STATES OF EMERGENCY - Patrick Lagadec

6 Introductionwhich any real questioning is stifled before it can be heard; a scientific andtechnical integrity, necessitated by the complexity and the impact of thesubject to be discussed; and an in-depth consideration of our majororganizations, rarely equipped to meet these new and complex challenges - ofhow they work and what their very cultural basis is. We will also begin tolook at questions and issues that are much harder to define: consistently sweptunder the rug, they reassert themselves forcefully when a major technicalbreakdown presents an occasion.Can crises be "managed"?Any project has inherent limits and dangers, and this one is no exception tothe rule. It was of course greeted enthusiastically, especially by thoses figureswho one day had to face the storm alone.But it is important to acknowledge the objections that are raised regularlyabout this kind of work :1. It is useless: every situation is unique, so one person's experience is ofno use to another.2. The approach could be harmful to organizational development: becausethe systems will be better equipped, they may muffle crises that should beallowed to explode, since some situations can only be resolved throughconvulsion.3. The effort is vain: anyone who knows how organizations work knowsthey couldn't care less about profound transformation. Don't expect anythingbeyond a short-term effort to get over the difficult moments and avoidmaking any substantial changes.4. The project itself is unacceptable: it takes a typically conservativeapproach. True innovation comes through profound crisis and radicalupheaval, which supply the levers necessary to change.In reply, we should specify the following points:1. Though every case is specific, they all nevertheless present constantsthat can be very effectively examined.2. Our purpose is not to propose an emergency repair manual or atechnique for circumventing the real issues. The temptation there is alreadytoo great, as Henry Kissinger reminds us: "In high office competing pressurestempt one to believe that an issue deferred is a problem avoided; more oftenit is a crisis invited" (17). And of course we can paraphrase Montesquieu'shypothesis in order to unveil the illusions of those who would confusetackling crisis with performing magic tricks: if a social organization findsitself severely destabilized by an event, it is because the overall conditionsexisted to give that event a supreme destabilizing power. There can be noquestion here of attempting a merely superficial treatment.3. There are many ways to justify the pessimism about the actual will andcapacity to make changes. However, we think it possible to reply that at thevery least, there are specific points for which improvements can be made.