STATES OF EMERGENCY - Patrick Lagadec

36 Technical breakdown, crisis and destabilizationcomplexity present to greater or lesser degrees in any post-accidentalsituation.Bhopal: For Union Carbide, each line of questioning threatened to becomea terrible trap:- Where the same safety measures taken in Bhopal as in the United States?If not, the door was open to a battle over the exploitation of third worldcountries. If so, then sharp tension would begin to build around the similarAmerican site.- What immediate measures did the company intend to take? It could stopproducing methylisocyanate (MIC) until it was able to understand what hadhappened in Bhopal. But could a strategy be based on that decision, knowingthat collecting information would be long and difficult? And why not stopproduction of chemicals that were even more worrisome, such as chlorine,manufactured and transported in much greater quantities?- Was Union Carbide's safety policy adequate to meet such risks? Therethe answer had to be yes. But if so, how could anyone account for theavalanche of problems observed (or revealed) at Bhopal, including designflaws, faulty maintenance, insufficient prevention efforts, and poorly trainedpersonnel? In its January 28, 1985 feature, the New York Times identifiedten procedural violations. Could it be claimed that the Indians wereresponsible for operating the plant? Of course, but no one could pretend thatthe headquarters in Danbury had not given close attention to problems UnionCarbide qualified as having "absolute priority." Nor could there be anyquestion of laying all the blame on the Indians - both at present and in thefuture, interests in India and elsewhere closed off that alternative.- Could the company pay? Here again, the answer had to be yes. But athin line had to be trodden: generating excessive confidence in its capacitiescould lead the plaintiffs (and their many lawyers) to raise the stakes, and thatwould change the entire picture.- What basis would be used to calculate indemnities? If North Americanstandards were applied, doubts could be raised as to the firm's financialcapacities. If standards more appropriate to the country involved were used,the strategically volatile debate on multinationals vs. the third world couldblow open again. One more detail: the firm still had to face attacks fromwithin, as its own shareholders were undertaking legal action against theboard of directors for placing their investments at risk.On the Indian side, the situation was also awkward. The local subsidiaryheld undeniable responsibilities. The Americans couldn't be blamed for urbanplanning problems (except for having provided insufficient information onthe product). Even small efforts to inform the public could have saved a greatmany human lives. Also, the connections between the subsidiary'smanagement and top-ranking local officials raised eyebrows: both belonged tothe same party as the prime minister, and elections were close at hand (11,12, 13, 14).