Download Report - Independent Evaluation Group - World Bank

19MONITORING AND EVALUATION AND OTHER ISSUES5.13 The project document contained a matrix of performance indicators percomponent, stated in terms of units (e.g., number of firms, values, percentages, etc.) andsources of measurement by the end of the project (i.e., by PY5). While the nature of theindicators was adequate, the measurement units and the targets by PY5 implied in manycases the existence of data (from the statistical office, reports, surveys, etc.) unlikely to bereadily available. There is insufficient information about whether data were actuallycollected during implementation and, if so, how they were utilized. The ICR limits itselfto record achievements under each component. There were no issues with respect tocompliance with fiduciary safeguards.OUTCOME5.14 Moderately Satisfactory. The project contributed indirectly to the growthperformance of the second half of the 1990s by helping GOM implement - withreasonable success - its PSD and divestiture policies, despite the difficulties encountered.This positive outcome is due to the refocused objectives after restructuring, reducing therisks of dispersion. The fact that the privatization program was not completed does notalter fundamentally this assessment, as the priority given to the large PEs was deliberateto have a demonstration effect of the role of the private sector, as illustrated by the surgein FDI over 1999-01 (Table 1 in Section 4). It remains however that a very large portionof the privatization program was postponed (as of end 2005, it was still not completed).The activities directed at SMEs also contributed to reaching the objective. Unfortunately,this component was not carried over under the successor project (Private SectorDevelopment Project-II (PSDP-II), approved by the Board in August 2001), followingthe decision of the post-crisis government to discontinue the scheme. In sum, thePATESP led to much progress considering the situation from which the reform processstarted, and, without it and the advisory role of the Bank, results under the programwould have been very different. However, as early as 2000-01, it was clear that asuccessor project would be needed to complete the agenda. This proved to be a sounddecision, as the PSDP-II, effective since November 2002, became the main vehicle toconsolidate the still fragile achievements of the PATESP.INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT5.15 Substantial. The project succeeded in strengthening some institutions, not leastby making them operational to carry out their mandate. The main beneficiaries were theTechnical Secretariat of the PC and the regulatory authorities. However, after closing,these were still weak and in need of further support to build their staff and expertise – aserious challenge given the complexity of the tasks involved. Thus, continued supportwas provided under PSDP-II. On the other hand, the project had no impact on the twofunds aimed at disseminating ownership in privatized PEs and it is questionable whetherthey were a priority in the circumstances. Similarly, there was little impact on thePASERP due to its change in mandate that blurred its original objective. In contrast, aserious loss was caused by the decision to dismantle the Private Sector Support Fund.