STATES OF EMERGENCY - Patrick Lagadec

Introduction 7Look for example at the magnificent account given by the specialists whohave succeeded in inventing catastrophe medicine (18) and who have shownhow pertinent persistently developed skills can be in handling situations likethe terrorist attacks on Paris-Orly Airport in 1983 or on department stores inFrance and England in 1986, or numerous other catastrophes. Look howFrance's second PCB "scandal", striking the suburbs of Lyons in 1986,avoided so many of the pitfalls encountered in the first case, in Rheims (19)(20). Consider the successful response given by Johnson & Johnson in theUnited States (21), where thoughtful preparation saved the company frombeing overwhelmed by the Tylenol cyanide capsule menaces in 1982 (whichnevertheless left seven dead, required the recall of 31 million bottles, and cost$100 million) and again in 1986 (with a death toll of one and the recall ofmillions more bottles at a cost of $150 million).4. Finally, to strategic and philosophical objections, we would oppose ourconviction that every-man-for-himself policies rarely stimulate progress foranyone whatsoever, and least of all for those who cherished the illusion thatthey would reap the primary benefits.We have therefore chosen to pursue our goal of working for a betterunderstanding and control of crisis phenomena - but we remain prudent, andwe keep the above list of objections posted at Mission Control. Above all, thediscussion must always remain open. After all, the purpose of seeking bettercontrol over crisis situations should not to encourage such madness tocontinue. Take the example of a megalopolis like Mexico City: five millioninhabitants live without a sewer system, threatened with formidable publichealth problems; the levels of lead pollution in the air are so high that braindamage in children is a clear and present danger. As this extreme case shows,the priority should not be to pile up the safety systems, but rather toundertake fundamental structural transformations. The point is not to acquiremagnificent resources that blockade us in dead ends. Crisis management canfurnish a safety net against breakdowns. It must not become an alibi foruntenable situations.The first step: collecting and analyzing experienceThis book is first and foremost an investigation of experience: how did thepeople placed in charge of technological crisis situations react, and what didthey learn?This was the approach suggested by Richard Thornburgh, governor ofPennsylvania during the Three Mile Island crisis. At the New Yorkconference mentioned earlier, the governor presented a day-by-day accountof his own experience. Explaining why he had bothered to write this report,he was adamant: simply because he found himself alone, with no references,at a time when he had to confront the world's first significant failure in anuclear power plant. His key phrase was, "... if one of my colleagues alreadyhad experienced a nuclear emergency like Three Mile Island, and had