Download Report - Independent Evaluation Group - World Bank

31events and to the recommendations of Bank missions. Also, it was not capable toneutralize abuses that undermined the implementation or the success of somecomponents. Finally - and most importantly – it failed to take advantage of the programto formulate and develop pro-poor policies and build effective mechanisms to reducepoverty and inequality as well as the urban-rural disparity.7. Lessons7.1 The following lessons emerge from the assessment.• The record of fragile political stability in Madagascar pleads for designing policydevelopment operations in a flexible manner based either on a menu-based approachto tranche release, or preferably, or on a programmatic series of one-trancheoperations with prior actions.• Given Madagascar's relatively low absorptive capacity, TA operations forsupporting reforms should be well focused and have limited objectives initially aimedat implementation bottlenecks.• Νew institutions in Madagascar need continued assistance from the donorcommunity. Establishing new institutions does not ensure their effective operations.Continued support is required, for example, to strengthen the different regulatoryauthorities created in the public service sectors and competition in general, as well asthe business framework. Similarly, continued assistance is needed to strengthen thejudiciary, which is a long term undertaking.• Consideration should be given to revive the Private Sector Support Fund, whichproved successful, or to set up a similar scheme to promote PSD.• The tax effort in Madagascar is particularly low. Much greater attention than inthe past should be given by the authorities and by the Bank to revenue mobilizationand reallocation of public resources for poverty reduction, without which recentimprovements in social indicators will not be sustained.