Download Report - Independent Evaluation Group - World Bank

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25(iv) after the crisis, the new government had launched a series of emergency measures totackle corruption and strengthen public financial management (see para. 6.22 below). 266.11 Upon completing the review, the Credit was restructured and the conditions forthird tranche release revised, with a notable shift in favor of governance and financialmanagement. Some conditions were amended, others deleted, and still others added. Thecore measure relating to air transport was amended from the sale of a majority of sharesin Air Madagascar to the signing of a management contract. The additional measures 2,4, 7 and 8 were modified as discussed below. Annex D lists the changes in detail. On thewhole, the conditions were substantially diluted: not only were they less constraining, butthey essentially confirmed measures taken since the end of the crisis in June/July 2002,thus ratifying a de facto situation. GOM and the Bank agreed on a supplement to theoriginal LDP and on amendments to the DCA. The Board approved the restructuring inSeptember 2002 and the tranche was released in October 2002.Achievements under Economic Management6.12 Up to the end of 2001, macro-economic stability was maintained. Growthreached an average of 5.2 percent over 1999-2001 due to the good performance of privateinvestment, in particular of foreign direct investment (FDI) in textiles, petroleum, andmobile telephony, with a large spillover effect on small businesses and employment.There was also a substantial increase in tourism. Inflation remained contained, hoveringjust below 10 percent per year. But tax revenues continued to perform poorly, stagnatingat an average of 10.6 percent of GDP over 1999-01 as a result of tax exemptions, weaktax administration, and widespread fraud in the run-up to the presidential elections of2001. The fiscal deficit rose from an average of 5.6 percent of GDP over 1996-98 to anaverage of 6.3 percent over 1999-01 (Table 1 in Section 4). The crisis led to a dramaticreversal in performance, with GDP falling by 12.7 percent in 2002, and investment from18.5 percent of GDP in 2001 to 14.3 percent. 27 After the crisis, the economy reboundedwith a cumulative growth rate of about 15 percent over 2003-04.Achievements under Privatization and Competitive Regulatory Frameworks6.13 The LDP specified that the state had total or partial ownership of about 136enterprises and that, by June 30, 2000, it would sell its controlling interests in—orproceed with liquidations of—46 of these, i.e., the list of May 1997 plus TELMA.However, SAC-II included specific conditions only for BTM, SOLIMA, TELMA, andAir Madagascar. As a result, and as noted earlier, SAC-II focused on these latter threeand on concluding BTM’s transaction, which was a condition of second tranche release.Divestiture of the other PEs continued to be carried out under the PATESP.6.14 The sale of BTM was completed in November 1999. In the petroleum sector, theregulatory framework and regulatory body became operational in September 1999, but26 During the crisis, corruption had flourished, public resources squandered, and the President’ Special Funds overspentto the tune of US$25 million vs. a budgeted amount of US$400,000.27 The largest drop was in FDI, falling from US$93 million in 2001 to US$8.5 million in 2002 and, in the textile sectorwhere foreign investment dominated, output fell by 81.1 percent.

