91.8. Vide, pp.93-101.9. Vide, p. 105.10. Vide, p. 11.

11. Vide, p. 120.12. Vide, p. 124.13. Vide, p. 132.14. Vide, p. 137.15. Vide, pp. 150-60.16. Vide, pp. 169-71.17. Vide, pp. 171-7518. Vide. p. 179.19. Vide, pp. 187-90.20. Vide, p. 195.21. Vide, pp. 198-200.22. Vide, p. 174.23. Heidegger, Poetry, Langauge, and Thought, op. cit..p. 161.24. Heidegger, Scheling(l936), cited in Graham Parkesed. Heidegger and Asian Thought (Honolulu:University of Hawai Press, 1990), p. 160.25. It may be noted that Graham Parkes' Heidegger andAsian Thought(Honolu1u: University of Hawai Press,1989) is an attempt to see the relevance ofHeideggerian thinking from the pespective of Asianthought.26. Heidegger, An Introduction of Metaphysics, op. ci t.,p. 198.27. Heidegger, Lecture Course on the Sophist,l924 ascited in Jacques Taminiaux, Heidegger and theProject of Fundamental Ontology (New York: StateUniversity of New York Press, 19911, p. 1.

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