STATES OF EMERGENCY - Patrick Lagadec

210 Technological crises and the actors involvedtechnical difficulties we were encountering. If the containers had leaked, onething is for sure: we would have been too late. If I can make one generalremark on the information aspect, the public imagines that there exists aplace where we know everything and can do anything. It has the idea thatthere is a sort of all-knowing central office. This explains the frequentsuspicion that secrets are being kept. In the reports I received, I don't everremember reading anything that didn't reach the press, and my motto wasalways "Openness".P.L.: Now more specifically, how were you, as Prime Minister, plungedinto this matter on Saturday, August 25, 1985?L. FABIUS: First I was informed: "There are sunken containers, we don'tknow exactly where." I asked, "Is it serious or not? How might the problemevolve?" Answer: "It's not really serious, but..." I asked, "What can we do?"Answer: "Not much, and besides, because of where the ship went down, it'swithin another country's competence." I then gave the order to the ministersinvolved to follow the matter with extreme attention and to report back tome. The rest is history.It's important to emphasize that in certain areas (airline hijacking, forexample), more of the kinks have been worked out of crisis management. Assoon as a problem arises, specific procedures are brought into play. Thesehave developed bit by bit, from one trying experience to another. We knowthe role of each minister involved, the messages that have to be sent, thespecific actions to be taken - beginning negotiations, finding a spokesman,and so on. In technological crisis situations, there is not only a proceduralproblem, but a technical one as well - and that's where the actors are often ata loss. This is why I think that longer term efforts, like those made byHaroun Tazieff (on the issue of earthquakes in the Mediterranean basin, inparticular, or on river flooding) offer an excellent approach. You need tohave a view of the long run.Our administrations already have enough trouble trying to deal with whatcan be foreseen (look at the problems we run into in fighting forest fires,even though they happen every year). They are often helpless when facedwith unforeseen difficulties.P.L.: And why, in your opinion, is there an almost cultural resistance tothinking about things that aren't immediate emergencies?L. FABIUS: Is it part of human nature, or is it a specific characteristic ofFrench government? I note in any case - and I regret - that we tend tobelieve that what has been prefigures exactly what will be, and what is urgentcomes before what is important. These are grave errors.P.L.: But we are going to have to manage increasingly complex systems,which are going to continue to generate unforeseen events. Don't we run therisk, in your opinion, of encountering more and more pitfalls?L. FABIUS: That's the risk. And I suppose you are dealing with thefollowing question in your own work: what kind of governmental,administrative, or social organization is best equipped to prepare for andrespond to a crisis? For me, the most advanced societies are those that have