STATES OF EMERGENCY - Patrick Lagadec

170 Technological crises and the actors involvedseverely, you can still do something - provided you realize that the mea culpacan't be used over and over.Now let's look at the question of an extreme situation. Let's say we learnthat a radioactive cloud is hanging over France, and no one knows when theweather will drive it away. We're pushing the example to the limit, but let'ssuppose this scenario could happen. If I were an official then, I wouldimmediately do two things: call together a crisis team at the highest level, andannounce a press conference. During the press conference, I would give afirst description of the problem, even if I had very little information - atleast you can stop wild speculation and narrow the definition of the hazards.But I think I would try to communicate on a second level, and to transmitthis message: "I'm going to inform you, I'm going to give you information,even if I'm not able to interpret it. I'll try to bring it gradually into focus." Inother words, I'd create a climate of trust. Then I could count on receptivepartners when it came time to give instructions (whether general or specific)or reduce the level of vigilance. Above all, I'd try to tell myself,"Information is too dangerous to be left by the wayside, hi this country, thereare too many people who have information for us to be able to give this eventthe silent treatment. So I might as well be an information source. I have to becredible and establish trusting relationships right away."What if I don't? I have to realize that on the other side, everything isready to track down information. Here's an example from our own methods:in Paris, when there were the terrorist bombings in 1985, we were neverinformed (of course the police had other things to do besides call us in thosecases). So, we retrained one of our men and bought him a high-frequencyscanner. He spends all day with his ear glued to the scanner. Now we're outthere at the first indication. In other words, when there is no satisfactorymethod, you make due with something else, but you always find a way. So ifthere were a major accident, I'd have to do everything possible to reassurepeople that I would give them information.P.L.: Nonetheless, there remains a substantial danger, that ofsystematically going too far to protect or develop credibility. In that case,when there was the slightest incident, an official might decide, as a preventivemeasure, to stop everything. In other words, to be a macho: "Look howserious I am, you can trust me, I'll stop the whole works." That's temptingfor an official more concerned with image than with the general impact of anaction. Isn't there a danger of the pendulum's swinging too far in the otherdirection?PH. DESSAINT: It's true that the danger exists: imagine evacuating Lyons(population 800,000) when there's an incident next door in Villeurbanne. Ingeneral, I'd say that just as handling a crisis technically withoutcommunicating is a grave mistake, management communication withouttechnical knowledge is also disastrous. What's needed is to measure the rangeof potential dangers with the specialists, then, based on this diagnosis, to