Africa's Missing Billions - Oxfam International
Africa's Missing Billions - Oxfam International Africa's Missing Billions - Oxfam International
Faso increased military investments by 52.6 per cent in 1999 andcontinued spending in 2000. 79An inflow of refugees can be costly and the return of migrant workerscan lead to a major decrease in remittances. This was particularlysignificant for Burkina Faso, where several hundred thousandBurkinabé from Côte d’Ivoire stopped sending home remittances –where previously such remittances made up 70 per cent of financialprivate net transfers. 80‘War overhang’: long-term costsOur calculation has only looked at the period of armed conflict.However, economists find that economies often remain essentially atconflict levels for many years; this ‘war overhang’ is more commonthan the expected ‘peace dividend’. 81If, during peacetime, the average military spending of a developingcountry amounts to 2.8 per cent of its GDP, this increases to aroundfive per cent during civil war, 82 and remains elevated to 4.5 per centduring the first post-conflict decade. 83 Mortality rates also remainhigh: approximately half of lost years of life expectancy arise after theviolence is over, mainly due to degraded health and sanitationconditions. 84Economies also change. Economic behaviour shifts towards activitieswhich bring short-term returns. In Angola, landmines have createdan extra burden, as land remains inaccessible and unproductive. Themovement of people from rural to urban areas during armed conflictsis not reversed; Freetown in Sierra Leone and Monrovia, Liberia haveseen their populations triple. 85 As well as rapid urbanisationincreasing the likelihood of armed violence, 86 it can lead to labourshortages in rural areas, slowing down reconstruction, and can boostthe informal economy in urban areas. In Somaliland andMozambique, informal economies that provided a basic means ofsurvival in wartime have been partly responsible for the collapse offormal rural market networks and have been an obstacle to postconflictreconstruction. 874 Where do Africa’s weapons of warcome from?What weapons are used in Africa’s conflicts?This section focuses on the most numerous weapons used in Africa’sconflicts: small arms and light weapons. However, it is worth18Africa’s missing billions, IANSA, Oxfam, and Saferworld, October2007
underlining that heavy weapons have played a major role in some ofAfrica’s conflicts with a very heavy humanitarian and economic toll.To identify which small arms are used in Africa’s conflicts, weinvestigated arms collection programmes and government stockpiles.Arms collection programmes: We collected quantified informationfrom seven arms collections in Africa, mostly as part of Disarmament,Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes (in SouthSudan, Nigeria, Mozambique, Uganda, Central African Republic, theRepublic of Congo, and Sierra Leone), and received anecdotal/nonquantifiedevidence from seven other sources. 88 A wide variety ofweapons was reported, but the Kalashnikov assault rifle and itsderivatives (the most well-known being the AK-47), were ranked asthe first or second most numerous weapon in every case.Government stockpiles: An examination of government inventoriesrevealed that the most popular assault rifles are from the Kalashnikovfamily: 27 countries hold the AK-47 and 28 countries hold the AKM. 89Government forces are not the only users of weapons from statestockpiles. Rebel army groups and bandits typically obtain their armsand ammunition by seizing them from police and army stockpiles.This was illustrated during the 1990s in conflicts in the Republic ofCongo, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Somalia. 90And while the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda hasstockpiles of weapons obtained many years ago, it continuallyacquires weapons by capturing them from Ugandan defence forces.The primary weapons used by the LRA are Kalashnikov derivatives –most commonly Chinese Type 56. 91This problem is compounded by the fact that many Africangovernments distribute arms to non-state forces. Recipients might bemilitias in-country, militias in other countries, or ‘local defenceforces’. The governments generally do not have adequate ‘commandand control’ over the groups using these weapons and there is anincreased risk of diversion of these weapons to the illicit trade.Thus the most commonly used weapon in Africa’s conflict zones isthe Kalashnikov and its derivatives.The rest of this section looks exclusively at weapons used inAfrica’s conflicts rather than in crime, due to length constraints.However, it is worth noting that whilst criminals in other countriesmight typically use handguns, military assault rifles are oftenfound in the hands of African criminals, particularly where DDRprogrammes have been inadequate. For example, in Cameroon’sNorthern Region, more than half the highway bandits are former19Africa’s missing billions, IANSA, Oxfam, and Saferworld, October2007
- Page 4 and 5: abuse human rights and ignore the r
- Page 6 and 7: conflict is one important factor in
- Page 8 and 9: Using the definitions from the Heid
- Page 10 and 11: Table 1: Selected country results f
- Page 12 and 13: Table 2: Key costs to the national
- Page 14 and 15: Direct costs, with a focus on medic
- Page 16 and 17: example, tend to be major losers in
- Page 20 and 21: combatants and have brought their w
- Page 22 and 23: Exactly quantifying African product
- Page 24 and 25: principles of customary internation
- Page 26 and 27: Diversion from stockpiles: As state
- Page 28 and 29: Appendix: Methodology for cost toAf
- Page 30 and 31: Notes1 International Action Network
- Page 32 and 33: Education in Africa: $5bn/year, fro
- Page 34 and 35: 65http://www.oxfam.org.uk/applicati
- Page 36 and 37: 104 Amnesty International, IANSA, a
- Page 38: © The International Action Network
Faso increased military investments by 52.6 per cent in 1999 andcontinued spending in 2000. 79An inflow of refugees can be costly and the return of migrant workerscan lead to a major decrease in remittances. This was particularlysignificant for Burkina Faso, where several hundred thousandBurkinabé from Côte d’Ivoire stopped sending home remittances –where previously such remittances made up 70 per cent of financialprivate net transfers. 80‘War overhang’: long-term costsOur calculation has only looked at the period of armed conflict.However, economists find that economies often remain essentially atconflict levels for many years; this ‘war overhang’ is more commonthan the expected ‘peace dividend’. 81If, during peacetime, the average military spending of a developingcountry amounts to 2.8 per cent of its GDP, this increases to aroundfive per cent during civil war, 82 and remains elevated to 4.5 per centduring the first post-conflict decade. 83 Mortality rates also remainhigh: approximately half of lost years of life expectancy arise after theviolence is over, mainly due to degraded health and sanitationconditions. 84Economies also change. Economic behaviour shifts towards activitieswhich bring short-term returns. In Angola, landmines have createdan extra burden, as land remains inaccessible and unproductive. Themovement of people from rural to urban areas during armed conflictsis not reversed; Freetown in Sierra Leone and Monrovia, Liberia haveseen their populations triple. 85 As well as rapid urbanisationincreasing the likelihood of armed violence, 86 it can lead to labourshortages in rural areas, slowing down reconstruction, and can boostthe informal economy in urban areas. In Somaliland andMozambique, informal economies that provided a basic means ofsurvival in wartime have been partly responsible for the collapse offormal rural market networks and have been an obstacle to postconflictreconstruction. 874 Where do Africa’s weapons of warcome from?What weapons are used in Africa’s conflicts?This section focuses on the most numerous weapons used in Africa’sconflicts: small arms and light weapons. However, it is worth18Africa’s missing billions, IANSA, <strong>Oxfam</strong>, and Saferworld, October2007
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