STATES OF EMERGENCY - Patrick Lagadec

38 Technical breakdown, crisis and destabilizationAt this point, a general feeling of powerlessness and disgust sets in. Thiswas visible in the aftermath of the gas explosion in Mexico City in 1984. Theidea was formulated in the press: this time, there isn't even a crisis, we're justwaiting for the next disaster. "The government, as is its custom, won't domuch. It will wait for time to calm people's minds and make them forget itall." This judgment, rendered by the opposition newspaper Proceso onOctober 26, 1984, seemed indeed to summarize a feeling that was general,even among the forces in power.No on speaks anymore across the barricades and the partitions. Everyoneis busy hunting for ammunition, and any excuse is seized upon to avoidclarifying even the slightest aspect of the situation. The crisis becomesincreasingly independent of the original event. The fundamental points thatshould have been discussed - controlling technology, managing development- are forgotten in favor of a sort of Brownian motion that soon sweeps upeverything in its path.Self-sustaining crisisThe case become a gnawing abscess, attracting masses of difficulties andanguish totally unrelated to the original event. At this point, the crisis carriesus beyond the scope of this work...This is the frame of reference. Obviously, its brings together too manydifficulties in a single picture for us to recognize any single situation in it -thank goodness. Nonetheless, there are multiple ways in which a majoraccident can profoundly destabilize the social system, or a minor accident canunleash excessive turmoil. Everything comes down to a question of thebalance between the strength of die external disturbance and the context inwhich it strikes.This general frame of reference should solicit serious efforts to analyze,organize, and learn from it. And some fundamental questions need to beasked. As we have seen, deeply preoccupying threats hover on the horizon -systems may be so severely out of balance that even a major catastrophe willnot trigger any corrective reaction. The task here is not so simply to design aseries of techniques for keeping periodic outbreaks under control - crisismanagement only takes on meaning when it becomes part of a process thattakes into account a multi-layered socio-economic reality. Clearly the task isnot a simple one.To set the process in motion, it seems best at this point to delve into theexperience of those who have been through this type of situation and facedthese questions. This approach has a twofold advantage: we can gain preciousinsight from seeing how officials confronted the great unknowns and themultiple facets of crisis; equally precious insights are to be found incomparing a variety of points of view - those of the victim, the journalist, the