26the sale of SOLIMA and of its subsidiaries proved to be a long and arduous process. Thedivision of the assets into lots raised difficult issues of property rights and land tenure,and required the creation of several joint ventures. The complexity of the operation wasexacerbated by the increase in oil prices as GOM and the new owners had to agree on atimetable and a formula to align domestic and world prices. The transaction was deemedcompleted in June 2000, with the sale of the refinery and the oil terminal at Taomasina,thus clearing the way for Credit effectiveness. However, the transactions of the other lots(logistics, distribution, etc.) were concluded much later, the last one in March 2005.6.15 The privatization of TELMA was considerably delayed due to contested propertyrights, litigation over bidding procedures, and the political crisis. The transaction wasfinally closed in June 2004, with DISTACOM, a Hong Kong group, holding 68 percentof the shares (34 percent from the state and 34 percent from France Telecom for a total ofUS$25.2 million). 28 The objective of inviting a second fixed line operator was abandonedat restructuring, although GOM reserved the right to launch a bid to that effect. In airtransport, the regulatory authority was established in 1999, but the privatization of AirMadagascar was abandoned. After a bid was launched in February 1999, the processstalled due to an unsettled claim of the US Exim Bank on the airline’s largest asset, itsBoeing 747. In addition, the events of September 2001 and the crisis led to a sharpdeterioration in the financial situation of the company making its sale unattractive. Thisled GOM to revise its strategy in favor of a management contract with LufthansaConsulting, signed in May 2002 and renewed in May 2004. In this climate, the twinobjective of privatizing airport infrastructure was temporarily abandoned.6.16 To sum up, achievements were mixed and considerably delayed. The number ofissues encountered in the privatization of the large PEs, together with resistance fromsome political quarters and labor unions, absorbed an enormous amount of time andenergy for both GOM and the Bank. By project closing, none of the three majorprivatizations had been completed by the original deadline. Moreover, there were manyshortcomings, such as incomplete adherence to procedures, lack of clarity in the functionsof the PC vs. the secretariat, and lack of expertise in the latter. Finally, IEG notes that theICR is silent on the divestiture of the remaining 43 PEs, an indication of theoverwhelming attention accorded to the three major companies. After December 2002,the privatization program was carried over under PSDP-II. 29Achievements under Improvement in the Business Environment6.17 The project aimed at improving the business environment by targeting promisingsectors and promoting transparency in licensing for the exploitation of natural resources.Three sectors were targeted as initial engines of growth: mining, fisheries, and tourism.28 The state currently holds 22 percent; TELMA’s personnel holds 4 percent; and 6 percent are to be transferred by thestate to the Privatization Trust Fund.29 As of end May 2005, of the 43 remaining PEs, 24 had been sold and 5 liquidated; bidding documents were underpreparation or sent for 4 companies; consultants were being recruited to prepare the bidding documents for 6companies; and bidding was suspended for 2 companies. The Northern Railway Company was operating underconcession and a concession agreement was under preparation for the Southern Railway Company (Source: InternalBank document of August 2005).

25(iv) after the crisis, the new government had launched a series of emergency measures totackle corruption and strengthen public financial management (see para. 6.22 below). 266.11 Upon completing the review, the Credit was restructured and the conditions forthird tranche release revised, with a notable shift in favor of governance and financialmanagement. Some conditions were amended, others deleted, and still others added. Thecore measure relating to air transport was amended from the sale of a majority of sharesin Air Madagascar to the signing of a management contract. The additional measures 2,4, 7 and 8 were modified as discussed below. Annex D lists the changes in detail. On thewhole, the conditions were substantially diluted: not only were they less constraining, butthey essentially confirmed measures taken since the end of the crisis in June/July 2002,thus ratifying a de facto situation. GOM and the <strong>Bank</strong> agreed on a supplement to theoriginal LDP and on amendments to the DCA. The Board approved the restructuring inSeptember 2002 and the tranche was released in October 2002.Achievements under Economic Management6.12 Up to the end of 2001, macro-economic stability was maintained. Growthreached an average of 5.2 percent over 1999-2001 due to the good performance of privateinvestment, in particular of foreign direct investment (FDI) in textiles, petroleum, andmobile telephony, with a large spillover effect on small businesses and employment.There was also a substantial increase in tourism. Inflation remained contained, hoveringjust below 10 percent per year. But tax revenues continued to perform poorly, stagnatingat an average of 10.6 percent of GDP over 1999-01 as a result of tax exemptions, weaktax administration, and widespread fraud in the run-up to the presidential elections of2001. The fiscal deficit rose from an average of 5.6 percent of GDP over 1996-98 to anaverage of 6.3 percent over 1999-01 (Table 1 in Section 4). The crisis led to a dramaticreversal in performance, with GDP falling by 12.7 percent in 2002, and investment from18.5 percent of GDP in 2001 to 14.3 percent. 27 After the crisis, the economy reboundedwith a cumulative growth rate of about 15 percent over 2003-04.Achievements under Privatization and Competitive Regulatory Frameworks6.13 The LDP specified that the state had total or partial ownership of about 136enterprises and that, by June 30, 2000, it would sell its controlling interests in—orproceed with liquidations of—46 of these, i.e., the list of May 1997 plus TELMA.However, SAC-II included specific conditions only for BTM, SOLIMA, TELMA, andAir Madagascar. As a result, and as noted earlier, SAC-II focused on these latter threeand on concluding BTM’s transaction, which was a condition of second tranche release.Divestiture of the other PEs continued to be carried out under the PATESP.6.14 The sale of BTM was completed in November 1999. In the petroleum sector, theregulatory framework and regulatory body became operational in September 1999, but26 During the crisis, corruption had flourished, public resources squandered, and the President’ Special Funds overspentto the tune of US$25 million vs. a budgeted amount of US$400,000.27 The largest drop was in FDI, falling from US$93 million in 2001 to US$8.5 million in 2002 and, in the textile sectorwhere foreign investment dominated, output fell by 81.1 percent.

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