STATES OF EMERGENCY - Patrick Lagadec

50 Technological crises and the actors involvedI have to add that we were learning the technique as we went along. We'dworked all the farmers' sump pumps really hard, but after two or three days,the farmers didn't want to lend them any more. They said, "Our pumps aregoing to be ruined by the oil." So there was a meeting with union leaders - Ihad meetings all the time. Resulting in a written promise from me that therepairs would be covered by the overall "war" organization. I said, "We haveto move now, as fast as possible, because in a few days, when that stuffthickens, we won't be able to use the same techniques."P.L.: And you - as the cornerstone of the whole system, what worried youmost?M. BECAM: The thing seemed so immense that... What worried me themost was Easter at Portsall. The situation was getting worse, going downhillevery day. The more we picked up, the more there was. I thought to myself,"There's no way... It's going to kill us! There's no way. We aren't going tomake it."Of course I never said so. Of course I said the opposite. I kept that out ofany conversation. But inside, I thought, "My boy, there's no way. It's goingto kill us, we're going to die, this business will wear us out. And the goo isgetting thicker." It was like watching the end of the world.Yet we had more and more equipment - special skimmers costing 10,000Francs a day per machine - and soldiers from everywhere. I went to seethem, I used my authority to demand that showers be installed within 24hours in a given building (because the soldiers who were going home had tobe able to wash). Sometimes I ate with them at the mess. Me, in the midst ofthe war.What worried me the most was to think, "We're never going to overcomethe problem."Then the debate came wide open: "Wouldn't it be better to mine the shipand cause a massive spill, instead of fighting this interminable flow ? " Sowith the admiral, we decided to mine the ship. I took the responsibility,because those were the rules.P.L.: What were the moments when things could have gotten out ofcontrol?M. BECAM: There was the debate that started - after the fact — about myfirst decision not to burn the tanker. After I had taken charge of theoperation, at least eight days after the fact, the Spanish experts came and said,"You should have burned it." A week earlier, everything pointed in onedirection: "Don't fire it, the consequences would be too great." A week later,the question was open again: "If Becam had agreed to bum it on the first day,things wouldn't be where they are now." What's more, certain localpoliticians, including my friend Senator Georges Lombard (a former mayorof Brest), agreed with these outsiders, even in the press.P.L.: Could the situation have begun to fester? Could the rumor havespread, say, that the oil was toxic, or that the clean-up workers were all goingto develop cancer?