Download Report - Independent Evaluation Group - World Bank

14Table 4.2: Budget Allocations to Social Sectors, 1995-20021997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002EducationIn % of total expenditures 10.5 12.7 11.8 12.8 12.2 14.0In % of GDP 1.9 2.3 2.5 2.9 2.8 3.4HealthIn % of total expenditures 7.8 6.6 6.7 8.1 7.3 8.0In % of GDP 1.4 1.2 1.4 1.8 1.7 1.9Source: Loi de FinancesMONITORING AND EVALUATION AND OTHER ISSUES4.11 SAC-I did not contain any specific monitoring indicators or milestones to assessprogress after disbursement of the tranche at effectiveness. Progress was monitored byreference to GOM’s commitments under its FY96-99 reform program. There were noissues with respect to fiduciary safeguards.OUTCOME4.12 Moderately Satisfactory. Some objectives were met, others only partially, and stillothers were not. Macro-economic stability was maintained, inflation declinedsubstantially, and prior achievements in exchange rate and trade policies were sustained.The business climate was somewhat improved with better incentives for PSD, but effectiveimplementation left much to be desired. In three important areas, progress was verylimited: (i) the privatization of BTM was considerably delayed; (ii) although the legalmonopolies in telecom, petroleum, and air transport were abolished, no progress wasachieved in privatizing the incumbent companies or in attracting competition, except formobile phone operators; and (iii) expenditures were not redirected to the social sectors.Despite the numerous shortcomings, the rating is justified on the basis that SAC-I was thefirst - and important - step to opening the economy to market forces and to the outsideworld. Changing the climate was a valuable outcome, given the isolation of the countrysince independence.INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT4.13 Modest. Institutional capacity was somewhat strengthened in the areas of tradeand PSD and the public and private sectors entered into a dialogue on incentives forinvestment. However, there was little progress in the management of the public sector,either in the PE divestiture program, where vested interests and opposition remainedstrong, or in the ability to redirect resources to poverty reduction. There was definitelyless GOM’s ownership in those areas with a corresponding lesser interest instrengthening the responsible ministries and entities.